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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an analytic study that aims to examine the intricacies of Libya's AML 
framework, focusing largely on the Combat Money Laundering Act (2005) and the 
mechanisms used in Libya to curb money laundering operations specifically the illegal 
selling of oil. The United Kingdom was selected as a model on which this study was 
based; because of the United Kingdom UK’s importance as a financial centre. 
This thesis presents and clarifies the concept of money laundering as a way to legitimise 
illegal proceeds; it also explores what steps the government of Libya is taking to control 
money laundering in Libya through the Combat Money Laundering Act (2005) and to find 
out whether these steps are successful or not. 
The analysis highlights the differences in money laundering regulations in the UK and 
Libya,  and point out the more efficient and effective results in various regions, providing 
unique details that can serve as a basis for ongoing research and development. Some of 
the important literature relating to anti- money laundering efforts, both nationally and 
internationally will be reviewed to reveal key theories and concepts. Research questions 
and research aims and objectives will be addressed and an overview of the research 
methods used in studies of UK anti-money laundering will be examined. 
In modern times, money laundering has been using increasingly sophisticated means 
and technology, and is a global problem. Anti-laundering efforts have been initiated as 
an attempt to combat this crime, but have been largely unsuccessful, even acting as a 
deterrent to some legitimate transactions in some cases. So, this study will attempt to 
analyse and explain central aspects of the UK regulations related to money laundering, 
and the provisions contained in Libyan domestic statutes to find out if these is any gap 
need to be filled. 
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                                   Chapter One Introduction  
1.1- General Introduction: 
Since the early 1950s, Libya has attempted to prevent money laundering (ML) crimes by 
issuing many different regulations related to financial crimes. However, due to rapid 
global developments in technology, these regulations against financial crimes were 
becoming powerless to prevent ML crimes. Thus, in line with international attempts to 
curb ML offences, Libya issued the Combat Money Laundering Act (CMLA)in 2005. With 
one of the world’s largest oil reserves, Libya is the third largest oil producer in Africa, after 
Angola and Nigeria1; and, like many other oil-producing countries is potentially very 
prosperous. However, according to Taguri and Nasef, Libya has a weak infrastructure in 
health care and was ranked 87th from 191 countries by the World Health Organisation in 
20002. The author believe that this was due to corruption, ML and civil war over recent 
years. 
1.2-Rationale 
ML has become a concrete phenomenon that threatens most countries’ economies alike, 
especially the major industrialized countries. The ML crime plays a basic role in benefiting 
drug traffickers, corrupt individuals, financial criminals, and others who wish to hide 
wealth gained from illegal activities. Despite national and international efforts to combat 
ML, this type of crime has grown to become a global phenomenon; according to Sariguit 
is estimated to be approximately two to five percent of World GDP3. 
Squalli has noted that Libya is a major producer of petroleum, with oil extracted and 
refined in Libya; and that the country’s economy depends largely on the sale of this oil4. 
Libya’s oil revenues, for example, constitute 95% of the nation’s exports. In this context, 
crime manifests itself in many different ways; one of which appears in the form of oil 
smuggling, which is one of ML means. ML clearly is a crime that poses a threat to the 
stability of the international financial and economic system.  
                                                          
1 Hagger, N. (2009) The Libyan Revolution: Its Origins and Legacy : a Memoir and Assessment John HuntUK (p.136). 
2 Taguri,A and Nasef,A. (2008) The French Health Care System; what can We Learn? Libyan Journal of Medicine Vol.3, 
No 4 pp 186–191 (p.186). 
3Sarigul,H. (2013) Money laundering and Abuse of the Financial System.International Journal of Business and 
Management Studies 1 Vol.2, No 1 pp 287–301. 
4 Squalli,J. (2007) Electricity consumption and economic growth: Bounds and causality analyses of OPEC members 
Energy Economics Vol.29, No 6 pp 1192–1205. (p.1195). 
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This has led to the holding of seminars and conferences in most countries across the 
world including Libya to discuss how to limit the effects of these operations, such as the 
meeting of the IMF in consultation with Libya5 and the issuance of the CMLA in 2005.Libya 
was governed with the absence of a constitution, during the Gaddafi's regime. This 
regime was characterised by the non-existence of democratic institutions and the 
absence of the rule of law provisions. However, the revolution in 2011 changed to armed 
conflict, which continued for approximately eight months, and resulted in the fall of 
Gaddafi's regime6. This also led to the collapse of both state institutions and the rule of 
law. Although there has been an attempt to change the Libyan regime to a democratic 
one, the result has been violence; and many difficulties face the elected institutions when 
they try to instigate reforms. All this has contributed to an increase in oil smuggling, and 
associated ML crime7. 
This crime has also begun to be something concrete in the Libyan economy in the past 
few decades. The smuggling of oil from Libya’s militia-controlled oil facilities is one form 
of ML, and it is still occurring; for example, smuggling oil derivatives, through the borders 
with neighbouring countries has increased, as this study will explain. Thus, Libya has 
participated in establishing procedures and precautions to avoid ML and its 
consequences, but, as this study will argue, there is more to do. This crime has resulted 
in the negative effects of ML crime for the Libyan people and the disastrous costs of this 
kind of offending for Libyan financial institutions. Libya has more crude oil reserves than 
any other country in Africa and should have one of the strongest economies; however, in 
2016 Libya's budget revenues were estimated at $5.8bn, with expenditures of $13.7bn8. 
Oil smuggling in Libya has thus cost the state coffers more than half a billion dinars that 
is approximately $360m9. The smugglers use small boats and tankers containing up to 
                                                          
5See Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV Consultation, Prepared by representatives of IMF a consultation 2005 with 
Libya. Available at: file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/cr06136a%20(1).pdf Accessed in 20/6/2017. 
6 Vira, V, et al. (2011) The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory: Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(2011p.62). Available at: 
https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/110620_libya.pdf  [Accessed in 8 
September 2017]. 
7 See the Monthly Report Libyan Organization for Policies and Strategies. The economic case in Libya March (2017 
p.10) Available at: http://loopsresearch.org/media/images/photo561znlw9va.pdf (Accessed in 15/6/2017). 
8 Mannocchi, F. How Libya's oil smugglers are bleeding country of cash 2017 Available at: 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/how-libyas-oil-smugglers-are-bleeding-country-cash-592024472 (Accessed in 
15/06/2017). 
9 Ibid. 
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40,000 litres of oil derivatives and carry them to Malta, and also Sicily, where it is sold 
before reaching Italy10. As a result of these illegal actions, the Libyan economy is exposed 
to the risk of collapse; the Libyan dinar exchange rate fell against foreign currencies, 
leading to continued shortages of basic commodities, higher prices and high Libyan 
inflation rates; and the banks are unable to meet their obligations to customers due to 
lack of liquidity.11The link between ML and corruption is very strong and both often 
happen together; thus money-laundering is not a single act, but a complex process 
achieved in a variety of ways and involving a variety of financial institutions12. Sources of 
dirty funds widely attributed drug trade and smuggling, and in Libya’s case it is oil 
smuggling. ML is used by those engaged in oil smuggling as a way to hide the origins of 
their illegal proceeds; it allows criminals to enjoy their corrupt earnings without fear of 
revealing the original source of the funds. These smugglers launder their illegal earnings 
by buying property or setting up fake companies. 
Even though Anti – Money Laundering (AML) legislation was enacted in Libya in 2005, the 
crime of ML has been increasing. For example, according to the Libya Oil Almanac, during 
Gaddafi’s regime, his loyalists often sought to extract millions of dollars from contracts 
with international companies operating in the Libyan market13.Additionally, the collapse 
of state institutions and armed militia on the sources of the Libyan oil and the weakness 
of observation on the borders points has assisted in increasing this crime; as this study, 
will go on to argue. 
1.2.1-Definition of Money Laundering 
Alldridge considered that ML is an old crime, but the world has focused on it particularly 
after the events of 9/1114. ML may be defined in a number of ways. Seymour stated that 
it “is a process conducted through the use of financial transactions to disguise the origins 
of large sums of money”15. According to Ryder “ML is the illegal process or act by which 
                                                          
10Ibid. 
11See the Monthly Report Libyan Organization for Policies and Strategies. the economic case in Libya March (2017 
p.10). Available at: http://loopsresearch.org/media/images/photo561znlw9va.pdf (Accessed in 15/6/2017). 
12Chaikin, D ibid. (2008 p.274). 
13 Libya Oil Almanac an Open Oil Reference Guide (2012 p.27). Available at: http://openoil.net/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Libya-PDF-v-2.0.pdf (Accessed in 15/2/2014). 
14 Alldridge, P. (2003) Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering and Taxation 
of the Proceeds of Crime, Oxford, Hart, UK (p.87). 
15 Seymour, B. (2008) Global Money Laundering Journal of Applied Security Research UK, Vol.4, No 3 pp 373-387 (p.374). 
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individuals or groups attempt to disguise, hide or distance themselves from their illegal 
activities”16. Unger and Busuioc, added that ML is “the process of disguising the unlawful 
source of criminally derived proceeds to make them appear legal”17. Indeed, there are 
many definitions for ML, which have focused on the aspect of hiding or disguising the 
illegal source of proceeds. However, the majority of countries have applied the definition 
adopted by the UN Convention, which identifies “the conversion or transfer of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from any [drug trafficking] offence or offences or 
from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the 
commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his 
actions”18. The Vienna Convention definition has identified some characteristics which 
are definitive of the crime of ML; first is the conversion or moving of funds to a place 
where they are less likely to attract attention; second is the concealment or disguising of 
the true origin of property, the third is the acquisition, possession or use of property, 
knowing that the money came from illegal activity, further it is easy to note that this 
definition has also added an important point which is participation in committing this 
crime that involves attempting to commit, assisting, inciting, facilitating and counselling19. 
In fact, some criminal activities are based on cash, so many launderers use cash, 
smuggling across national borders, because they can hide their illegal proceeds, and it is 
difficult to be detected by law enforcement officials and banking20. As a result, most 
countries encourage businesses and the community to avoid using cash in their 
transactions in the financial system, especially when the transaction is related to paying 
for expensive items, like real estate, vehicles or luxury items. As a result, they will be 
deterred from repeating this offence at a later time. Indeed, ML is simply turning illegal 
money into legal money by hiding its illegitimate origin. This allows the criminal to enjoy 
this illegal money and use it in other crimes, such as drug trafficking and corruption, and 
may also be the beginning of further serious offences, such as financing terrorism or may 
                                                          
16 Ryder, N. (2012) Money Laundering-An Endless Cycle? USA and Canada: Routledge World-check, USA and Canada 
(p.1). 
17Unger, B and Busuioc, E. (2007) The scale and impacts of money laundering. Indiana University Edward Elgar (p.15). 
18 See Article 3.1.b. I of the United Nation Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See GOPAC, Anti-Money Laundering Action Guide for Parliamentarians (2012, p.5). 
14 
 
just insulate the criminal from the criminal underworld to enable him or her to appear as 
a wealthy and wholly legitimate individual. The definition of ML in the Vienna Convention 
is too limited, because it identifies ML in the context of the proceeds that come from drug 
trafficking. As a result, this definition does not include crimes, which are not related to 
the illegal drugs trade, such as corruption, tax evasion and fraud. However, Schott has 
suggested that the international community has decided to expand the definition to 
include other serious crimes21. As will be argued later, in 2000, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime expanded the definition of ML and started to include the 
proceeds of all serious crimes, such as participation in organised criminal groups and 
corruption. 
Generally, ML, according to the definitions above, is a crime without a direct victim, which 
has been emphasised by Alexander22, because it is just the transfer of money, and nobody 
is directly affected by it. Moreover, ML can also be considered as beneficial to the national 
economy, because it helps bring money into the country and leads to increased profits for 
the financial sector, and also the greater availability of credit. In that case, why should it 
be combated? The reason is that it indirectly affects people, making many people rich at 
great cost to others; it also affects the national and international economy, as these illegal 
actions create social harms and divert money away from economies and legal business 
activities. ML is a serious crime that affects the growth of economy as a whole, as will be 
suggested later in this chapter. Also, note its links with organised crime which stifles due 
process, democracy and the rule of law. 
 
1.2.2-The Definition of Money Laundering Crime by the Vienna 
Convention (1988), 
Even though the term ‘ML’ was coined in the 1920s, the basis of the international 
criminalization of this crime was the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
and Psychotropic Drugs (1988). Most international and national regulations have adopted 
the approach of this Convention to combat the endemic nature of ML. The Vienna 
Convention defined ML as ''the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from specifically a drugs offence or offences or from an act of 
                                                          
21 Schott, P. (2006) Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism the World 
Bank, Washington (p. I-3). 
22 Alexander, R. (2007). Insider dealing and money laundering in the EU: law and regulation. Aldershot: Ashgate.  (p.2). 
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participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission 
of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions”23. 
Additionally, Article 3 of the Vienna Convention has identified the relationship between 
ML and primary crime in that the source of ML is identified as crime related to the 
production, preparation, trade, export or the cultivation of narcotics such as the opium 
poppy.  Furthermore, the definition of ‘illegal gains’ was expanded to include both direct 
and indirect proceeds through the commission of an offence24. The direct proceeds come 
from activities such as drug trafficking and the indirect proceeds refer to using illegal 
proceeds in other legal activities. Thus, transferring or changing the money to other 
assets or real estate will not makes them legal assets, and thus allows for the freezing and 
confiscation of such assets.  
The term ‘direct or indirect' raised some controversy during the preparation of the draft 
of the Vienna Convention between the participating countries which can be summarized 
as follows: Firstly, some countries (Austria, Barbados, Japan, Turkey, Canada and France) 
believed that ‘the proceeds’ referred to in the text should be limited to just those from 
direct drug proceeds as the term 'direct or indirect' in the context is unclear, thus it could 
be difficult for some countries to involve this term in internal regulation. Moreover, it 
could be difficult for judicial bodies to take action like issuing a judgment for confiscation 
of assets against the indirect illegal proceeds because of difficulties of proving links to the 
original drug offence25. Similarly, the OECD/The World Bank agreed that there was a 
difficulty in identifying illegal proceeds as well as for courts in different countries, which 
had to precisely determine what might constitute the ‘fruits of licit activities financed by 
illicit proceeds’26. In such cases, it is important to know the World Bank's ideas about the 
draft international agreement related to anti-ML because of its important role in the 
interpretation or application of the Convention. Zapata has considered that ''the role of 
the Bank has not merely been that of a contributor among others, but rather that of the 
                                                          
23 Article 3.1.b. of Vienna Convention, 1988. 
24Article 3.1.b. of Vienna Convention, 1988. 
25 Tahar, M. (2004) Legislative confrontation of the phenomena of laundering money that are the proceeds of drug 
crimes, PhD thesis, Cairo, the University of Cairo, Egypt (p.105). 
26 OECD/The World Bank. Identification and Quantification of the Proceeds of Bribery (2012 p.18). Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/50057547.pdf [Accessed in 8 July 2015]. 
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driving force behind the agreement''27.Secondly, other countries (Colombia, Australia, 
Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Norway and 
Iran) supported the term 'direct or indirect' as they believed that keeping this term in the 
definition has some advantages. Those who wanted to keep this term believed that it 
strengthened the measures which restrict the drug trade and also controlled the transfer 
of all proceeds, including indirect proceeds28. 
It is argued here that the text should include the term 'direct or indirect' to ensure that 
the legislation covers all the proceeds that are derived from illegal actions, even if these 
proceeds came from investment of the proceeds of the drug trafficking, corruption or 
other crimes. This is to prevent criminals investing any illegal proceeds and also to deprive 
them of the benefits of its revenue. The term 'direct or indirect' was chosen by the 
member countries to be in the text of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, which covers 
all illegal proceeds. 
This kind of crime might be committed by a person who may well have had no 
involvement in the drug trafficking or other predicate offenses, but who is aware of the 
source of the money or property and who assists serious criminals to conceal or disguise 
the cash money or other proceeds derived from their crimes29. 
1.2.3-The Estimated Amount of Money Laundering, 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the worldwide volume of ML over 
the period of 2000-2005 was somewhere between 2 and 5 percent of the world’s Gross 
Domestic Product30. Unfortunately, the IMF’s documents do not clarify the methodology 
which they used to arrive at these figures. However, if we believe that they are accurate, 
it then shows that ML varies between $590 billion to $ 1.5 trillion per year. The lower 
figure is nearly equal to the total yield of the Spanish economy. 
In summary, ML is a crime based on other crimes, one of which is corruption. ML has a 
                                                          
27 Zapata, R. (2006) Interpretation under the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties - 25 Years on London, at 
Lincoln’s Inn (p. 10). 
28 Tahar, M ibid (2004 p.106). 
29 Booth, R. et al. (2011) Money laundering law and regulation a practical guide. Oxford University Press (P.20). 
30 United Nations. Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized 
crimes. Research Report United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna (2011) Available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf [Accessed in 10 
May 2014]. 
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negative result on the people of the countries where these crimes have taken place; for 
example, through the increase in crime, poverty and political instability.   
Khamissi noted that, as a result of corruption, the Libyan's economy is suffering from a 
lack of liquidity and the deficit in the state budget and balance of payments is 
unprecedented. There is also a high foreign exchange rate in the parallel market and 
inflation in the general level of prices, the smuggling of fuel and goods and breaks in the 
power supply (electricity and fuel) in addition to the deterioration of the health services. 
Libya's foreign exchange reserves fell to $35 billion in 2016, an average of 66%, compared 
to the year before. Similarly, there is a negative effect on the Libyan economy due to 
certain trading companies involved in corruption arranging trade deals which allowed 
them to obtain money for nothing31; by manipulating credit and the supply chains of 
subsidised products. 
Also, the militia which controls the oil facilities were built up by corrupt money and the 
political standoff. Weak security conditions have taken a severe toll on the economy; and 
militia blockades of oil infrastructures and resulting decline in oil exports continue to 
constrain the supply side of the economy, which has shrunk, in addition to falling budget 
revenues from the hydrocarbon sector. All these events have had negative effects on the 
adequate public provision of health, education, sanitation services, water and electricity 
in the whole country32. 
In the USA, the criminal proceeds of drug trafficking and organised crimes amounted to 
2.0% of global GDP, without tax evasion33. However, the United Kingdom authorities have 
estimated that the volume of money laundered was £25 billion each year in the UK34. 
However, Aluko and Bagheri have estimated the amount of funds exported per year to 
the US from Nigeria between mid-1980s and 1999, through the international financial 
systems, including the proceeds from drug trafficking and financial crimes to be $100 
billion35. In fact, ML has been classified as the third largest business in the world after 
                                                          
31 Khamissi, A. The involvement of 230 Libyan companies with corruption, Arab New 2017, Available at: 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2017/1/26/ (Accessed in 9/2/2017). 
32 See the Monthly Report Libyan Organization for Policies and Strategies. The economic case in Libya, March. Ibid 
(2017 p.10). 
33United Nations Ibid (p.20). 
34 See GOPAC Ibid (p.11). 
35Aluko, A and Bagheri, M. (2012) The impact of money laundering on economic and financial stability and on political 
development in developing countries: The case of Nigeria, Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol. 15, No. 4, pp 
442 – 457 (p.27). 
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foreign exchange and oil, with yearly proceeds ranging from $500 billion to $1 trillion36, 
and the global money-laundering total of S 2.85 bn per year, is heavily concentrated in 
Europe and North America37. Whatever the size of the discrepancy between the previous 
figures, they reveal the extent of the crime, and the seriousness of cross-border crime, 
including ML, especially on a global level. 
Apart from the social harms caused by drugs, there is a growing realization of the money 
being produced by it. Vanduyneet al have asserted that “sales [of drugs] amount to 
approximately $122 billion per year in the US and Europe, of which 50–70% or as much 
as $85 billion per year could be available for laundering and investment”38. In the 1980s, 
the globalisation of financial markets benefited both legal and illegal trade, so 
globalisation involves the international integration of capital, technology, and information 
in a manner resulting in a single global market and, to some degree, a global village. This 
integration enables individuals and corporations to reach around the world farther, faster, 
deeper, and more cheaply than ever before. 
1.3- The link between illegal oil selling and ML 
Thus, the link between illegal oil selling and ML is that the illegal proceeds that come from 
smuggling oil are used for individual gain, like buying luxury real estate, or the funds are 
smuggled overseas or used for terrorism39. As a result, dysfunctional infrastructures and 
health systems sit side by side with considerable oil wealth. ML is among the problems 
that beset the economies of countries, especially developing countries, the phenomenon 
is considered as a form of economic crime, and has been defined by Ryder as follows: as 
its illegal activity which is due to the illegal activities of money launderers40.  
1.3.1-The reason for choosing the UK, 
In the light of the evident failure of Libya’s AML legislation and policies, this research has 
been undertaken with the aim of evaluating the potential of the UK’s AML legislation and 
approach to provide some guidance. Notwithstanding the very great differences between 
the social and political context of the two countries, the UK has been chosen for this study 
                                                          
36Wright, A. (2006) Organised Crime. Cullumpton: Willan Publishing UK (p.69). 
37Walker, J. (1999) How Big is Global Money Laundering? Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol. 3 No. (1), 25-37. 
(p.25). 
38 Vanduyne, P. et al. (2005) Balancing ﬁnancial threats and legal interests in money-laundering policy. Crime, Law & 
Social Change Vol 43, No 2–3, pp 117–147 (p.122). 
39Viott, P. (2010) American Foreign Policy: Polity Press Gambirdge UK (p.146). 
40 Ryder, N. ibid (2012 p.1). 
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because it suffers from this type of crime as ''the size and complexity of the financial 
sector and free movement of capital within the European Union makes London a prime 
target for ML''41; and Costello notes that “Britain is still the money-laundering capital of 
the world”42. Another reason for using the UK as the country of study is that it operates 
fully in line with the standards created by international conventions such as the EU 
Directive and bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force(FATF), which are critical 
components of the global AML framework because they constitute a framework of rules, 
principles, procedures, norms and regulatory guidelines for states to adopt in their laws 
against ML and its predicate crimes, as this study will explain later. Additionally, this thesis 
posits that the regulatory regime in Libya is not effective in curbing this crime because 
regulations tend to be incompatible with the legislation that is used by developed 
countries such as the UK. Whereas, this study is not using a full-scale comparative, 
because of the profound differences between conditions in the UK and Libya. This is a 
partial comparison for the specific purpose of identifying best practice and investigating 
its relevance for Libya. The thematic focus of the thesis has thus been to explore the gaps 
in the current Libyan legislation and mechanisms and address the AML framework and its 
ability to prevent this crime; and to see how UK AML Acts could be adapted to fill these 
gaps. 
The Libyan system, and the AML framework specifically, are based on obtaining the 
requisite information about suspected ML operations, and this depends on Libya’s 
capacity to generate and harness this information. Libya suffers from an inadequate 
capacity to provide and process the required information on ML operations; for example, 
it is difficult to transfer information about suspected ML operations, due to there being 
no obligation on competent financial institutions to provide the details on suspicious 
operations within a short time, as this study will explain later. The provision of this 
information is a prerequisite for the Financial Information Unit FIU to function effectively. 
However, the international AML principles, such as ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC), are 
difficult to apply in Libya, given that implementing them depends on the availability of 
                                                          
41Leong, A. (2007) The Disruption of international Organised Crime an Analysis of Legal and Non-Legal Strategies 
Ashgate Hampshire, UK. (p.41). 
42 Costello, T. London is the ‘global capital of money-laundering’ comments 2012 Available at: The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism website https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/08/09/london-is-the-global-capital-
of-money-laundering/ (Accessed in 28/1/2016). 
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the requisite information on bank clients. This is often inadequate due to either 
deficiencies in centralized data registries to generate data about the magnitude or type 
of crime, or because the data generated is too patchy to inform and enable the adoption 
of normative policy choices. 
ML is among the most significant problems that affect the economies of developed and 
developing countries alike, and is a form of economic crime that is rampant at the present 
time. It is also a crime related to the financial institutions, especially banks, as they 
provide the channels through which operations suspected of being money-laundering 
may be conducted. This study attempts to understand ML and its economic 
consequences, to address and contest the view of those who suggest that it may be 
beneficial to the economy and to show that it is one of the most serious problems to 
beset a country such as Libya. 
In addition to understanding the reality of ML, this thesis examines control measures and 
the effects of the crime, and specifically aims to evaluate the extent of the effectiveness 
of the Libyan AML Act and mechanisms used in Libya to curb this increasing crime. The 
research has also focused on assessing the potential for UK AML legislation to be applied 
in Libya.  
It is the contention of this study that oil smuggling and the laundering of its illegal 
proceeds weaken the national economy, not least by investing that money abroad. 
Furthermore, Libyan industrial projects are disrupted as they lack the funds to provide 
essential spare parts, resulting in the loss of much needed energy production. This 
weakening of national industries is compounded by the instability of the exchange rate 
for the local currency as compared to more stable foreign exchange rates, poor income 
distribution and the introduction of inferior goods into the domestic market. This leads 
to negative economic effects on the country as well these illegal funds being used to 
destabilize the country's political stability by supporting armed groups which commit 
crimes of kidnapping, murder and smuggling, as is happening in Libya now43.  
In the same way, according to Shaw and Mangan, many Libyan businessmen became rich 
after the revolution by smuggling subsidized Libyan oil through Libyan ports to Malta and 
                                                          
43 See the Monthly Report Libyan Organization for Policies and Strategies Ibid (2017). 
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Europe44. Vira, Cordesman and Arleigh add that in Libya the revolution of 2011 changed 
to armed conflict, which continued for approximately eight months, and ended with the 
fall of Gaddafi’sregime45; and that this led to the collapse of state institutions and 
regulations, which contributed to increased oil smuggling. Recently, there have been 
attempts to smuggle oil from Libya’s military-controlled oil facilities, which led the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to issue a resolution allowing UNSC member states to 
inspect ships suspected of carrying illegal crude oil from Libya in international waters. 
Moreover, the UNSC has imposed sanctions against illegal crude exports.  
These types of crimes need national and international cooperation to curb them. The 
underlying reason for such crimes apparently being weak regulations or the unsuccessful 
mechanisms used against ML. 
1.4- Research Questions 
This study will address the question: How can ML be reduced in Libya due to illegal sale 
of oil through looking at attempts to combat ML in the UK? 
Before answering this question, other related questions need to be addressed in order to 
establish a framework for the research, namely: 
1- How does ML take place internationally and in Libya, and how can it be prevented? 
2-What is the impact of international law and agreements on anti-ML in Libya? 
3- What are current Libyan regulations, relating to ML, and does a new mechanism need 
to be designed to stop ML that is taking place due to illegal sale of oil? 
4-What legal mechanisms used in the United Kingdom are successful in stopping ML? 
5- What role could the Libyan Financial Information Unit FIU and banks play in AML? and 
they need to change their structure and approach in line with related UK regulation? 
1.5- Research Objectives 
The aim of this research is to determine whether the Libyan legal regime is sufficient to 
combat ML, particularly in relation to illegal sales of oil. In addition, this work will explore 
                                                          
44 Shaw, M. & Mangan, F. (2014) Illicit trafficking and Libya’s transition: profits and losses. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace (p.27). 
45 Vira,V et al.. Ibid (2011, p.62). 
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whether anti-ML mechanisms used so far elsewhere, particularly in the UK, have been 
successful, and whether such mechanisms could be adopted in Libya. Furthermore, the 
study aims to: 
1- Provide a good basis to understand weak control mechanisms, and show how the 
Financial Services Authorities and banking structures are struggling to cope with illegal 
money, in particular those related to the illegal selling of Libyan oil. 
2- Assess which aspects of UK regulations may be adopted by the Libyan legal system. 
3- Present recommendations to the new Libyan authorities concerning legal strategies 
and procedures that could be useful in AML. 
1.6-Literature Review: 
1.6.1-Background on ML. 
In recent decades, hundreds of studies have been published describing and examining 
the impact of ML. To date, I have not found any studies dealing with AML in relation to 
the illegal sale of oil; also, there are no studies that deal specifically with a comparison of 
AML procedures in Libya with those of the West.  In contrast, there are some general 
studies, which have been published, that address the definitions of ML, national and 
international rules for combating ML, and its relationship with terrorist financing and 
which describe and examine the impact of ML. This work will review some of these 
studies below. 
These studies are largely descriptive and I have had problems finding sufficient academic 
sources that offer any kind of analysis; thus, my study aims to complete the gaps in 
knowledge on this specific topic as well as contributing to the literature which analyses 
Libyan procedures. 
1.6.2-The relationship between ML and terrorist financing 
The book "Dirty Dealing" by leading expert, Peter Lilley (2006) provides a background to 
ML, and mentions that its origins date back to the 1920s. Methods for laundering money 
have evolved constantly, and launderers increasingly use electronic means as the 
financial world moved into cyberspace, significantly amplifying and complicating the 
problem. Today, criminals use all manner of physical and virtual enterprises, and all types 
of financial transactions to process their money. Lilley (2000) defines ML, and its effect 
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on the national and international economy, estimating that it is as high as $2 trillion per 
year, based on United Nations (UN)and International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics46. 
The book exposes the huge scale and scope of global ML, and its infiltration of the world's 
legitimate business structures.  
Lilley (2000) describes the three basic stages of ML as well as its other sources, such as 
drugs, trafficking, and corruption; although he omits to include illegal oil sales. He also 
focuses on terrorist financing, devoting a full section to this point, and explains the 
relationship between ML and terrorist financing. He reveals how the money is obtained, 
and the process of ML. Importantly, he explains the system that can be used by 
organisations to stop ML, mentioning some AML rules from international conventions 
and the FATF. 
Chatain et al (2009) also give a background to ML and terrorist financing and their impact 
on the national and international economy; and describe the measures against ML and 
terrorist financing. They raise the serious point about the relationship between terrorist 
financing and ML, saying that both impact the economy and may undermine banking 
institutions. The prevalence of this crime in a country leads businesses to take their 
business elsewhere in the world. The authors mention some sources of ML, like drug 
trafficking, arms smuggling and corruption. The book also elaborates another important 
point, devoting a chapter to risk management in combating ML and terrorist financing, 
and provides an overview of risk related to ML, terrorist financing and related compliance 
issues. The authors suggest that banks should focus on these factors to combat ML and 
understand the main types of criminal activity likely to create proceeds that could be the 
subject of ML. The work explores the data raised from the risk categories, and makes 
some conclusions about the role played by weak banking systems. 
Schott (2006) explores definitions of ML, the ways used to launder money and makes 
recommendations on combating ML. He points out that the Vienna Convention definition 
limits ML to the proceeds of drug trafficking; however, the international community, 
through the FATF and other international instruments, has expanded the Vienna 
Convention definition to include other serious crimes. Currently, increasingly 
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sophisticated methods have been used worldwide to move illegal money through 
financial systems. Schott also considers the problems caused by the crime of ML; and 
concludes that countries have to cooperate in taking specific action against these 
offences according to international recommendations established by FATF, and the other 
international standard setters, where each element is essential to a comprehensive and 
effective regime. The role of international organisations, such as the World Bank and IMF, 
are explored in the process, as is the coordination of technical assistance available to 
countries in order to help them. In his investigation of the link between ML and terrorist 
financing, the author found they use the same techniques to conceal their sources of 
financing. In his study, however, Schott concentrates only on the role of the international 
anti-ML standard adopted before 2006, which means it doesn’t include the current 
international standard; also, he does not consider elements relevant to Libya, such as 
illegal oil selling. This means that the study is limited when it comes to providing an 
analysis of how to control and detect suspicious operations in Libya in cases of oil 
smuggling, and thus offers no real critical analysis. 
1.6.3-Financial Crimes and Globalization 
Bjeloper and Finklea (2012) focus on the current means used to commit financial crimes 
which are related to technological development; and how these crimes have increased 
worldwide, and have been facilitated by globalization, which allows easy global 
movement of money. These means are exploited by criminals to launder illicit proceeds, 
and used in the stages of ML. In the United States, organised criminals have included 
technological means in the criminal process through use of the Internet. This study is 
however limited to organised crime and technological developments in the USA and more 
exploration is needed to see how technological issues relate to ML in Libya and the 
measures that need to be taken to combat it.  
Vaithilingam and Nair (2007) present five factors that have had an impact on the 
pervasiveness of ML in developing countries; such as technology, the quality of human 
capital, efficient legal framework, behaviour and finally, innovation. Technology: This has 
become very important nowadays, and it plays an important role against ML crime. 
Vaithilingam and Nair (2007) suggest that the inadequacy of ICT infrastructure has 
resulted in pervasive ML in developing countries. However, on this point, the study can 
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argue that developed countries are still suffering from the crime, although they are 
already more advanced in ICT infrastructure; as the study, will explain later when 
comparing developed and developing countries. 
The high quality of human capital appears to have a positive effect in curbing the 
pervasiveness of ML. That means the fight against ML is affected negatively in developing 
countries, such as Libya, by the low level of quality human capital, as this study will later 
explain. In the same way, Vaithilingam and Nair have added that an efficient legal 
framework and good ethical behaviour of companies have a significant effect on the 
pervasiveness of ML. Although the latter two points are arguably the case, the same 
cannot be said for the ‘high quality of human capital’ as it takes clever and skilled people 
to commit ML crimes as even countries where there is an effective legal framework still 
suffer from it. 
This notwithstanding, it could be concluded that these are very significant factors in 
curbing ML, which could be used by some countries, like Libya, as a guide to fighting this 
crime. Libya arguably needs to develop its regulations and staff employed in the field and 
build its technological infrastructure. 
In ‘West Africa under Attack’47 Philip de Andrés defines ML and its effect on the national 
and international economy; he also presents a theory on the new threats to the world 
security and focuses on drug trafficking and organized crime such as Illegal trade in ivory 
and rough diamonds and illicit arms trade in West and Central Africa, although he omits 
to include illegal oil sales. However, he mentions that there is no effective cross-border 
control, which makes it easier for illegal activities to occur; and concludes that this needs 
significant concentration. He adds that the political instability seen in Ghana in 1966 was 
the main reason for this bad situation. Philip de Andrés believes that collaboration by 
these gangs along the borders, and lack a control in this area contributed to the 
pervasiveness of this crime, and that the role of the international community in policing 
borders was crucial in combating ML as well as the need to strengthen the efficiency of 
the legal framework in the bordering countries. 
                                                          
47De Andrés A. P. (2008) West Africa under Attack: Drug, organized crime and Terrorism as the New Treats to Global 
Security: UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 16. Available at:  
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In conclusion, this argument is convincing as this situation is similar to the Libyan case. 
Libya also needs to focus more on strengthening the efficiency of the legal framework in 
this area; and this includes regulating the observation of the movement of travellers and 
goods as well as the necessity for international cooperation against this crime. 
In this case, however, in the fight against money laundering, an adjudicative jurisdiction 
problem that is related to state sovereignty has arisen. This is particularly so in applying 
the rules of the anti-money laundering such as the confiscation and of the criminalization 
of money laundering, which needs a global response due to the international nature of 
the money laundering phenomenon. For this reason, Stessens has considered that a state 
can never have enforcement jurisdiction if it does not have prescriptive jurisdiction 
regarding the facts at hand: prescriptive jurisdiction is a necessary but not sufficient 
requirement for enforcement jurisdiction48. 
1.7. Theoretical Framework 
In this thesis, the transitional justice theory will be applied. Transitional justice, as defined 
by the UN is the "full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation"49. Moreover, the Guidance Note 
of the Secretary-General (2010) adds that transitional justice processes and mechanisms 
are a critical component of the UN framework for strengthening the rule of law50. 
Transitional justice depends on both judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms. 
It involves institutional reform, and includes civil rights, i.e. political, economic, social and 
cultural rights. According to Villalba, the system of transitional justice works to address 
violations, which occurred under the old regime using legitimate means51. This theory will 
mainly be applied to guarantee that Libyan regulations incorporate international human 
rights law, and that law reform takes place to bring them into conformity with Libya's 
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obligations under international law, including the ML confiscation system52; through the 
adoption of the Constitution, law enforcement, and punishment of the criminals of the 
previous regime. 
This means that solutions for the issues in the countries that moved from authoritarian 
regimes towards democracy should be identified, in two ways; firstly, institutional reform 
and secondly, a confiscation system. For example, Libya was under the Gaddafi regime 
for approximately 42 years53; it then witnessed a revolution, which changed to a war to 
move to a democratic regime. Under the authoritarian regime and during the war, there 
were violations of economic, social and cultural, as well as human rights. For example, 
the Libya Herald published on 4/5/2012 that it was estimated that in the 10 years before 
Gaddafi was overthrown, $150 billion of Libyan oil money went missing and still remains 
to be accounted for54. So, in this case, it is necessary to implement transitional justice 
and, as Nkansah considers, this involves ''compensating victims for their losses; punishing 
wrongdoers and forcing individuals to surrender property that was wrongfully acquired; 
and revealing the truth about past events''55 This could be used to cement commitment 
to property rights, democratic institutions, and establishing constitutional precedents 
that may deter future leaders from repeating the abuses of the old regime. According to 
Posner and Vermeule, transitional justice provides “a method for the public to recapture 
lost traditions and institutions; depriving former officials of political and economic 
influence that they could use to frustrate reform; signalling a commitment to property 
rights, the market, and democratic institutions; and establishing constitutional 
precedents that may deter future leaders from repeating the abuses of the old regime”56, 
to reform institutions and laws and also prevent organised crime, ML, corruption, and the 
illegal use of public office for private gain. 
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The transitional justice perspective will mainly be applied to studying and analysing issues 
relating to international financial crimes committed during the Libyan revolution and the 
2011 war. This is because the present political structure of the country is not very 
supportive of implementing a new legal framework. Indeed, the country is still in the post-
civil war period, i.e. in the process of transition, where political powers are being handed 
over to an elected council that will design the new legal framework to pave the way for 
democratic national elections57. This research will help in designing the new ML 
confiscation framework, incorporating the existing mechanism, and leading to finding 
new concepts that include revolutionary principles. A detailed analysis of these elements 
gives an idea as to how the Financial Services Authorities need to move forward. 
1.8-Methodology 
A comparative study approach is applied to the issue of money laundering; this approach 
seeks to draw parallels and contrasts between two similar or competing systems of legal 
processes. According to Eberle ''The essence of comparison is then aligning similarities 
and differences between data points and using this exercise as a measure to obtain 
understanding of the content and range of the data points''58. In addition, analysing and 
comparing between these data points to discover the similarities reveals what needs to 
be done59. The comparative study helps in understanding the new ideas and concepts of 
international legal studies, and to understand different successful paradigms of legal 
action adopted in the fight against money laundering, in this instance anti-money 
laundering in the UK and Libya. 
This study will attempt to analyse and explain matters arising in the UK regulations related 
to money laundering, compared to the provisions contained in Libyan domestic statutes.   
Mills, Bunt and Bruijn have considered that a comparative approach uses both 
quantitative and qualitative comparisons to analyse similarities and differences and 
focuses on context and difference in order to comprehend specificities60. In the later part 
                                                          
57 See Human Rights Watch report, 2014 Ibid. 
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59 Eberle, E. ibid (2009 p.452).  
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of this work, the researcher will attempt to assess which parts of the principles of the UK 
regulations could be adopted by the Libyan legal system.  However, this study is not using 
a full-scale comparative, because of the profound differences between conditions in the 
UK and Libya. This is a partial comparison for the specific purpose of identifying best 
practice and investigating its relevance for Libya. 
The research methodology will be based on a mixed approach - a qualitative data 
collection and analysis approach which will consider the gathering of information 
personally by the researcher including semi-structured interviews with appropriate 
respondents. This study attempts to analyse, assess and explain matters arising in the UK 
regulations related to ML which could be adopted by the Libyan legal system. However, 
this will be limited to a number of carefully chosen issues, due to the existence of the 
many regulations adopted in the UK to address this crime and there being not enough 
time for study all them in this research. Only those which specifically relate to the aims 
of the study are selected; after which, possible gaps or non-conformity in Libyan criminal 
law will be explained and analysed so as to understand the links and the divergences 
between these statutes in Libya and those of the UK. The basic requirement is the 
availability of relevant data; and for this purpose, an inductive research method can prove 
very effective. 
The inductive approach is a systematic procedure for analysing qualitative data in which 
the analysis is likely to be guided by specific evaluation objectives. According to Thomas 
there are certain reasons behind using this particular methodology61; notably, that the 
inductive research method is easy to use, and is different from the systemic framework 
of deductive and other research methods62. The inductive approach is helpful, because it 
enables the researcher to understand the context of the research. In light of that context, 
it is easy to construct the argument and find a solution to the problem. This method also 
helps analyse research questions. Flexibility is a major norm of this research method. As 
has been discussed, the inductive approach is very different to the deductive. Indeed, it 
is better to analyse its working framework to clarify its use for research purposes. Thomas 
believes the inductive method is unique, because its starting point is observations that 
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are helpful for a researcher to obtain a more-focused and first-hand knowledge of the 
issue63. 
1.8.1-The Interviews 
The interview in qualitative research seeks to understand the experiences of others 
through an analysis of the meaning of what they have said during the interview. The 
interview is defined by Aali et al as: “a conversation between two or more people where 
questions are asked to obtain information from the interviewee”64. The interview can be 
seen as a social relationship in which questions are asked to understand the individual's 
unique and changing perspective65.Thus, interviews play an important role during data 
collection to explore participants’ perspectives, be they employees or others, on a 
particular idea by asking them some questions66 as Boyce and Neale have considered. It 
is my aim to contact some professional participants, in Libya, as will be explained later. 
This research topic is extensive, but extremely significant, because it involves 
investigation in Libya. For this reason, the research aims to gather as much data as 
possible through field research, as well as by consulting academic theories. The major 
part of the field research will depend on face-to-face interviews in Libya. 
1.8.2-Preparatory Stage 
According to Lambea, a mixture of closed and open questions can be used in interviews 
while recording all answers67. In this study, the questions are to be sent to participants 
before the interview to give them an opportunity to know in advance about the topic and 
to prepare answers. The questions that will be asked in the interviews are generally open-
ended questions in order to encourage interviewees to expand their answers and freely 
give their perceptions, as well as avoiding ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. The questions will be 
phrased carefully, in a way that includes the full range of views and represents views 
accurately and without bias. Moreover, they will not be too personal or intrusive, and the 
purpose of the research will be for the common good and to further knowledge, rather 
                                                          
63 Ibid. 
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than for any other aim, and will adhere to ethical principles of research68. According to 
Hancock and Windridge, “Qualitative research attempts to broaden and/or deepen our 
understanding of how things came to be the way they are in our social world.”69.The 
interviews therefore aim to explore this sensitive topic more fully as it will be possible to 
make a note of the problems that emerge due to ML from the illegal sale of oil. 
These interviews are conducted in order to shed more light on the subject of the crime 
of money-laundering and its prevention; thus, they are designed to allow further 
exploration of subjects as they arise during the interview as well as allowing for the 
opportunity to explore themes that might not have been hitherto considered. The 
interviews are to begin with general questions designed to establish rapport and trust; 
and ensure that the interviewee was relaxed and fully understood the topics that were 
to be covered. During the interviews, questions arising from the interview schedule and 
previously determined areas of legal themes will be put, and then the interviewees have 
the freedom to expand on the subject, as the research interest lies in the interviewees’ 
viewpoints and perceptions. This semi-structured interview form is used in this study as 
it is considered the best means of determining whether the Libyan legal regime is 
sufficient to combat ML, particularly in relation to illegal sales of oil. In addition, these 
interviews explore whether AML mechanisms used so far elsewhere, particularly in the 
UK, have been successful, and whether such mechanisms could be adopted in Libya. 
Finally, they are designed to find out how ML might be reduced in Libya. 
1.8.3-How the interview data is used in the thesis 
The data obtained from the interviews is used to clarify points about how Libya struggles 
with the ML crime and the interviews are also focused on whether the Libyan legal regime 
is effective in combating ML, particularly in relation to illegal sales of oil. Quotations are 
extracted from the interview transcripts to illustrate specific points, such as identifying 
the problems with the enforcement of the ML Act against illegal sale of oil in Libya. The 
data is also used to construct a general impression of the culture that exists in the banks 
and the customers. For example, the interview data was used to illustrate how the culture 
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in Libya is one of 'following precedent' and as such how the culture has an effect on 
increasing ML. 
As will be seen, the study found out that employees who can be aware of ML operations 
already have full knowledge of the AML legislations. The majority of the interviewees are 
totally aware that the CMLA 2005 has weaknesses, and believe it is not enough to curb 
this crime. That led the researcher to believe that there was an urgent need to change 
the CMLA 2005 and that this revised law would need to be applied and related staff also 
need to be trained to apply it. 
The study is timely not only because the ML issue has been ignored in Libya, but mainly 
because some facts mentioned above raise questions about whether new mechanisms 
can be designed to stop ML that is taking place due to illegal oil selling as well as other 
commercial activities. It is important to find out to what extent the FIU in Libya has been 
successful until now, and to what extent there is a need to bring structural changes into 
the FIU in Libya. This research will help to design a new ML confiscation framework while 
incorporating the existing ML mechanism. A detailed study of the Customer Due Diligence 
(CDD), Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and identifying clients and record-keeping 
would help to highlight weaknesses in the existing FIU in the Libyan framework and bring 
in the revolutionary idea of introducing a new ML confiscation system in Libya. A detailed 
analysis of these elements can give an idea about which direction the FIU in Libya needs 
to take in order to move forward. As far as I know, no one has worked in Libya on the 
points I have raised. It will definitely be very interesting for the legislative council in Libya 
to study the data collected by this study and the facts and figures related to the Libyan 
and UK ML confiscation systems. 
1.8.4- Piloting the interview 
Before designing my draft interview schedule, I decided to develop my skills in using this 
qualitative instrument by attending workshops on Qualitative Research and Interview 
Skills at the Law, Politics and Sociology School at Sussex University. A draft semi-
structured interview schedule was then designed in line with the research questions and 
piloted with official employees in Libya. These pilot studies were conducted with three 
Libyan officials - a lawyer, an official employee at the Ministry of Finance and the head of 
the Analysis Department. I approached each pilot participant, explained my purpose and 
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gave assurances of anonymity and confidentiality. I conducted the pilot interview and, at 
each stage asked the participant for feedback about the questions. 
The pilot interview with a lawyer in Libya was particularly useful. This interview provided 
me with the information I needed about AML rules and what issues might arise when 
conducting the interviews in Libya. For example, who to question about the role of legal 
advisers and banks in AML operations, also how ML could be detected, given there is no 
police department dedicated to combating ML. Discussing this at the pilot stage, led me 
to the decision that questions on this issue needed to be re-directed to the Analysis 
Department of the FIU of the Libyan Central Bank, as this was where I could obtain the 
information I needed and which was relevant to the thesis. 
Another issue which arose was that the officials who were to be interviewed might not 
know much about the illegal selling of oil in Libya. For this reason, I decided to interview 
an official from the Libyan National Oil Company in order to collect specific data on this 
topic. From conducting the pilot study, I realised that carrying out interviews in Libya was 
going to be a very big challenge. At present, there are security issues in Libya and it is 
difficult to move around the city of Tripoli and gain access to the places I need to go. 
However, the pilot interviews provided me with the opportunity to clarify the interview 
questions and think about alternative ways to phrase them in order to be able to prompt 
the interviewees without leading them.  
1.8.5-Audio recording 
Audio recording is regarded as a powerful method of data collection and it has become a 
staple of qualitative research. One of its main advantages is that allows the researcher to 
focus on the answers of the interviewees rather than writing down the comments; 
another is that the tape allows an exact transcript of what was actually said to be made 
and eliminates any possible distortion involved in using the interviewer’s notes. 
Through previously working as an official employee of Organisation Libya, I know that in 
Libya, people are not greatly interested in research and there is suspicion and resistance 
towards it. In order to succeed in data collection, therefore, I had to choose an 
appropriate way to convince informants to participate. Thus, in conducting the interviews 
I needed to get access and gain trust with the interviewees and using social ties and 
personal contacts was helpful. Furthermore, when conducting the interviews, I had to be 
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aware that participants might show a lack of confidence and refuse to be recorded or 
may agree to it but feel awkward about being taped or worry about the tape being heard 
by others; even if offered a promise of confidentiality and to be given the tape once it 
was finished with. 
1.8.6-The Libyan Interviews 
The field work for this study involves conducting interviews in Tripoli in Libya with ten 
Official Employees were selected for the Libyan part of this study, the interviewees were 
assured at the beginning of the interview that no one would listen to the recording other 
than me or my supervisor. Those that refused to be recorded allowed me to write the 
conversation down and note their opinions. Some participants regarded me as a more 
experienced person; nevertheless, as a result of the interviews, I made many friendships 
with the participants, due to the rapport built between us. I also gained a deeper 
understanding of the work of the banking sector in Libya, so this was an effective and 
enjoyable way of learning for me. However, as more than two months were spent on the 
fieldwork at the Libyan Central Bank this was enough time to build trust with the Central 
Bank official employees. Being there helped me to gain an understanding of the different 
issues that my interviewees had to deal with on a daily basis. Moreover, it allowed me to 
further understand AML rules and to see more clearly what the weak areas were, and 
thus to more easily gauge how accurate interviewees’ responses were. The data was 
collected through documents, statistics, studies and the interviews; and these different 
tools were used to construe the situation from different sources, which could then be 
triangulated in the analysis stage. 
At the first interview, I thought I would be able to easily and instantly translate the 
questions into Arabic for the interviewees; any possible problem with this was not picked 
up during the pilot interviews. This interview, however, showed how difficult it was to do 
this in an interview context, as it was not easy to follow the conversation and at the same 
time think about an accurate translation. Thus, it was necessary to translate all the 
questions into Arabic for interviewees at the Libyan bank and the other related 
departments which were a target of the interviews; and this helped to ensure that all the 
interviewees received exactly the same information. Another practical difficulty that 
affected the interviews was the power blackouts in Tripoli. These proved to be a real 
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challenge as interviews were frequently interrupted by the blackouts which meant that 
it was impossible to continue with the interview and a new appointment had to be made. 
Each type of participant brings the advantage of a different perspective, which could 
increase the value and reliability of the data. Moreover, analysis of data from all the 
different types of participant together could fill a gap in the available information 
regarding legal issues. Additionally, this combination could reveal in-depth information, 
as each type of participant may have a different level of knowledge regarding these 
issues. The limited number of professional employees selected to participate was due to 
time limitations, the type of information required, and the methodology applied in the 
study. Therefore, the researcher has assumed that the selection of a limited quantity of 
the different types of interviewee may be more beneficial for the current research, in 
order to accomplish the study on time, and to gather more detailed information from 
participants. 
1.8.7-The UK Interviews 
At first, I planned to use the interviews with a similar range of participants as those from 
Libya, with the aim of gaining a practical understanding of the control mechanisms and 
show how the Financial Services Authorities and banking structures are struggling to cope 
with illegal money. The ethical review panel gave approval for the Libyan interviews. 
Although the Libyan interviews were conducted, it was unfortunately not possible to 
generate a comparative analysis between the UK and Libya, even though the aim of my 
study was to use the comparative approach and had I applied for permission to conduct 
both sets of interviews in plenty of time. However, owing to the sensitivity of the area of 
research, I failed to get approval from the UK participants to conduct interviews and their 
refusal led to me to use an analysis of primary and secondary data resources in the UK 
after consultation with my supervisor. 
1.8.8-Analysis and Interpretation of Data 
The stage following interview data collection in a research project is the data analysis. 
The 'meaning condensation' methods have been used to analyses the interviews, as 
clarified by Kvale and Brinkmann, who defines the technique thus: "meaning 
condensation normally builds and entails an abridgement of the expressed by the 
interview into short formulations. Long statements are compressed into briefer 
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statement in which the main sense of what is said is released in a few words."70 Based on 
this definition, Kvale and Brinkmann,  highlight the following five steps in utilising this 
approach: firstly, the whole of interview transcript should be read once to establish the 
main ideas; secondly, the exact words of the subjects are identified by the researcher; 
thirdly, a main theme is assigned to each response by the researcher without bias; 
fourthly, meaning units should be related to the purpose of the study, which can be done 
by reminding oneself of its main questions; fifthly; the researcher gives a relevant 
description to each theme.  
Thus, I began by reading the interview transcripts; identifying the main ideas and linking 
these to the aims of the study and referring back to the main research questions. Finally, 
a description of the main ideas relevant to each theme was given. Before commencing 
the process of analysis, I had to write the whole of the conversation on paper and then 
type it up for each of the interviewees in Libya who refused to be recorded. Analysing the 
given data out of the interview transcriptions was also supportive for reaffirming the 
research claims; and using the 'meaning condensation’ helped to achieve the aim of this 
research, which was to understand how participants make sense of and interpret the 
spread of ML. Collecting the data took about three months, as I needed to conduct the 
interviews and transcribe them and think about possible ideas and themes; so, starting 
the data analysis was exciting. When I highlighted the themes, and started to give them 
codes I felt aware of my personal intervention, as I gave these themes names, based on 
my own understanding, beliefs and comments. 
A significant challenge that was faced regarding the interviews was the translation of 
interviewees’ views from Arabic to English, and it was very important in this study to focus 
on several methodological issues encountered when translating the interviewees' 
interviews. Culturally and linguistically, English and Arabic are two different languages; 
however, as the researcher who developed the theoretical framework for this enquiry in 
English and also as an Arabic speaker, I was able to translate the interviewees’ interviews 
from Arabic onto English. It must be acknowledged that I had to check with another 
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English speaker about my translation of specific concepts that I had in the interviewees’ 
data to validate the accuracy of the translation. 
1.8.9--How was data security maintained? 
- The storing and movement of the data was conducted in accordance with data 
protection acts and regulations. 
- Data was stored electronically and appropriate technical and organizational 
measures were taken to protect and secure the data 
- Data must not be kept for longer than necessary, thus it will only remain with the 
researcher until analysis is completed and for a minimum time after the writing up and 
examination process is completed. 
How to ensure the confidentiality of data? 
- Data was processed fairly and lawfully in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998 in line with the guidance offered by the University Ethical Code. 
- Data will be processed strictly for the purpose of this research project and not for 
any other purpose. 
- Appropriate technical and organizational measures have been taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of, or damage to, personal data.  This includes: 
- Efforts to ensure that the computer firewall was on and that virus-checking and 
anti-spyware software is efficient and up-to-date. 
- Encrypting electronic data so as to avoid damage or distress in the event of 
information being lost or stolen. 
- The researcher has not quoted any statement made by interviewees unless he 
received permissions from them to do so.   
This research was carried out in accordance with all the measures and regulations for 
ethical research. According to Bryman and Bell, the researcher must protect the 
participants by using coding on the data file and not using names and personal 
information. Researchers must conduct their studies without any sort of deception and 
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protect their participants’ data71. Additionally, the researcher made use of the research 
ethics checklist provided by the University to help anticipate and deal with ethical issues. 
In particular, according to Bryman and Bell the researcher must deal with the ethical 
issues through the following measures: 
- I explained to the participants that they had the right to agree or disagree to be 
interviewed or to withdraw from the interview at any time. 
- To avoid deception, I explained to participants what I was exploring in this 
research, the research purposes and what data I wanted from them. 
- I ensured that consent has been gained from participants.  
- I ensured that I would not use the information of this interview in a way which 
could identify participants and informed them of this. 
- I made sure that these interviews would not cause any harm to participants, as 
no confidential data or personal and work-related information was required in the 
interview. 
The privacy of participants’ information was maintained at all times, so that nobody else 
could recognise participants or data sources72. Due to the sensitivity of the subject and 
the risk that interviewees might be in jeopardy from the money launderers, I avoided any 
questions that posed a risk to the participants to ensure their safety and my safety as 
well. Thus, I avoided direct questions on current cases, but I focused on completed cases 
and the weaknesses of the current law. 
1.9-Proposed Thesis Structure 
After a general introduction, the second chapter explores the theory of transitional 
justice. This chapter concerns the package of transitional justice measures to be taken by 
a Libya that has emerged from conflict and revolution and suffered from serious 
violations of human rights. The concept of transitional justice, the challenges and 
importance of applying elements of this are explored, to show how the complex problems 
involved in applying, transitional justice cannot be resolved by a single procedure without 
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any effort to uncover the truth or award compensation. For example, how it may be 
considered necessary to punish a few minor perpetrators as a form of political revenge, 
and uncover the truth in isolation from efforts to punish the main perpetrators. The 
experience of transitional justice in some other countries and the challenges involved in 
its implementation such as the conflict between achieving justice or peace, identifying 
the victims and whether there are sufficient resources available to cover mechanisms like 
compensation, trials or institutional reform are also examined. 
Chapter Three attempts to give a comprehensive understanding of ML, and explores the 
role of globalisation in opening up new avenues for criminal groups to launder money 
earned through criminal activities. Furthermore, it sheds light on whether the 
development of technology is a reason behind the growth of the ML crime. In addition, 
the chapter focuses on the economic, social and political impacts of ML including the 
argument about whether ML benefits the domestic economy or not. Chapter Four aims 
to explore the international criminalization of ML, the measures considered to be 
necessary weapons in the fight against ML and the offences that are predicated on it. The 
purpose of this chapter is thus to understand the development of the criminalization of 
ML by discussing important issues that will clarify the development of international 
efforts to combat ML through the conventions that started with the Vienna Convention 
(1988), which is considered as the basis for the subsequent conventions and changes to 
the domestic regulations in some countries to prevent this crime. This chapter will also 
discuss the functions of international organizations that seek to curb ML crime. 
Chapter Five aims to investigate the AML system in the UK; the reasons that have led the 
country to focus on developing AML regulations; and the development of AML strategies 
that have been taken to prevent financial crime in the UK. The aim of this chapter is to 
analyses specific UK legal provisions relating to ML; such as the Proceeds of Crime Act 
(POCA) (2002) and the effect of EU directives on the POCA, in order to find out how this 
law is protecting public money through improving the effectiveness of measures taken 
against those who profit from crime. It will also explore the extent of the effectiveness of 
this approach against this crime, and whether it impedes financial and commercial 
activity. Additionally, this chapter argues whether the UK approach to AML has complied 
with the international principles against this crime and evaluates the advantages and 
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disadvantages of the UK AML legislation in order to find out what lessons and the 
successful AML strategy, can be learned when addressing gaps in the Libyan AML 
regulations rather than suggesting that a foreign AML system can be imported wholesale, 
and assess if it could be used in Libya to address the illegal sale of oil. 
Chapter Six looks at the development of AML laws in Libya; and examines how these laws 
have attempted to prevent the primary crimes associated with ML, such as corruption. 
So, the aim of this chapter is to establish why Libya, in an attempt to curb money-
laundering, has issued so many different regulations since the early 1950s related to 
financial crimes. The focus will be especially on the CMLA (2005), issued in Libya in line 
with the rules of international conventions on AML. The international criminalization of 
ML, the measures considered necessary weapons in the fight against ML and the offences 
that are predicated on it are explored in this chapter. It is crucial to understand 
international attempts to curb ML crime which was, but is no longer endemic, and just 
how rapidly these measures have developed. The following chapter, Seven, presents the 
data analysis on the comments of participants interviewed for this study under the 
mechanisms that were adopted by the CMLA 2005, and whether the mechanisms that 
are used against it are successful or not. The body of this chapter is organised so as to 
reflect the four research questions. The aim is to find out how ML related to the illegal 
sale of oil can be reduced in Libya through looking at attempts to combat ML in the UK. 
The chapter considers whether the Act has been enough to prevent ML crime or not and 
concludes that not only has this legislation failed to curb ML crime, but this crime has 
been increasing. 
Chapter Eight focuses on the vulnerability of Libyan AML legislation and what principles 
and rules could be taken from approaches that are used in the UK to address this 
weakness. Finally, Chapter Nine covers conclusions and recommendations. 
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Chapter Two:  The Theories 
2.1- Introduction 
In this thesis, the transitional justice theory is applied. This research will make use of some 
of the most relevant elements of the theory of transitional justice, because Libya went 
through undemocratic rule and civil war, thus, I would argue that this is the most 
appropriate theory to apply in this case.  
2.2-Transitional Justice Theory 
The term ''Transitional Justice'' has emerged in recent years to identify political practice 
concerned with the aftermath of conflict. It focuses on the best method to address past 
wrongs and move towards creating a decent civil order. States which move from 
authoritarianism to democracy have started by using transitional justice. Thoms has 
confirmed that transitional justice has proliferated in areas of conflict and societies which 
were under authoritarian rule73. The concept mainly formed in response to political 
changes in Latin America and Eastern Europe and to demands by human rights activists 
in these regions for justice through the systematic address of abuses, which were 
committed by the old regimes during their time in power. 
2.2.1-The Concept of Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice, as defined by the UN is the "full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation"74. 
Moreover, the transitional justice processes and mechanisms are a critical component of 
the UN framework for strengthening the rule of law. Transitional justice depends on both 
judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms. It involves institutional reform, and 
includes civil rights, i.e. political, economic, social and cultural rights75.  
The main aim of transitional justice is to curb the practice of those in power behaving 
with impunity and establish the rule of law; also, to protect human rights and to oblige 
countries undergoing transitions to implement their legal obligations with regards to 
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human rights violations76. In this context, this includes: ‘‘halting ongoing human rights 
abuses, investigating past crimes, identifying those responsible for human rights 
violations, imposing sanctions on those responsible, providing reparations to victims, 
preventing future abuses, security sector reform, preserving and enhancing peace and 
fostering individual and national reconciliation’’77. So, in general, seeking the truth, 
identifying crimes and holding perpetrators accountable by strengthening the rule of law 
and effectuating institutional reform, providing victims and promoting reconciliation are 
the final aims of the primary objective of a transitional justice policy. 
Money laundering mostly goes hand in hand with human rights abuses in authoritarian 
countries; and those two are linked with each other as corrupt funds are used by dictators 
to maintain power. In Libya, illegal oil proceeds are used to perpetuate the war and stir 
up unrest, and it is also used as a means of rewarding those who carried out or covered 
up regime crimes78. In this way, this laundered money has participated in creating the 
acute economic crisis in Libya, as this study has explained above. 
The mechanisms of transitional justice have thus not adequately dealt with the legacy of 
authoritarian corruption nor remedied its far-reaching socio-economic effects.  
Additionally, the policy makers of transitional justice are failing to clarify the relationship 
between corruption and human rights abuses. The damage done to the people by the 
corrupt money is on a large-scale and outnumbers the victims of physical atrocities; and 
through stalling or obstructing meaningful reforms, damage is done to the national 
economy79. Libya is the best example of this process. 
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2.3- Legal transplants 
The term ‘legal transplants’ means borrowing legal rules from abroad;80 the target of this 
is to develop the framework of domestic law to face certain situations and to use the legal 
transplants as tools for promoting legal change81.   
This section deals with several aspects of legal transplants: Firstly, the significance of and 
justification for legal transplants and their importance as mechanisms of achieving one 
of the targets of transitional justice, which is the reform of law in Libya. Secondly, 
transplant assessment, and a discussion of the effect of transplants on identity and the 
culture, due to these rules being imported from elsewhere82. 
2.3.1-The significance of legal transplants 
In the framework of the application of transitional justice, reforming the law is an 
important step in ensuring that there is no return to the abuses of the past. This happens 
in countries where wars occur or there are fundamental changes during the transition 
from dictatorship to democracy, usually if the legislation was taken from elsewhere at 
low cost and has been implemented83, These laws often were applied in societies and in 
places very different from those they were transplanted from. Historically, there was a 
large amount of legislation throughout the world which was borrowed from other legal 
jurisdictions; which is evidence that legal transplantation has a role in the development 
of legal areas quickly and effectively. For example, Italy made some changes to its criminal 
codes in 1808 and 1848, which clearly demonstrate legal transplant, as were codes in 
Holland in 186784, Prussia in 1851 and Russia in 186485. 
The Napoleonic Code d’Instruction Criminelle of 1808 had a clear effect on both France 
and Spain, specifically their criminal justice systems86. Furthermore, the reforms to the 
criminal procedures in some Muslim countries were affected by Japan in the 19th and 
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20th centuries.  According to Vogler, the reforms that took place in the Ottoman Empire 
between 1839 and 1879 represented important changes to criminal justice procedure, 
and they had clear effects on western European powers87 For example, Great Britain tried 
to protect its citizens, who were trading in the Ottoman Empire, through bilateral 
agreements whereby all cases involving their citizens were dealt with by special consular 
courts88 
In Sudan, however, the influence of the Ottoman Empire was counterbalanced by 
provisions of Islamic law which remained in place until 1899 when the first Sudanese 
Criminal Procedure and Penal Code and derived from the Indian Penal Code was 
introduced under the aegis of an Anglo-Egyptian co-dominion with Shari’ah being 
reserved only for family law in 190289. 
Although Libya has been under Islamic law, it was under the influence of the Ottoman 
Empire; and its legislative status remained under its influence until the Italian Occupation, 
when the Italian Penal Code was applied90, and the formation of the Libyan Penal Code 
in 1947.Libya issued a lot of legislation in the 1970s, in compliance with the Islamic law, 
as this study has discussed (See Chapter 6 section 3). 
In the same way, the laws of a large number of the Latin American countries, such as Chile 
and Argentina, have been affected; specifically, those involving criminal procedure 
reforms that replaced their inquisitorial systems with adversarial ones. They developed 
new, hybrid forms of criminal procedure by international criminal tribunals91. Thus, the 
prevalence of legal transplants confirms their significance as tools for promoting legal 
development and the professional inclination to rely on them when creating new laws. 
On the other hand, Legrand has argued that the Law of one country cannot be simply 
transplanted to another because legal rules are related directly to their culture context. 
                                                          
87Vogler, R. ibid (2005 p.116). 
88 Ibid (p.115). 
89 Ibid (p.118). 
90 Barak, A. Punitive toward a unified law and modern Arab Countries 2015 available at 
http://www.ahmadbarak.com/Category/studydetails/1063. (Accessed in 18/02/2017). 
91Jacqueline E. et al (2016) Comparative Criminal Procedure Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham UK (p.12). 
45 
 
He also added that legal transplantation is ‘impossible’ to be accepted, since the 
relationship between the legal rules and society is so interdependent92. 
In this he is echoing the well-known views of Montesquieu who declared that: ‘the 
political civil laws of each nation should be so closely tailored to the people for whom 
they are made, that it would be pure chance [‘un grandhazard’] if the laws of one nation 
could meet the needs of another…’93 
Many theoreticians have adopted Montesquieu's approach, particularly those who assert 
that legal systems are divided into distinct and opposed’’ families’’94 as Renee David has 
considered. These theoreticians contend that law corresponds with societal features or 
is an expression of social interests or needs95, and its development is based on a number 
of physical, cultural and political ingredients unique to the particular society it 
serves96.The Law is created through a mixture of sociological, cultural and economic 
forces that it can rarely have validity in any other environment. This makes the adoption 
of foreign law problematic, transferring law to another environment requires stimuli 
relating to society, culture and the economy that are more relevant than legal transplants 
alone for motivating and shaping legal change97.However, it is argued here that these 
views are increasingly untenable in a global society where many communities face the 
same threats from international crime and require concerted solutions which draw from 
the experience of different nations. 
2.3.2- Motivations for Transplanting Law. 
The foreign law transplant may be related to the importance and the prestige of that 
law;98furthermore, such laws have been previously tested, found to be successful and 
able to be enforced.  Recently globalisation has a substantial effect on legal transplants, 
and Miller has considered that the legal transplant process has increased in developing 
countries and some of their laws are transplanted from foreign Acts,99 which mean that 
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their legal system is influenced by legal transplants. The other reason for legal transplants 
is modernisation100, specifically in developing countries, who wish to comply with the 
standards of more economically powerful countries. For example, some criminal justice 
laws in several Muslim countries, between 1839 and 1970, were impacted by European 
legislation from countries such as France and Great Britain101. 
Although transplants have been taken place in both the ancient and the modern world, 
the law was considered to be closely related to the identity of a nation or people102.Legal 
transplants have assisted in developing domestic law, additionally, legal transplant and 
globalisation, may also influence the culture of the receiving country103as Teubner, has 
remarked, thus, countries should transplant laws carefully, to retain their cultural 
identity.     
I would suggest that the peoples’ cultures are related to livelihood, achievements and 
creativity, and are an expression of their right of self-determination and their spiritual 
and material relationship with their lands, territories and resources, that is reflected in 
their language, spirituality, sense of belonging, behaviour and laws; and that due to this, 
legal transplants are, in effect, the borrowing of ideas between legal cultures and/or 
systems104. Thus, it is important for individual countries to decide what rules they could 
choose from another country which would preserve their identity. 
The process of improving access to justice in the medium to long term, requires a 
comprehensive reform of the objectives of the current system, and includes the 
legislative, institutional and practical measures to promote access to justice in line with 
international standards and best practices. Efforts to redress the collective abuse 
widespread in the context of the so-called initiatives of transitional justice is important 
but it is working to establish important principles that can provide the means for the 
introduction of a methodology for changes to strengthen access to justice.  
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So, in Libya the reform process should include constitutional reform in conjunction with 
institutional reform. Agreement on the ‘objective’ criteria of the new constitution is not 
enough to ensure the effective protection of civil and political rights. Thus, the debate on 
the constitution must go boldly beyond just the constitutional text itself and find ways 
and means to defend those ‘constitutional’ and ‘effective’ principles through establishing 
institutional mechanisms for the effective protection of human rights and the rule of law. 
However, if these mechanisms do not exist on the ground, any such ‘constitutional 
protection’ will remain ‘a dead letter’, without any strength or support. In order for any 
process of constitutional reform to be effective and meaningful, there is a need for 
institutional reform in important sectors such as the police, national intelligence and 
security. This requires measures to give the authorities power to arrest and detain 
suspects irrespective of position as well as parliamentary and judicial accountability and 
effective control. In Libya, the Penal Law (1956) reflects the reality of Libyan society, 
whether political or social, cultural, on the other hand, the national criminal policy should 
be developed to be in compliance with international standards; that requires a 
comprehensive review of all penal law in Libya to keep pace with the times, whilst taking 
into account the principles of Islamic Shari’ah, and Libyan culture and society when 
making the changes recommended by this study. 
A transitional justice policy has various mechanisms used to achieve these aims; for 
example, trials, which are the means used to make the criminals who committed the 
crimes in the old regime accountable for their actions105. These include judicial 
investigations with those responsible for committing human rights violations in which the 
prosecutors often focus on those who believe they bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious or systematic violations. It could be argued that the first realization of this 
mechanism was with the Nuremberg trials of the Nazis in Germany after the Second 
World War106. The trials may be at the regional or international level, or through some 
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other institution, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone107, which also included 
financial crimes in its proceedings. 
Another means of achieving transitional justice is the establishment of truth 
commissions, which were created to investigate and report on the offences and the 
criminals who committed these crimes during the old regimes. Truth commissions 
investigate the cause behind systematic patterns of abuse and the reasons for the serious 
human rights violations that were committed108. These commissions have basic aims, 
which are to contribute to justice and accountability through facilitating public 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, to respond to the needs of victims, and also to 
recommend reforms and help settle conflict 109. 
Reparations, which are initiatives that take material forms such as cash payments or 
health services, aim to address the harm suffered by the victims. Additionally, these 
means include the reform of state institutions such as the armed forces, the police and 
the courts, which were abusive during the old regime. To ensure that serious human 
rights violations will not recur, reparations can also involve the creation of museums and 
memorials to memorialize the memory of the victims110.  
One important aspect of a country’s process of transitional justice is the offer of an 
amnesty for past crimes. Villalba notes that possibly this can act as an obstacle to 
peace111.Amnesty was used by French President Charles de Gaulle in the process of 
reconciliation for the crimes committed under occupation during the Algerian war112. 
Mandela also used this tactic in South Africa, because he saw the principle of a general 
amnesty as the way to negotiate a resolution after the end of a regime of apartheid113. 
Sometimes issuing an amnesty has been seen as a setback to the implementation of the 
rule of law and justice during the transitional phase. One such example is in Argentina 
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when it was introduced after the trials of the perpetrators of crimes from the former 
repressive regime had started114.2013 saw Tunisia adopting the Transitional Justice Act 
which includes clauses about establishing a new governing body to negotiate with 
businesses to gain amnesty in return for repaying stolen money. Although this will be of 
financial benefit to Tunisia, and attract new investment115; Williamson points out that 
many civil organisations have opposed this law on the grounds that undermines the 
principles of transitional justice116. 
Although amnesty can result in the stabilization of a country, as supporters of the old 
regime are unlikely to create destabilization, any restructuring of state institutions that 
respect human rights and maintain rule of law must be subject to a system of 
accountability. The foundations of the regime that perpetrated or allowed human rights 
violations must be disabled by a process that ensures a minimum standard of professional 
standards and impartiality among judges and prosecutors. There must be guarantees of 
accountability, transparency and independence either through reforming existing legal 
frameworks, ensuring the recovery of looted funds, or creating new frameworks such as 
the adoption of a constitution or ratifying international human rights treaties. As 
discussed above, the aim of transitional justice is an investigation which will give access 
to the truth, justice, forgiveness, and healing; which will achieve the reconciliation 
necessary to allow people to live alongside former enemies. In other words, the past must 
be addressed in order to achieve peace in the future. I believe that an effective way to 
achieve all these aims is through the transitional justice elements mentioned above; and 
that these also will ensure lasting peace. Democracy will be enhanced because the truth 
has been revealed, rights have been ensured and the harm that was suffered by victims 
has been addressed, all of which will lead to a result that is worth the effort. 
Under international law, transitional justice has gained an important foundation in the 
decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988 in the case of Velásquez 
Rodríguez v. Honduras, (a case heard by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR) and also known as Manfredo Velásquez v. Honduras). In this case the Court 
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ordered the government of Honduras to comply with certain points, which related to 
human rights violations117. The court decided that all countries are obligated by four 
fundamental obligations in the area of human rights, which are: to take reasonable steps 
to prevent human rights violations, to conduct a serious investigation of violations when 
they occur to impose suitable sanctions on those responsible for the violations; and to 
ensure justice for the victims of the violations118.  
2.4-The experiences of some countries to implement the transitional 
justice 
There are various countries around the world which have been able to achieve 
transitional justice, such as South Africa, Argentina and Morocco. 
2.4.1-The experience of transitional justice in South Africa 
The South African experience began in the early nineties, after the release of Nelson 
Mandela. This example of transitional justice addressed the elimination in a system where 
apartheid had prevailed. Negotiations were conducted between the government and the 
African National Congress; and an experiment began in the conducting of popular trials 
called ‘truth and reconciliation’, to reveal the abuses that had occurred during the 
apartheid regime. However, the perpetrators did not submit to a trial as demonstrated 
by the truth and reconciliation commission’s slogan ‘amnesty in exchange for the truth’, 
which exposed the South African experience to widespread criticism119. Victims 
complained that they had not been given any compensation and that the perpetrators of 
crimes had not been brought to justice by means of a proper trial. The inadequacy of the 
South African experience is clearly highlighted by the fact that it did not address 
corruption due to its claim that corruption fell outside its mandate, which should be a 
lesson for other countries, especially those seeking to emulate this experience120. 
2.4.2-The experience of transitional justice in Argentina 
After the end of the dictatorship that lasted between 1976 and 1983, Argentina saw 
dramatic changes in the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations that 
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occurred when the country was under the dictatorial rule and which led to the forcible 
disappearance of about 30,000 people. After the restoration of civilian rule, the 
government developed a set of search-related initiatives, trials and compensation121. 
Alfonsín, the first democratically elected president after the end of authoritarian military 
rule, established an amnesty law.  It identified a deadline of sixty days which began after 
the new trials, and granted immunity to military personnel from the rank of colonel and 
below, since they simply carried out orders. Some key military leaders appeared in the 
dock in two large trials only 18 months after the fall of the military government. 
Legislation compensating the victims was subsequently passed and a compensation 
programme based on records available was also carried out122. 
2.4.3-Morocco’s successful experience of transitional justice 
Efforts in transitional justice have been made since the early 1990s to address violations 
of human rights committed at the start of the 1960 when dozens of people disappeared 
and hundreds of political prisoners were taken123. By the end of the 1990s both legal and 
institutional reforms had been made and some financial compensation was made 
available for several human right victims and their families. There have been adverse 
reactions to this as many victims, and their families, preferred mental and physical 
healthcare, death certificates or an apology from the state124. All these protests resulted 
in the creation of an Equity and Reconciliation Commission125.This Commission worked 
to investigate the disappearance and death of the hundreds of people who were 
arbitrarily arrested and detained and then subsequently disappeared or died during past 
events and social uprisings126 However, this process has only been partially successful, 
and Moroccan victim’s families are still waiting to know what happened to their loved 
ones and who were responsible for their fate127. 
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Morocco’s experience is one of the most important among Arab states and 
internationally in open files regarding enforced disappearances and torture. Morocco 
created the Equity and Reconciliation Organization, commissioned by the King of 
Morocco to address reparations and reconciliation, compensated the victims, and also 
worked to reform and rehabilitate a large number of institutions. Knowing the truth about 
incidents required the implementation of transitional justice; most notably for 
investigations on the subject of serious violations, where it was necessary to know the 
precise details and enormity of the crimes in order to make reparation and to take 
measures to ensure the rule of law such that these crimes could not be repeated. Political 
and institutional reforms were also taken to curb authoritarian tendencies128. 
It is clear that in most of these experiences, the use of transplants in transitional justice 
was aimed at addressing the human rights violations that occurred in the past, and did 
not concentrate on financial crimes. In the implementation of transitional justice, human 
rights violations should be linked to corruption by the collection of the evidence about 
illegal activities by members of the old regime, forwarding them to domestic and 
international prosecutions and including economic crimes129. This is what happened in 
Kenya with prosecutions for the economic crimes of illicit land grabs and illegal 
acquisition of other property130.  This trial included interrogation of Charles, the president 
of Liberia, about his trading in so-called ‘blood diamonds’ that assisted in fuelling the 
conflict131. In the same way, according to Sorensen, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the previous 
president of Tunisia and his wife were sentenced to prison in absentia due to their 
embezzlement and misuse of state funds132. During the application of transitional justice, 
the collective or individual reparations on the rights abuses could be funded by any 
recovered assets. Additionally, the institution of reform could also apply socio-economic 
reforms and remove corrupt officials; this would improve the quality of the civil service133. 
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The law may fall short of sufficiently criminalizing activities of ML, such as in Angola, which 
has allowed them to be committed with impunity which has resulted in a weakening of 
efforts to establish the rule of the law134. In the same way, Bosnian law has not focused 
on corruption and money laundering, and has not developed mechanisms, such as 
confiscation, to keep these activities under control135.   
2.5-The Challenges of Transitional Justice 
The implementation of transitional justice faces some contradictions because it seeks to 
achieve various aims. For example, creating a record of past human rights abuses is very 
important both as a means of establishing the truth and to be able to refuse spurious 
claims. Such records make it impossible for the perpetrators of crimes in an oppressive 
regime to deny responsibility and involvement in past crimes136. Moreover, transitional 
justice needs to result in citizens trusting their government to efficiently serve the needs 
of the people; cement the rule of law and provide basic services reliably. Transitional 
justice can thus change attitudes that were formed during the previous regime and 
underline the notion that the job of the government is to serve the population rather 
than oppress them137. It should also serve to reduce violence and consolidate stability. 
However, the implementation of these important aims may itself threaten political 
stability by stirring up conflict again, especially when trials are used as the primary 
mechanism of transitional justice 138. 
There are various challenges that have faced transitional justice since it started, such as 
identifying the victims and deciding whether the superiors and their aides should be 
punished or not, which can result in a ‘victors’ justice’. Other challenges include whether 
there are sufficient resources available to cover mechanisms like compensation, trials, or 
institutional reforms; and the transitional time may also only lead to a limited peace or 
fragile democracy.  
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Transitional justice (TJ) involves judicial proceedings against individuals alleged to have 
committed gross violations of human rights and forms truth commissions to record the 
wrongdoing which happened during the old regime. Another role of TJ is to identify what 
reparations and law enforcement is to be made139. However, discussion about the 
effectiveness of TJ as a means to ensure the consolidation of peace and the promotion 
of human rights and democracy, have led some to confirm that it is indeed useful after 
war time and it will help societies to move from war or authoritarianism to peace and 
democracy. On the other hand, others believe that applying TJ will undermine the 
prospect for peace and it may well be the reason for failure to negotiate peace. Smith has 
confirmed that reconciliation in the post conflict period can usefully address issues in a 
way that contributes to positive political development, socio-economic assistance and 
security140. Thus, reconciliation is an important way to get lasting peace and there will be 
no return to violence as soon as political settlement has been reached. This being the 
case, reconciliation as a principle of TJ will result in peace and stability and support socio-
political stability. In the case of the recovery of smuggled funds it will assist in economic 
development. 
Other challenges face the implement of transitional justice. Transitional justice activities 
are normally managed through cooperation between the post-conflict state and 
international bodies like the UN, but it may be difficult for these bodies to use the 
international tribunals because the countries involved may consider that this is a 
derogation of their sovereignty, which results in tension. Furthermore, the immunities 
given to some individuals may be a barrier to holding an effective trial of the criminals 
and any universal jurisdiction will be difficult to apply. Yet another challenge is related to 
mutual legal assistance (MLA), which is “a method of cooperation between states for 
obtaining assistance in the investigation or prosecution of criminal offences”141. MLA is 
not used in some cases because the countries involved refuse to apply this principle142. 
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According to Parlevliet, another significant challenge against transitional justice is the 
conflict between the aims of achieving peace and administering justice, which results in 
tension between them. In such a case, the argument for justice is that it should take place 
to ensure a transition from conflict to peace. All perpetrators of human rights crimes 
must be put on trial for the offences that were committed and there must not be 
immunity for these crimes. However, some argue that the only means to end violence 
and achieve peace is by granting amnesties and entering into negotiations to persuade 
criminals to lay down their arms143. Thoms et al add that others have argued that the 
implementation of the principles of fundamental justice is a form ‘digging up the past’ 
because identifying criminals will lead to renewed conflict, societal division and also 
reduce the chances of negotiating peace, thus all attempts to establish peace will 
fail144.The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has resulted in another issue 
as the relationship between the Court and transitional justice mechanisms is not clear at 
the national level. The reason for that is that it is difficult to achieve consensus on the 
mechanisms which would allow the Court to intervene in national transitional justice 
processes that were negotiated during times of delicate peace and post-conflict145. 
This researcher takes the view that the importance of transitional justice lies in identifying 
the perpetrators of the crimes and that knowing the truth promotes civic trust and 
strengthens the democratic rule of law, as does making reparations after a time of conflict 
or state repression in the interests of justice. 
2.6-The jurisdiction of the ICC on the ML crime 
ML can be one of the most serious crimes because it has effects far greater than simply 
financing terrorism. It affects the stability and integrity of international financial 
institutions, which can result in the destabilization of a country’s economy and political 
system. So, Anderson has suggested that the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopts a 
money-laundering statute, as it is the appropriate international body for investigating and 
prosecuting organized crime because of its far-reaching jurisdiction. Furthermore, taking 
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this action will also support the global effort in combating ML146. However, Libya has not 
ratified this statute. 
However, the question arises whether the ICC can address crime, corruption committed 
over the past three decades, which can be attributed to some officials in Libya? The 
International Criminal Court will exercise jurisdiction over "persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern", and has jurisdiction over the four international crimes, 
namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. 
Thus, public funds must be found to deal with crimes of corruption, which include wasting 
public money (See El-Ahram newspaper 20/0/2017)147. 
2.7-Why the theory of Transitional Justice; and why there is no 
other appropriate theory? 
The Transitional Justice (TJ) theory is the best suited to apply in this research as TJ aims 
to implement forms of institution that have been part of a despotic regime and existed 
in times of civil war, which is the case in Libya. According to Villalba, the system of 
transitional justice works to address violations, which occurred under the old regime 
using legitimate means148. Elements of this theory will mainly be applied to guarantee 
that Libyan regulations incorporate international human rights law, and that certain law 
reforms take place to bring them into conformity with Libya's obligations under 
international law, including the ML confiscation system149.  
Libya was governed by a tyrannical regime for more than 42 years with the absence of a 
constitution, a lack of democratic institutions and the absence of the rule of law 
provisions. The revolution started in 2011, changed to armed conflict and resulted in the 
collapse of both state institutions and the rule of law and spread chaos.  All this has 
contributed to an increase in oil smuggling, and associated ML, as this study has explained 
above. 
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With regard to the achievement of national reconciliation, which is the basis of 
transitional justice, in the case of Libya there are various challenges including the issue of 
accountability and justice, the issue of violence and terrorism, assassination and the 
proliferation of arms, the existence of an armed militia and party-political conflicts. These 
all contribute to making it difficult to apply the principles of justice, make reparations and 
achieve reconciliation. It is necessary to move to the stage where the wounds have healed 
and justice can be realized; when all violations files are opened and serious steps for 
redress and punishment can be taken150. 
The element of fighting corruption needs to be included in the transitional justice project 
as it is important in achieving a transition to democracy, stability and the prevention of 
tyranny. The uncovering of the truth is pivotal to the success in the struggle against 
corruption151. Alongside of this, institutions and certain laws must be comprehensively 
reformed if the sources of corruption are to atrophy; decision-making must be de-
centralized and transparency in administrative procedures is essential152.  In order to 
achieve this, an independent body that will develop and restructure institutions should 
be created; as should a time frame for implementation. There also needs to be an 
investigation into financial and administrative corruption so as to determine the 
necessary procedures for dealing with them153. These procedures should include 
administrative discipline or referral to the public prosecution. The independent body 
should also have the authority to propose the draft laws necessary to the successful 
achievement of its objectives. 
In regards to financial crimes committed during the old regime, a general rule of 
attributing criminal accountability by bringing the accused before the public prosecutor 
should be implemented. This procedure of giving perpetrators a fair hearing could be 
accompanied by a process of reconciliation. This principle of transitional Justice allows 
movement from the stage of corruption and chaos to stability and improved conditions. 
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Restoration of looted money will also help those countries suffering from institutional, 
economic and political turmoil to work more efficiently on this situation through the 
adoption of transitional justice.  
This is precisely the case in post-revolution Libya where protests about people who 
worked in the old regime having public functions led to the passing of the Political 
Isolation Law (PIL) in 2013154; though this was later repealed by the Libyan parliament155. 
It was an attempt to bring those involved in crimes or financial corruption and 
administrative staff who worked in the Gaddafi regime before the judiciary. If the 
transitional government does not invariably use the principles of transitional justice to 
conduct the affairs of state, then it requires the people to be free of the desire for 
revenge through a process of national reconciliation if there is to be a transition from 
totalitarianism to a new democratic political system which is capable of achieving national 
aspiration This will not preclude from a fair trial those who committed crimes or fixed 
evidence, especially financial crimes, in order to recover money looted or smuggled 
abroad, when this cannot be restored without a court ruling. 
2.8-Conclusion 
In summary, this study notes that transitional justice can be used to establish the rule of 
law, to protect human rights and obligate countries that are undergoing transitions to 
implement their legal obligations against human rights violations; thus, it is a suitable 
theory which can be applied in this study,   
Transitional justice involves a package of measures to be taken by a state that has 
emerged from conflict or revolution and suffered from serious violations of human rights. 
The main obstacle to its application is often the unwillingness of the government to 
undertake these measures. Often, past problems are very complex and cannot be 
resolved by a single procedure without any effort to uncover the truth or award 
compensation. For example, it may be considered necessary to punish a few perpetrators 
as a form of political revenge, and uncover the truth in isolation from efforts to punish 
the perpetrators. Furthermore, institutional reform can be considered without any real 
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intention of action by the state, which renders their words worthless. What could be 
regarded as compensation may be done without regard to judicial trials or truth-seeking 
and may be seen as an attempt to buy the silence of the victims.  
Transitional justice faces some challenges in the implementation of its elements, such as 
the conflict between achieving justice or peace, identifying the victims and whether there 
are sufficient resources available to cover mechanisms like compensation, trials or 
institutional reform. In spite of these difficulties, using the elements of transitional justice 
is an appropriate approach to apply to studying and analysing issues relating to 
international financial crimes committed in Libya during the war and the transitional 
period. In addition, Transitional justice includes law reform to establish procedures to 
deter future offenses, address the violations anterior and punishing the corruptors. 
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Chapter Three: The Global Problem of Money Laundering. 
3.1-Introduction 
ML continues its dramatic growth as a global crime despite national and international 
efforts to counter it. According to Interpol, cooperation between the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO) and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) resulted in 
the seizure of approximately USD 3.5 million in 2009 (see Interpol report, 2014). Then, 
why is this crime seemingly so difficult to prevent? Therefore, this chapter attempts to 
give a comprehensive account of ML, and also examines the role of globalisation in 
opening up new avenues for criminal groups to launder money earned through criminal 
activities specifically in illegal oil selling. Furthermore, it will highlight whether the 
development of technology is a reason behind the growth of the ML crime in addition, 
the chapter focuses on the economic, social and political impacts of ML including the 
argument as to whether ML has a benefit to the domestic economy or not. 
3.2-Objectives of Money Laundering 
The first reason for laundering money is to hide the link between illegal proceeds and 
their illegal origin, such as gambling, prostitution, narcotics, etc. The other reason for 
laundering money is that the launderer after earning huge funds from drug trafficking or 
other offending, needs to invest the illegal proceeds through the financial markets, and 
also erase their connection with the underworld, creating a strong link with the business 
and financial world, and finally to integrate into the market economy. As a result, Taher 
has argued that they will not only access the financial system and place their money in 
the financial markets, but will also gain prestige and high position in the social and political 
world156. Similarly, Dhillon, et al suggested that criminals seek to launder the proceeds 
gained from organised crime to protect this illegal money from confiscation, and make it 
difficult for law enforcement agencies to prove that certain funds are the product of 
criminal acts157. According to Barry Rider the most serious crimes are motivated by greed 
and the prospect of acquisition of money and control over it158. He added that economic 
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crimes are committed for the purpose of obtaining profits through illegal activities, from 
murder to drugs trafficking to fraud; these crimes have made many people rich at great 
cost to others. ML is a serious crime that effects the growth of economy as a whole; it 
hampers the social, political and cultural development of societies worldwide159. In the 
same way, Gilmore, believes that ML is a worldwide problem based, on two main factors. 
Firstly, due to the speed with which money or any other asset or economic value can 
travel around the economy of the countries or territories, the proceeds of crime change 
form so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources160. 
Secondly, any discrepancy between national measures to fight ML can be potentially used 
by launderers, who might be motivated to find and to take advantage of the weakest link 
in the preventive/regulatory and punitive anti-MI. norms of a particular country by 
shifting flows of dirty assets to that country161. Given that ML. is a global problem, it 
requires an international, coordinated and harmonized response162. 
3.3-The Origin of Money Laundering, 
 
According to Schneider the term ‘ML’ originated in the US in the 1920s or even earlier, 
when the US-based Mafia started using high cash turnover businesses, such as 
launderettes and carwashes, to hide the origin of their illicit money,163. Ering noted that 
one of the founding fathers of ML was Myer Lansky, who took advantage of the Swiss 
Banking Act of 1934 that created Swiss banking secrecy. Recently, new technological 
developments have offered money launderers worldwide the opportunity to launder 
their criminal funds164. Nowadays, according to Abel Souto there are many different types 
of sophisticated techniques to help them easily launder illegal proceeds, such as new 
payment methods for ML, specifically prepaid cards, and payment services on the 
Internet165. 
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Demetis has confirmed that money laundering complexity is the basis of the crime, as it 
is a generated prerequisite for concealing transactions and blurring the money trail. Thus, 
in ML there are different types of complexity that are propelling and exploiting the 
intrinsic patterns of systemic complexity. In this case, complexity becomes an absolutely 
critical mode of functioning for the money laundering system itself, rather than just a 
setting for something to be prevented or curbed. So, criminals intentionally force types of 
complexity on AML; such as the fast changes and the unpredictable ML strategy 
generated166. 
3.4-The Stages of Money Laundering 
Cash smuggling and trade-based ML have become very popular with money 
launderers.167 At the same time, banks normally focus on transactions, such as cash 
deposits and act as a control on ML trade. However, recent developments in banking 
technology, such as the introduction of mechanisation and computerisation in the banks 
and credit and debit cards, threaten bank transactions and lead to fraud through Internet 
banking; thus, risks have significantly increased. This section will describe the old process 
of ML, involving three stages, and include the electronic techniques that are used in these 
stages: 
3.4.1 -Placement 
Placement is the first stage of the ML process; this part is the process during which illicitly 
derived money is introduced into the financial markets. This is a critical stage in disposing 
of large cash sums by introducing them into the legitimate financial system. It is also the 
stage at which ML activities are most vulnerable to detection. There is no single route for 
ML in the placement stage, but a number of techniques are used, such as smuggling 
money into a country, and introducing large amounts of money into a bank account or 
entering into some commercial transactions168.  Schneider considers that the placement 
stage could take place by secondary deposit through transferring money to a legal 
depositor, and thus criminal proceeds are converted into other assets via front men, who 
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trade with the account of a third party169. There are other ways to use secondary deposits, 
which is by forwarding the displacement of ML into life insurance companies or by means 
of pretend turnovers170. Further, money launderers use ‘smurﬁng’, where cash is divided 
into small deposits of money used to avoid AML reporting requirements and suspicion of 
ML crime171. The other method involves purchases of real estate with illegal proceeds, 
and then selling the property lower than its real value; the objective being to launder the 
money. 
3.4.2- Layering 
Layering is the second stage of the ML process where the launderer engages in one or a 
series of transactions to separate the money from its criminal origin172. In the layering 
stage, the first attempt is made to hide the actual source of ownership of the money 
through complex transactions between accounts, across states and international borders, 
purchases and resale of assets. The purpose of organizing these transactions is to hide 
the audit trail, and also disguise the origin of the proceeds. This is why perpetrators of 
this kind of crime look for a suitable environment, where there is a weak enforcement 
mechanism against ML, they use many different methods to achieve this, like offshore 
banks, shell companies, or tax havens in conjunction with offshore jurisdictions to make 
it virtually untraceable173. 
3.4.3 Integration 
Integration is the third stage of the ML process. In this stage, the illicitly derived proceeds 
are integrated into the legitimate financial system, and made available for use without 
any suspicion174.This stage complements the previous stages of hiding the illegal money 
by transferring it several times. This stage is the safest and the least risky due to it being 
difficult to detect the real source of the money that was laundered specifically, after the 
long-time period required for the earlier stages of the laundering, which could reach to 
several years.  In this stage, the launderers of money could take the advantage of this 
illegal wealth and re-introduce this money into the national or international economy175.  
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The launderers might reach a pinnacle of success at this stage through achieving 
integration into the legitimate economy, which means that the ML process has been 
successful in transforming the money and dividing it from the criminal activities which 
were the original cause of its existence; and thus, a reasonable justification has been 
obtained for ownership. This stage is the most open of the three stages. 
 
This legitimisation of dirty money is the most dangerous to the national economy, due to 
the fact that it is very difficult for the security authorities to discover the steps of this 
crime; and by the fact that dirty money has been subjected to several levels of recycling 
which have obliterated its origins and any suspicious characteristics176.The process of ML 
through these three stages shows that whenever headway is made in completing them, 
it becomes difficult to identify the real source of the illegal money that has been 
laundered. 
There are many different ways to achieve this purpose: Most banks around the world use 
electronic means because of modern technological developments in providing financial 
and banking services. This has helped money launderers take advantage of these 
technologies and develop new methods of ML, such as credit and debit cards, and they 
have abandoned conventional methods, such as cash smuggling across national borders, 
as much as possible to avoid banking supervision and to make it almost impossible to 
trace sources of illicit money. This is because a series of complicated transactions can 
separate the money from its illegal origin177. For example, cellular telephones and 
sophisticated electronic systems, which have appeared recently, facilitate and accelerate 
transactions. 
3.4.3.1-Credit and Debit Cards 
In recent years, the use of credit and debit cards has grown, and become one of the most 
important ways for money launderers to integrate illegal money into the financial system. 
In this way, the launderer transfers the proceeds of crime into an international bank 
account using credit cards, and can also use credit and debit cards to make payments and 
transactions all over the world; such crimes are thus also related to technological 
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developments that have increased recently by using electronic banks to cover a range of 
transactions and activities, such as account processing, online banking, bill payment, 
point of sale card transactions and electronic money which allow for the easy global 
movement of money178.  A huge increase in the number of cross border money 
transactions, together with the emergence of electronic banking, have provided new 
prospects for legal business activities that criminals exploit to launder their illicit 
proceeds179. 
3.4.3.2 -Electronic Money 
Electronic money is a new system, including the use of computer networks, the Internet 
and digital stored value systems. These include electronic money used for bank deposits, 
electronic funds transfer, payment processors, and digital currencies. Electronic money 
offers a number of advantages as a payment instrument; for example, according to 
Merlonghi, the conversion into conventional money or the transfer to another subject in 
the form of electronic value does not necessarily require the intervention of a banking or 
financial intermediary. Recently, electronic money has come to play an important role in 
the development of national and international trade, in particular electronic trading. It 
enables dealers to conduct their transactions and settle payments from anywhere, such 
as the home or office. Moreover, like traditional money, it is used for procuring products 
or services, and payment of expenses, such as bills and employee salaries180. However, 
electronic money has been turned from an effective means of trade development to an 
instrument used to commit crime, including fraud and ML. It is assumed that for the less 
advantaged, the development of electronic money and digital financial transactions 
represents a positive step on the road to economic progress that needs be taken into 
account181. 
Furthermore, electronic money, as a new payment tool, brings the advantages that it is 
easy and fast to move182. However, money launderers have not allowed electronic money 
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to achieve its stated purpose. Rather, as it developed, they subverted its purpose and 
abused its advantages, for laundering purposes. According to the Working Group on 
Typologies Report, electronic money is used extensively for the purposes of ML as it is 
faster than using cash, which means that customers can use it remotely, and avoid being 
questioned by the customs authorities. Also, in this new way, money could be laundered. 
As such, this new electronic system of payments and funds transfers provide an 
opportunity for money launderers and tax evaders to conceal their illegal funds, which 
might be proceeds of smuggling oil. Thus, electronic money may be considered to have 
provided an important new tool for ML183. 
3.5-The effect of Money Laundering 
ML as a global problem not only impacts on the growth of economy as a whole, but also 
the society and politics as suggested below: 
3.5.1-The Effect of Money Laundering on the Economy 
The most serious crimes are motivated by greed, and the prospect of acquisition of 
money and control over it. Economic crimes are committed for the purpose of obtaining 
profits through illegal activities which generated from the lack of reform of the 
accompanying economic departments and authoritarian rule in countries such as Libya184. 
ML and related behaviour threaten the soundness of an economy, and is a severe 
impediment to growth, which in turn could cause severe disruption to the national 
economy, with significant adverse consequences for development in a country. In all 
likelihood, this criminal activity will impact on foreign investment in a country, as 
companies decide to limit their business there185. 
The most important economic effects are the loss of public money and damage to the 
national economy. The huge increase in the volume of cross border money transactions 
represents new opportunities for money launderers to take advantage of legal business 
activities. According to Simson (2005), these represent risks to the soundness and stability 
of financial institutions and systems, with greater volatility of international capital flows, 
and a dampening effect on foreign investment at large. However, McDowell and Novis 
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have argued that there has been an increase in the number of these illegal processes, 
which affect the international and national economy186. In the same way, Alhaty has 
argued that ML helps increase domestic production due to the flow of money into the 
local economy187. This means that Anti- ML efforts can have a damaging effect on 
commerce, especially in developing nations, in preventing money flowing into the 
national economy. Similarly, Aluko added that ML could lead to a sharp surge in financial 
activities. In other words, cash transfers can still be a useful way for investment in 
developing countries188. For example, illegal funds laundered by PEPs can be used to 
purchase products, e.g. agricultural products, which can be sold officially in agricultural 
markets, thereby accumulating official wealth.  
On the other hand, Gilmore disagrees with this idea and considers that ML should be 
prohibited since it contains a negative influence on the financial sector, and, in general, 
even more on the socio-economic system. He adds that a second reason for taking legal 
actions against ML at the international level is that the proceeds of crime allows criminals 
to consolidate their economic power in the legitimate economy189. 
Crime must be tackled, however, not only because it is “wrong”, “deviant”, and 
“Injurious”190, but because the proceeds it creates typically benefit the individual less 
than they damage society; estimates from the US place the net cost of crime in the region 
of $1trillion per annum191. ‘’Research suggests that as much as 80% of criminal proceeds 
are laundered192and hence without money laundering, crime would be dramatically less 
profitable, and the supply of crime would suffer an adverse shock’’193. 
However, the negative effects of ML far outweigh any benefits derived from these illegal 
practices, even in the developing countries. For example, illicit money has a negative 
impact on the credibility of a state’s economy, as it involves the overall economic 
                                                          
186 McDowell, J and Novis, G. (2001) The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime. Economic 
Perspectives. An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Vol. 6 No.2 (p.6). 
187Alhaty, A. (2010) The Phenomenon of the Hidden Economy and Money Laundering, the Sources and the Effects - a 
study in a group of selected countries for (2008 - 1989) Journal of Economics and Management. Vol 81 (p.82). 
188 Aluko, A. (2011) The Impact of Money Laundering on Economic, and Financial Stability and on Political Development 
of Developing Countries: London, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (p.13). 
189Gilmore, W ibid (2003 p. 21). 
190 Ormerod, D. (2005) Smith & Hogan Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
191 Reuter, P. Truman, E. (2004) Chasing dirty money – The fight against money laundering. Discussion paper, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, DC 
192 Unger, B Ibid (2007). 
193 Killian J. et al (2015) Modeling the money launderer: Microtheoretical arguments on anti-money laundering policy 
International Review of Law and Economics 43.148–155 
68 
 
environment in which it is invested. Indeed, launderers ignore the economic viability of 
an investment, as their target is to engage the illicit money and recycle it through a 
legitimate enterprise, even though doing so may be contrary to existing economic rules 
and laws. Furthermore, ML leads to unequal competition between national and 
international investments, and impacts the domestic and international economy due to 
the negative effect on profitability194; thus, ML affects interest and exchange rates, as well 
as the movement of capital. 
As a result, ML has a negative impact on the credibility of economic policy, and the 
stability of international financial markets. In addition, the presence or suspicion of 
laundered money results in reduced confidence in a domestic market. As such, businesses 
may decide to relocate abroad to a safer jurisdiction not affected by ML.  This can lead to 
a decline in domestic production, and a rise in unemployment due to less employment 
opportunities in a shrinking job market195. In addition, according to a UN Report, the 
proceeds of drug trafficking amount to four times the size of the proceeds of legitimate 
trade196. Similarly, in countries such as, Bolivia and Colombia, according to some 
estimates, this amounts to the equivalent of the volume of legitimate exports; with an 
estimated $1 billion USD of criminal profits exchanged in the world’s financial markets 
every day197 and more than $1trillion transferred across the world daily; as the proceeds 
of drug trafficking can move very quickly between the countries indicated198. 
 
Although it can be easy to understand the effect of ML on the direct victims, those who 
lost funds as a result of the predicate crime, there can also be an even deeper impact on 
society as a whole199. As an example, money launderers seek to channel their illegal 
proceeds through front companies to hide the illegal source of such funds. Essentially, the 
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operations of these kinds of companies are subsidised, and can afford to sell their 
products at less than cost, which will impact on the entire economy200. 
Finally, as a result, these illegal actions divert money away from the national economy and 
legal business activities, which will significantly harm the international economy. 
 
3.5.2-The Effect of Money Laundering on Society 
ML impacts on society as it may lead to unemployment. Money launderers introduce their 
illegal money into the financial market system in the form of investments in particular 
markets. Their objective is to complete a certain stage of ML. Once this is accomplished, 
the launderer suddenly moves to the next stage, i.e. transferring the money out of, or 
away from the financial markets, which in the case of large volume funds may lead to a 
collapse of the particular financial market201. Therefore, this creates mistrust in the 
markets, and introduces distortions in the economy; for example, launderers may buy 
marketable securities on international markets, but suddenly sell them. This activity leads 
to an inflation of investment and the escape of private capital out of the local economy 
to a foreign economy. Indeed, laundered money always escapes from its original 
jurisdiction or source, especially where an economic offence was committed. This leads 
to damage to the structure of the national economy, and causes investment instability, 
while reducing government tax revenue. This is therefore reflected directly on social 
conditions, and contributes to growing poverty rates. Moreover, the huge economic 
power arising from ML crimes and the huge surplus of funds accruing to criminals from 
ML has a corrupting effect on all elements of society, which can lead to the virtual take-
over of legitimate government202. 
 
ML also has the most serious effect on violence as well as corruption and waste of money, 
which leads to serious damage to the economy and inefficiencies in the allocation of 
available economic resources in the country in both local and foreign jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the inequitable distribution of income and increased corruption may lead to 
lower social and economic welfare through higher prices and the diversion of resources 
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to non-priority projects, unrelated to the real needs of individuals. This promotes distrust 
towards governing regimes and rising public discontent. As a result, the ruling system will 
be rejected by some people, and it is natural that in turn, leads to the emergence of 
groups that reject and may resort to violence and terrorism as a way of reform and in 
order to claim their rights203; as has happened recently in some Arab countries. 
The other effect of ML on society is related to poverty, due to the unfair distribution of 
national income, and also increased corruption that makes many people rich at great cost 
to others, greatly increasing the crime rates in society, in relation to corruption, fraud, 
terrorism, and violence. However, it could be said that the proceeds of the crime, which 
are laundered and subsequent enjoyment of these funds by criminals, further fuel the 
crime cycle. Consequently, ML motivates other, different kinds of crimes and opens 
different ways to commit other crimes. Therefore, the growing crime rate affects social 
values, such as the values of work and production, due to money launderers not 
necessarily pursuing long term but rather short-term investments204.Investments that 
simply allow the recycling of their illicit proceeds even if they entail taking a low rate of 
return, such as speculation in 'real estate' before leaving the project to collapse at the 
completion of the ML purpose, which finally leads serious damage to the national 
economic system. 
3.5.3-The Effect of Money Laundering on Politics 
The effects of ML crime are not only on the economy and society, but include the political 
arena. The cumulative effects of ML indicated above may lead to unrest with political 
consequences. ML may undermine security and disrupt the stability of society due to ML 
operations orchestrated by organised criminal gangs with the objective of causing coups 
and political unrest at times. In consequence, security spending will have to be increased 
to protect the political regime. Moreover, the process of ML often involves distortion of 
the democratic processes in the community, because this crime will lead to the election 
of illegal earners to seats in Parliament, councils, trade unions, and industry bodies. 
Similarly, they will continue to encourage all of the above to support their presence to 
continue in the process of ML, and continue to engage in criminal activities, including 
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benefits and the resulting financial rewards205. 
The migration of workers has been increasing nowadays more than ever before, as this 
crime is related to globalisation. Fischer noted that migration is due to greater 
opportunities for work, particularly in the developing countries, and helps to increase the 
movement of money between countries206. It should be noted that Libya has become one 
of the main transit points for trafficked workers and migrant workers into Europe, 
resulting in huge loss of life207.Moreover, the numbers of people living in regions with 
some of the worst forms of poverty, including Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, 
have increased since the World Trade Organisation was established. Similarly, the gap 
between the rich and poor has widened worldwide during the World Trade Organisation 
decades, instead of generating income convergence between rich and poor nations208.In 
addition, according to Bashir and Abraham, there are no limits to the effects of ML, which 
are universal and include causing breakdown in government structures where launderers 
turnover large illegal proceeds, and use the illegal money to penetrate and undermine 
government structures. 
3.6-The relation between Money Laundering and the oil industry 
Oil is one of the main and vital resources in many industries; and represents the world's 
largest industry in terms of dollar value209. Oil industries involve different types of 
processes, such as exploration, extraction, refining, transporting and marketing. So, what 
is the relation between the petroleum industry and ML? How does it take place? This 
study has so far presented ML based on crimes seemingly unrelated to oil. Some countries 
that produce petroleum are rich, but the populations are poor. How can this happen? 
Indeed, corruption has taken place, often in collusion with the companies, which has 
prevented the investment of the proceeds of petroleum into infrastructure of the country 
they transfer them into individuals’ accounts, related to the governments210.Corruption 
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in these countries is associated with lack of transparency and accountability about the oil 
proceeds by some governments, where these operations are processed under an official 
government umbrella. Despite international efforts against corruption, these attempts 
have arguably failed211. The process for this illegal action could take place in one of two 
ways: firstly, the illegal sale of oil; and secondly through corruption in the petroleum 
industry. The first is accomplished through bribery by companies of government officials 
to facilitate the entry of these companies into the country’s oil sector. Obioma observed 
that the reason behind the corruption in this industry included “greed among the workers, 
management and stakeholders in the industry, the inordinate ambition to get rich quick, 
enjoy financial security, and improve one’s welfare, with extremely low risk of sanctions. 
The exogenous corruption comes from the government officials in selecting contractors 
to build the sector infrastructure, through the process of selecting a less competent 
contractor because of the desire to make personal gain by government officials212. For 
example, the American business consultant James Giffen was indicted by US prosecutors 
on federal bribery charges for channelling over US$78m in payments from some western 
oil companies to senior government officials in Kazakhstan, in order to allow these 
companies to work in the Kazakh oil industries213. 
The second way is theft of oil; for example, Katsouris and Sayne suggested that an average 
of 100,000 barrels per day in oil were stolen in the first quarter of 2013 in Nigeria214. This 
figure does not include what may happen at export terminals, or theft direct from the 
wellheads. In the same way, several Libyan people have become rich through smuggling 
oil through ports to some neighbouring countries215. There was also severe damage to 
institutional structures and the regulations, after the Libyan revolution 2011 which helped 
increase oil smuggling, and therefore ML, as this study has described in Chapter 1. 
Recently, in Libya, attempts were made to smuggle oil from Libya’s militant-controlled oil 
facilities, as a result the UNSC adopted a resolution allowing the Security Council’s 
member states to inspect ships suspected of carrying illegal crude oil from Libya in 
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international waters. Furthermore, the UNSC adopted sanctions against illegal crude 
exports. Thus, these kinds of crimes need national and international cooperation to curb 
them. 
3.6.1-The role of corruption in facilitating the activities that 
associated with money laundering and the sale of oil. 
Even though this study has presented ML as a phenomenon linked to financial or 
economic crime, it has also been described as a tool for organised crime, especially since 
it is related to other crimes, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and corruption. In relation 
to corruption, Aguilera and Vadera have defined “organisational corruption” as a “crime 
that is committed by the use of authority within organisations for personal gain”216. 
Hence, while corruption typically involves persons, who are in high public office, it may 
also involve any public or indeed private sector employee, who misuses his authority to 
achieve personal gain. 
Corruption has severe effects on the national and international economy. Indeed, 
corruption poses a significant danger to the stability of social and political institutions217. 
Nevertheless, financial institutions should increase the level of (CDD) for those customers 
identified as (PEPs) because they could pose higher risk than others. PEPs are defined as 
important people in a country, including any person who is working, or has worked in 
government. According to Johnson, these are typically presidents or heads of state, 
members of executive branches of government, members of parliament, or any senior 
political person. Hence, their bank accounts should be monitored to ensure no ML 
occurs218.For example, the government of Brazil requested that the account belonging to 
Paulo Maluf, a deputy member of the Sao Paulo State, be frozen, claiming that he looted 
money from Brazil, as described by World-Check219. Additionally; they must have the 
means to detect the crime using available information, and also disclose if there is any 
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suspicion related to ML220. 
However, the UK and USA have different definitions for PEPs. The UK has a specific 
definition for a PEP, which includes any person who has been working in a prominent 
public function in the last year, such as head of state, member of government or Member 
of Parliament; and may not necessarily be an entity, as noted by HM Revenue & Customs 
(2010). In contrast, the USA has a wider definition of a PEP, which includes any present or 
former senior foreign government official or senior foreign political party member, or 
senior executive in a foreign organisation or foreign government-owned commercial 
enterprise221. 
Corruption is a worldwide crime; it is not limited to some countries but afflicts all nations 
as it is related to valuable natural resources. Wherever government officials ‘primary aims 
are to achieve personal financial gain, and there are weak political institutions and rule of 
law, there is a prevalence of different types of corruption. According to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Nigeria and Angola were ranked as having high levels of corruption in 
2007 as well as being oil rich countries222.Corruption has also prevailed in many other 
African and Asian countries; and illegal oil sales in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, 
Nigeria and Angola have been valued at some $8 billion each year which ended up as 
laundered money223. Russia also suffered corruption at the end of 1980s and beginning 
of 1990s; and Russian exporters often received generous kickbacks in offshore bank 
accounts from European clients for selling oil, gas, gold, diamonds, aluminium, pulp and 
timber at low prices224. 
Corruption has also taken place in Iraq, and it increased in 1990s, due to the war. 
Between1991 and 2003 approximately 900 million barrels were smuggled from Iraq225. 
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Additionally, Iraq gained illegal proceeds of more than $8 billion between 1997 and 
2003226. 
The prevalence of this crime meant that the Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index 2004, classified rich countries which produced oil, namely:  Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Chad, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, 
Venezuela and Yemen as among the most corrupt countries. The head of Transparency 
International added that these countries lose their wealth through corruption by paying 
bribes at home and abroad, including to the local officials and the oil executives227.The 
World Bank has estimated that approximately $1 trillion is paid annually in bribes228.Thus, 
many countries that produce petroleum are rich, but their populations face abject 
poverty229. Peeran et al confirm that Libya is one of the world’s major producers of 
petroleum; nevertheless, the majority of the population live in considerable poverty230. 
Corruption in these countries is associated with a lack of transparency and accountability 
about oil proceeds by some governments, where these operations are processed under 
a government official’s umbrella. This happens despite international efforts against 
corruption. For example, referring to events in Congo’s Brazzaville, McFerson stated that: 
''In 2005, dealing with a private company, Africa Oil & Gas, run by Denis AM Gokana, the 
head of Congo’s national oil company and special adviser to President Sassou-Nguesso, 
arranged for an oil shipment to the United States for $53 million. The Congo government 
received $48.8 million, and Africa Oil & Gas pocketed $4.2 million''231. A French court 
convicted Abacha’s oil Minister, Dan Etete of ML for using 15 million Euros in funds 
obtained fraudulently to buy properties in 1999 and 2000; this included a chateau in 
northwest France, a Paris apartment and a luxury villa in the chic Paris suburb of 
Neuilly232. 
Corruption has severe effects on the national and international economy. Indeed, this 
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crime has made many people rich at great cost to others. The outcomes of these illegal 
actions are social harm and money diverted from economies and legal business activities. 
Indeed, corruption poses a significant danger to the stability of social and political 
institutions, and there is evidence that corruption is the main reason behind the political 
changes that happened in some countries233. In North Africa for example, large funds 
were smuggled from countries such as Libya. These funds were later frozen by UN 
decisions. Although there is an attempt to change the Libyan regime to a democratic one, 
the result has been violence and many difficulties facing the elected institutions when 
they try to instigate reforms. Therefore, this paper will explore why corruption still exists 
in Libya even though there were regulations issued against corruption.  It will also focus 
on the role of corruption and ML in limiting growth and improvements in the standard of 
living in these oil-producing countries. 
In this way, corruption and money laundering have a mutual effect (which mean each one 
has an effect on the other); and Gallant considers that the enormity of illegal proceeds 
could have a negative effect by diminishing the deterrent capacity of traditional criminal 
sanctions, whereby a loss of liberty through a term in prison becomes an acceptable cost 
given the financial gains to be obtained upon release. Thus, criminal sanctions become a 
cost of doing business, an expense that is easily absorbed by the revenues234. He adds 
that illegal proceeds could be contributing to causing corruption, through using resources 
furnished by the holder to infiltrate and pervert law enforcement agencies and political 
and judicial institutions235. Regarding the nexus between corruption and money 
laundering, Liew argues that money laundering does not necessarily precede corruption, 
which in essence means that there would still be corruption without money laundering236. 
In Libya Oil and oil derivative smuggling constitutes one of the means of ML crime in Libya. 
Oil was smuggled through Zuwara to Malta and Tunisia, because the oil derivatives were 
being subsidised by the government237. There are also practices which involve 
transferring billions of dollars to safe areas across the world - sums which were later 
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frozen by the Security Council resolution 1973 (2011)238. For example, in 2011 £2 billion 
were frozen in the UK, and $60 billion elsewhere, as this study has stated above. There is 
corruption in the drawing up of contracts for exploring petroleum, with companies that 
want to penetrate the Libyan markets239. The investment of huge capital sums overseas 
without control and the smuggling of oil, such as the attempt that was made to smuggle 
oil from Libya’s militia-controlled oil facilities on March 8th, 2014, have been well-
documented.  
According to Reuters (2011), approximately five million barrels of oil with a value of nearly 
half a billion dollars, disappeared in 2008. In 2011 £2 billion contained in 26 Libyan 
accounts were frozen by the UK, as was $60 billion of the Libyan Investment Company’s 
money held worldwide by the British bank HSBC240. Furthermore, Alfahlah reports on a 
case where an Egyptian bank received a transfer of $1,650,000 to the account of a 
navigation services company from one of its European counterparts. Although the bank 
requested information about the client who had ordered these funds to be transferred, 
no such information was ever received241. This transfer was for the customer of a Libyan 
bank. However, as the money was never transferred the case was not brought before the 
judiciary, and as there was no judgement issued it was not possible to know the Libyan 
judiciary’s perspective242. Moreover, a lot of money was smuggled both before and 
during the 2011 revolution and this clearly constitutes the crime of ML243. Oil smuggling 
or artificially lowering oil prices constitutes corruption and the Law of Libya website 
reports that during the Gaddafi's regime, oil was re-priced at less than its real price and 
sold on244. The purpose of selling the smuggled oil derivatives for less than the real price 
was to encourage the smugglers to participate in this risky situation; furthermore, its 
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price in Libya was also too low.  At nightfall, there are many smugglers who fill ships with 
fuel in western Libya and smuggle these oil materials to Italy245.Here 27 fuel stations were 
closed in 2017 due to their participation in the smuggling of oil derivatives, which were 
an estimated 27.31 million litres246.Evidence of this is supported by the UN decision 
concerning freezing the Libyan smuggled funds, issued in Resolution No. S/RES/1970 
(2011)247. 
 All this is evidence shows that ML was taking place by means of smuggling. However, the 
interviews also revealed how oil smuggling has taken place in Libya, the legal adviser at 
National Oil argued that the smuggling oil from the oil ports could not possibly be a means 
of ML, because the exportation of oil was limited to certain institutions, which had all 
signed contracts before the exportation. Furthermore, they had also designed their 
factories to work with this kind of oil and he thus considered that: ''the selling of oil is by 
international institutions to organisations that have been identified in advance, so illegal 
oil operations are impossible because of the difficulty in selling it (illegally acquired oil)’’248. 
However, there is strong evidence249 to suggest that oil smuggling has been used as a 
means of ML, and that rather than abating after the end of the Gaddafi's regime, ML 
continued under many different guises, such as oil smuggling, as mentioned above. Sea 
routes have been used to smuggle subsidized goods including oil, and people have 
exploited smuggling as an illegal business to improve their standard of living. The 
transparency team for Libya (2010) confirmed that the weakness of Libyan employees 
‘salaries and disparity in income distribution are clearly some of the reasons for the 
prevalence of corruption was because people were seeking to raise their standard of 
living. The law relating to Libyan employees’ salaries that was issued in 1981 was a reason 
behind the low salaries which were inadequate to meet the basic needs of staff. This 
caused them to invent different ways to improve their incomes which included illegal 
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means such as bribery and other forms of corruption,250as this study has discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Idrissi, the former head of the FIU in the Libyan Central Bank has stated that no ML 
operations were recorded in Libya, as the former regime wanted to demonstrate that 
Libya has complied with international standards251. However, the law relating to ML falls 
short of international standards and knowledge of the law is limited252.  
Evidence of crime and to know the size of this crime is in the answer to the relevant 
interviews questions from Official Financial employee 2 who confirmed that there were 
large amounts of funds which were smuggled and then frozen when he stated: “About 
the money that was smuggled and then frozen – well, its volume was estimated at 
approximately seven billion DLY”253. This statement is confirmation that the smuggling of 
funds has taken place as a way of laundering money in Libya. 
The type of ML in Libya related to the smuggling of oil derivatives to neighbouring 
countries is a crime concentrated in the border areas. In an attempt to mitigate high 
prices and help the poorer class of society, the Libyan government subsidised essential 
consumer goods by an estimated 12,400 million DLY, estimated as approximately 
$15,500 million, in 2013. Fuel subsidies formed part of this initiative. During the 
interviews, some of reasons behind this crime were clarified, the Official National Oil 
Corporation Employee remarked ‘’so the provision of subsidy for oil derivatives has 
encouraged some people in Libya to smuggle it in order to earn the difference between 
the international price of the oil and the local, subsidized price.’’254  At the same time, the 
poverty in neighbouring countries has meant that there has been a demand by the people 
there for these cheaper oil derivatives. The National Oil Corporation Employee added 
that: ‘‘the illegal selling of oil derivatives is taking place through distribution stations to 
the neighbouring countries’’255.  Therefore, this facility is helping to smuggle oil 
derivatives; and I also believe that another reason for this type of smuggling is that some 
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Libyan people are looking to improve their the incomes in this way due to the law on 
Libyan employee‘s salaries issued in 1981. Therefore, oil smuggling has been used in 
order to earn the difference between the international and local price, which has had a 
negative effect on the local economy and maintaining a standard of living has become 
difficult due to lack of provision of the fuel256. Additionally, oil smuggling crime has made 
some people rich at the great cost to others, which has had a negative effect on the social 
situation as well257. 
The other problem that has been identified is that there is no control on the selling of oil; 
and the smuggling of oil derivatives is taking place without being observed by the 
competent institutions like security and customs. As the Official National Oil Corporation 
employee remarked: “Security is obtained through observation of the border and through 
the link between the Customs Department and the border ports’’258.  
Furthermore, Official Financial Employee1’s answers revealed that there were not many 
cases of ML crime through the illegal selling of oil that had been registered: ‘’...oil 
smuggling did take place one time through a vessel that shipped oil from the port of 
Zuwara and headed to Malta, where it sold the shipment to another vessel in 2015’’259. 
Also, there were unsuccessful attempts made to smuggle oil, as Official Financial 
Employe3, remarked: ‘’...there was an attempt to smuggle oil through the gateway that 
was stopped in international seas in 2014,’’260. 
Additionally, the policies used to manage the country that were adopted by the ‘Popular 
Revolution’ that started in 1973, involved radical changes to Libya’s system of 
governance. Corruption did not stop in Libya, and continued after the Libyan revolution.  
The end of Gaddafi’s regime also did not mark an end to corruption, and it still exists in 
many forms, for example the smuggling of oil to the neighbouring countries. The 
attempts to develop and adopt legislation that works against this crime will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
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Although Libya enacted the CMLA (2005), this has not been effective in preventing ML 
crime, as this crime has increased, according to reports which confirmed that the 
smuggled oil reached a value of 21.895 million DLY, in March 2017.261The smuggling of 
fuel from Libya is enough for approximately 40% of the needs of the Tunisian market262. 
As the Official National Oil Corporation Employee remarked: ‘’...so the provision of subsidy 
for oil derivatives has encouraged some people in Libya to smuggle it in order to earn the 
difference between the international price of the oil and the local, subsidized price.’’263The 
Official National Oil Corporation Employee confirmed that: “the illegal selling of oil 
derivatives is happening through distribution stations to neighbouring countries”264. 
Similarly, Judge 7.1, added: “There is no security in the country and the spread of chaos 
helped to allow and increase the crime; and the illegal proceeds could be hidden by buying 
real estate and transferring ownership abroad”265. Similarly, Official Financial Employee 8 
added: “The sale of illegal oil derivatives is happening through smuggling to neighbouring 
countries. The cause is the poverty in these counties and the low price of the oil derivatives 
in Libya compared to the price in these neighbouring counties”266.  
These answers reveal how ML has taken place, and how it has given rise to significant 
losses in the proceeds of Libyan oil, due to the lack of any proper monitoring of the system 
of oil selling. In the following section, the aim is to identify gaps in the application of the 
law relating to ML which need to be filled in order to criminalise all the means of ML. The 
absence and insufficiency of these regulations will be explored next, and these 
regulations will be shown not to have covered all ML operations. 
As previously stated, the illegal oil selling of Libyan oil perpetrated by official employees 
is commonplace in Libya, thus making ML a global problem. The oil regions and the oil 
export ports in Libya are under control of armed factions and have seen major bouts of 
violence and a high degree of tension, as these ports continue to close over the last few 
years. That led to most people in this region living in abject poverty, despite residing in a 
region that has the largest oil output. The armed factions conditionally open oil exporting 
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ports to allow oil to be exported, and for this they obtain a substantial amount of money 
and smuggle this illegal money overseas. 
The head of National Oil argued has confirmed that a strategy has been used by armed 
factions to obtain a million DYL daily by claiming that they guard the oil institutions with 
22,800 personnel, while the real number is only a thousand. He confirmed that they had 
smuggled 40 thousand litres of oil derivatives and added that another smuggling 
operation of oil derivatives was being carried out by armed factions from the Zawiya Oil 
Refinery267. Further in 2013, approximately 4 million was given by the Prime Minister as 
a bribe to the head of the armed factions, Ibrahim Jadhran as an inducement leave the 
oil institutions268. 
In the UK ML crime has taken many forms, including corruption. For example, there is 
corruption in the drawing up of some contracts.269 This could be by use of third-party 
intermediaries such as agents or consultants or by giving gifts or providing meals, 
entertainment or travel to government employees, which violate the UK Bribery Act270. 
The UK has therefore requested the companies working in oil, gas, mining and forestry 
who are registered and EU-listed to report their payments annually to their governments 
worldwide, starting from early 2015, country by country and project by project271.  The 
UK is used by some corrupt foreign politicians as a safe haven for their illegal proceeds; 
they view London as a channel for laundered funds because there’s a lot of property to 
be bought. The money enters London via legal companies offshore, which is the weak 
point in this system due to the ease of creating a UK company via the Internet and even 
concealing the property272. London is a major trading centre for oil from West Africa; and 
it is estimated that London has been used for laundering around $470 million as proceeds 
from Congo's oil. In this instance, the Congolese government had been able to hide its 
corruption through a series of companies. One of these was registered in the UK, the 
National Oil Company of Congo, which sold oil at very low prices to a series of ‘shell’ 
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companies273. At the same time, the Realistic estimates put the value of money 
laundering through the UK at up to hundreds of billions of pounds sterling annually274; 
and in 2017 the Annual Fraud Indicator estimated that fraud cost the economy £190 
billion per year and there were 3.4m fraud offences in 2016–176 – almost a third of all 
crime275. 
There is another case related to the UK’s ‘shell’ companies, an estimated $1 billion dollars 
was laundered through a network of companies; some of them had not officially 
completed their registration in the UK and some being registered elsewhere276. More 
than $1.3 billion was stolen and laundered by former Nigerian dictator, General Sani 
Abacha; this illegal operation was done moreover through 23 London- based banks, 
which processed money suspected of being looted from the Nigerian treasury, Barclays 
alone having handled more than $170 million of these funds277.  Walker adds that the flow 
of money generated and laundered in the same region of the world may actually involve 
international transfers (e.g. a flow from the UK to Switzerland would be included in the internal 
figure of $985bn for money generated and laundered in Europe)278. 
ML could be one of the most serious impairments to the UK economy and its reputation, 
due to hundreds of billions of pounds being laundered through the UK banks and their 
subsidiaries annually. These large illegal proceeds which might be from oil sector are 
obtained through organised crime and corrupt PEPs279. Thus, according to the National 
Crime Agency (NCA), ML takes place in two ways: Firstly, by moving money through the 
UK banks, using an agency to transfer the money in smaller amounts to avoid detection. 
Secondly, there is high-end ML, which uses the bank system to launder money in 
operations that involve the largest values280. 
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Some money launderers have obtained their illegal funds by the most common means of 
transferring money, which is drug trafficking, because this activity does not leave any 
documentary trace. At the same time, according to Ryder, the “total quantified organised 
crime market in the UK is worth about £15 billion per year as follows: drugs (50 per cent); 
excise fraud (25 per cent); fraud (12 per cent); counterfeiting (7 per cent); organised 
immigration crime (6 per cent)”281. Other ways of ML that have taken place in the UK are 
to do with levels of corruption, some of which relate to the immigration service282. The 
EU observer has remarked that in Europe, corruption results in losses of approximately 
€120 billion annually283. Specifically, defence contracts are an opportunity for corruption; 
and it is estimated that $20 billion dollars are lost per annum due to corruption related 
to these contracts284. Additionally, ML in the UK could take other forms “these range from 
complex financial vehicles and tax havens through to property investments in London, to 
easily transportable and high value jewellery”285 
Tax evasion is defined by Barne-Aldred, C.W.et al as ‘’i.e., not reporting sales revenue to 
tax authorities’’286; and it is an illegal practice in all countries. It has a negative impact on 
local economies because it reduces the effectiveness of the financial policies pursued by 
governments for the purpose of raising the growth rate and improving the distribution of 
income. Although, the UK attempts to prevent ML in whatever form, even tax evasion; 
according to the NCA the UK loses approximately £5.4 billion of UK tax revenues per 
annum to organised crime 287. 
The laundering of global money in the UK can be conducted through the luxury housing 
sector; as it is possible to launder a large amount of money in one go by investing in this 
sector. According to information reported by the Financial Times, the volume of 
‘suspicious’ transactions in home buying, through external companies since 2004 has 
amounted to £180m of UK property; and been subject to criminal investigation as the 
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suspected proceeds of corruption.288 These deals have been transacted through buying 
housing that has cross-links with foreign firms and political persons289. In the same way, 
it has been confirmed that some luxury housing has been bought by Russian money 
launderers who have directed their money into the UK through ‘front companies’, which 
have been created to receive these dirty monies290. The UK has also emphasised the need 
to control arms exports, to ensure that licences are free from bribery291. This also extends 
to the buying of oil; for example, there is the oil deal, which William Hague was faced 
with questions about, i.e. transactions with the Libyan Obtained Heritage Oil Company of 
approximately £12.23 million (see below). 
Organised crime generates other crimes, and has a major influential role in the 
prevalence of ML crime; a negative impact on the economy and has links with terrorism. 
Organised crime costs the UK approximately £40bn annually292. Some success has been 
had with anti-organised crime strategy in the UK such as freezing funds belonging to 
certain suspect groups, but in 2006, the UK was only able to recover £9,318293. 
Nevertheless, in 2015 there was some improvement in the implementation of 
confiscation orders due to better multi-agency co-operation and the identification of 
weaknesses in the enforcement of orders, particularly on priority cases. Additionally, 
some improvements were made on the ability to use published financial statements to 
hold individual bodies to account, which resulted in the collection of £155 million in 2014-
15, that is the highest amount collected to date294. 
The oil sector constitutes a fertile ground for corruption; Watt and Mason have pointed 
out that William Hague, the then British Foreign Minister, faced questions about his role 
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in a controversial £12.23 million oil transaction with the Libya Obtained Heritage Oil 
Company. It was alleged that Hague had a private meeting with Tony Buckingham, the 
chief executive of Heritage Oil and a former mercenary who has given the Conservative 
party almost £60,000295. Thus, there is evidence that oil smuggling is still a significant 
problem; and this illegal action has allowed those who committed this crime to achieve 
large profits. Haigner et al suggest that the illegal arms business in Libya, which has 
provided weapons which have recently been used to undermine stability in Libya, is 
substantially funded by oil smuggling and ML296. 
In the same way, Faull et al have highlighted that the procedures of AML are under 
serious scrutiny, specifically the high-end ML through the City of London. For example, 
there is an $800m bank transfer that has a high risk of being related to corruption and 
suspicious operations in the oil industry297 A further factor is that low-paid officials can 
demand bribes to carry out bureaucratic procedures298.These characteristics thus 
constitute the main reasons for the prevalence of bribery, which is an aspect of 
corruption and a means by which money is laundered. So, the UK has adopted the Bribery 
Act (2010) that has addressed the problem of ML by creating a new crime to prevent 
persons associated with commercial organisations committing bribery on behalf of these 
organisations299. 
The Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2015300 noted that the UK had made 
progress under the FATF recommendations in fighting ML operations through addressing 
significant deficiencies in its legislation and responding to ML across a number of core functions 
and responsibilities by adopting the POCA (2002). Also by strategies such as the reports 
procedures which seeks the consent of the NCA before undertaking an activity which the reporter 
suspects may constitute ML; adopting the FATF recommendation and importing the EU’s Fourth 
ML Directive and entering it ''into UK law in the form of the Money Laundering Regulations (MLR 
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2017); and this has removed the UK from the FATF’s ‘regular follow-up process'' which resulted 
in improving the UK's regulations, which have adopted sound principles301. 
3.7-Conclusion 
In summary, ML is a crime based on other crimes, such as drug trafficking or theft of oil, 
oil derivatives or corruption in the oil industry. The definition of the crime was expanded 
to include other serious crimes, such as corruption, tax evasion and fraud.  Although, the 
majority of crimes have a clear impact, for example murder, in the case of ML it is unclear 
who the actual victim is. Thus, most countries worldwide are fighting an activity which is 
basically invisible and without a clear victim. Although some authors have argued that the 
ML has benefits that reflect on the domestic economy, in contrast, others considered that 
ML has a negative impact on the national and international economy. I have argued that 
ML presents more disadvantages than advantages. It reflects negatively on the economy, 
so will have negative results on the people of the countries where these crimes have taken 
place; for example, through the increase in crime and poverty. 
Despite international efforts to combat ML, this crime has increased. This process has 
been facilitated by technological developments that have occurred during the era of 
globalisation. Furthermore, some ML transactions involve government officials. 
Moreover, money launderers have benefited from globalisation, yet another advantage 
of globalisation, in this case, is the international co-operation between law enforcement 
agencies. This represents one of the ways to curb this crime. 
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Chapter Four: The International Campaign against Money 
Laundering. 
4.1- Introduction. 
This chapter explores the international criminalization of money laundering302, the 
measures considered to be necessary weapons in the fight against ML and the offences 
that are predicated on it. It is crucial to understand international attempts to curb ML 
crime, and just how rapidly these measures have developed. This study will discuss the 
process of criminalization and the extent to which the international campaign against ML 
has struggled to curb this crime. 
The purpose of this chapter is thus to understand the development of the criminalization 
of ML by discussing important issues that will clarify the development of international 
efforts to combat ML through the conventions that started with the Vienna Convention 
(1988), which is considered as the basis for the subsequent conventions and changes to 
the domestic regulations in some countries to prevent this crime. This chapter will also 
discuss the functions of international organizations that seek to curb ML crime. 
Accordingly, this chapter will deal with the criminalization of ML and move on to consider 
the Vienna Convention (1988). It will then address European measures against ML; the 
Basel Committee Statement of Principles (December 1988), the FATF Recommendations, 
the 2000 Palermo Convention; the International Criminal Police (Interpol), the role of the 
International Monetary Fund in AML efforts and finally the Islamic regulation of ML.   
Thus, the importance of discussing international law in this thesis lies in assessing the 
potential for Libya to benefit from the UN, AML treaties and FATF recommendations. This 
kind of crime crosses borders; and it therefore requires cooperation between countries 
to combat it effectively. This involves applying international principles to national 
regulations and applying these rules to deal effectively with international financial 
services. So, this chapter will explore the principles that should be applied to the national 
laws of the Libya to fill the gap in the current global AML, as one of the aims of this 
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research is to discover, through the interviews conducted, the impact of international law 
on local regulations. 
4.2 -The Criminalization of Money Laundering by the Vienna 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic 
Drugs 1988, 
The Vienna Convention sought to criminalize ML in Article 3303, which also obliges the 
member states to take necessary measures, such as establishing a comprehensive list 
with a punishment for all illegal activities related to drugs-trafficking; and to criminalize 
any activity if it involved any of the following:  Firstly, the conversion or moving of money 
to a place less likely to attract attention; or from an act of participation in such offense. 
Secondly, the disguising or concealment of the true origin of the proceeds, its source, 
location and the rights that related to the ownership of proceeds, at the same time 
knowing that the sources of these properties were illegal or from an act of participation 
in such offenses; thirdly, the acquisition, possession or use of property when knowing 
that the money came from illegal activity or from an act of participation in such an 
offense.  
Thus, this Convention has added an important point, which is the criminalization of 
'participation' in committing these crimes. Participation is when the crime is committed 
by more than one person, it could be through incitement to commit the crime, by helping 
to prepare for the offence or just by hiding the evidence of the crime. However, some 
countries, like Libya, had already criminalized aiding the commission of these crimes in 
their penal law. The drafters of the Vienna Convention were keen to involve the different 
types of criminal participation in ML crimes and obliged the member countries, which 
numbered 170 in 2005304, to criminalize participation in the commission of these crimes, 
be it actually committing the crime or assisting, inciting or facilitating it305. The question, 
however, is whether this criminalization is sufficient to limit money laundering in Libya, 
and this will be considered in more detail later. Even Islamic law criminalizes earning 
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money by illegal means such as theft, embezzlement, bribery, corruption, etc.., which are 
the primary crimes of the money laundering, as will be explained later. As far as Libya is 
concerned, anti-corruption principles are contained in Islamic Law; and, as an Islamic 
country, Libya needs to establish clear regulations relevant to the local culture in this 
case. This could usefully act as the link between international law and Libyan anti-money 
laundering regulations. States such as Libya could be encouraged to change their anti-
money laundering regulations, in ways which do not contradict their underlying principles 
but rather support the anti-financial crime principles contained in Islamic rules. 
This Convention did not create a dispute settlement body; but, in paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article 32, it allowed member states to settle disputes by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, recourse to regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful 
means agreed on by them. If it is impossible to settle a dispute, it can be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for a decision306.Thus, in the case of a dispute between 
member states related to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties 
could seek to settle disputes through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their 
choice. If there is a dispute, and the parties have failed to achieve a settlement through 
negotiation or peaceful means such as conciliation, arbitration, according to paragraphs 
2 or 3 of the aforementioned Article the dispute can be referred, at the request of any 
one of the parties, to the International Court of Justice for a decision. However, some 
member counties, for example Algeria, France and China, have reservations on this point 
and consider themselves not bound by the provisions of Article 32, paragraph 2. These 
countries feel that all parties in the dispute should agree to its being referred to the 
International Court of Justice for a decision. The most prominent feature of this 
Convention was that it addressed the issue of international cooperation and required the 
member countries to make their domestic regulations reflect the executive 
measures307that included international cooperation on issues such as confiscation, 
extradition and mutual legal assistance. Bashir and Abrahim, added that this convention 
was also important in the way it combated the drug trafficking element of ML and 
addressed recently developed means of curbing drug trafficking and ML such as 
                                                          
306 The Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs 1988 paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article32.  
307Article 6 to 9 of the Vienna Convention, 1988. 
91 
 
international cooperation on observing commercial transport and cooperation on the 
high seas308. These behaviours, which have been criminalized, will be later examined 
through the interviews in relation to whether they are addressed in the Libyan anti-
money laundering law or not. The Vienna Convention has addressed international 
cooperation through mutual legal assistance, extradition and forfeiture in this context as 
follows: 
4.2.1- Mutual Legal Assistance in the Vienna Convention.  
Each of the member countries had to provide, on request by another member country, 
the widest measure of mutual legal assistance that included the procedures of 
confiscation and all the judicial proceedings which related to the activities that were 
criminalized by this convention, including limiting or freezing the illegal proceeds until the 
judgment was issued, in order to prevent the movement of this money309. Similarly, this 
convention went further in obliging the member countries to enforce other member 
countries’ judgments of forfeiture upon request. They had to hear witnesses, report the 
judicial documents, carry out an investigation and receive the information and evidence. 
Additionally, the Vienna Convention allows member countries to ignore banking secrecy 
in Article 5(3)310. This means that banks can pass on a customer’s data, which is normally 
protected by law, to others who are authorized, as privacy is not implemented for crimes 
related to the subject of this convention.  
4.2.2- Extradition in the Vienna Convention. 
Extradition is based on the requisition from a state to another country to extradite a 
criminal existing in its territory. The Vienna Convention addressed the legal obstructions 
to extradition procedures that relate to ML crime involving the illegal drug trade.  This 
Convention allows any party to extradite if the case is related to ML crime or any crimes 
that are the subject of the Convention311. On the other hand, in Article 6(6), the 
Convention also allows a state to refuse extradition if there are any reasons that could 
facilitate the prosecution or punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions by the party who requested the extradition312. Article 
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6(10) gives a state who refuses to extradite someone, the authority to implement a 
punishment against the offender if he/she is a citizen of the state; on condition that the 
punishment is in accordance with the laws of the state requesting extradition’313.In order 
to enhance effective international cooperation, the Vienna Convention provides the legal 
basis of an extradition when related to ML crime or any crimes in Article 6. When there 
are no other extradition treaties between the countries, the member states are obliged 
by this Convention to provide mutual legal assistance, upon request, for the purposes of 
searches and seizures. 
To protect the accused, this Article allows to any party to refuse to implement the 
extradition requested if they believe that this person will not get a fair trial because of 
racism or any other reasons (e.g. the justice system is corrupt, or there is no due process... 
etc.). The party then has the authority to implement a punishment if the offender is its 
citizen and the punishment is in accordance with the laws of the state requesting 
extradition.    
4.2.3-Forfeiture in the Vienna Convention 
This Convention, in the spirit of international cooperation, obliges their parties to enforce 
forfeiture judgments that order confiscation of the proceeds of illegal drug trade or ML. 
This applies when these proceeds exist in the territory of another country which is not 
where the crime took place (Article 5, Vienna Convention, 1988). This means that any 
member state can request that illegal proceeds from crimes stipulated by the Convention 
be confiscated by the state where these proceeds have been found. Furthermore, the 
member countries can also inaugurate earlier procedures of confiscation, like measures 
relating to the limitation of funds and proceeds and tracking them and freezing them to 
allow forfeiture314.  Tahar adds that the requested state has to allow the courts and their 
authorities such as banks and financial institutions to make the commercial and bank 
records available as banking secrecy no longer applies in such cases315. 
Liew considers that revoking confiscation procedures contributes to money laundering 
and has increased over time. It converts the illegitimacy of money into legitimacy, and 
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thus has had negative effects. It facilitates and strengthens criminals and badly affects 
the functionality of the financial institutions. The volume and the size of this crime is 
unknown, which hinders implementing corrective strategies316. 
4.3 -European Measures against Money Laundering, 
 
4.3.1-The Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime, Strasbourg 1990, 
 
This Convention, which was issued in 1990, is also called the Council of Europe 
Convention and is related to the inspection, control and confiscation procedures of funds 
that are the proceeds of ML in the member states of the Council of Europe317and the 
other state signatories. The target of the Convention was to unify criminal policy at the 
regional level to protect society from these crimes. This Convention has also succeeded 
in unifying international efforts against all primary crimes associated with ML as these 
were not limited to drug crimes by this Convention, but expanded to include other 
financial crimes, such as the illegal use of cheques, movable funds and real estate. Thus, 
in Article 6, the Convention focused on obliging member states to amend their national 
laws so that European countries would regard the following crimes: Illegal transfers or 
disguising funds, concealment or disguising the true origin of funds and participation in 
the above crimes. 
Finally, this Convention had as its goal that member states would be able to use their 
domestic law to criminalize the actions of any person discovered to have funds in their 
possession which they knew to be of illegal origin. This was in order to take the necessary 
action to fight money-laundering crime318.  
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Thus, this Convention is one of the strongest international documents against ML crime, 
because it obliges the member countries to criminalize ML and involve their domestic 
regulations in the procedures of the confiscation of illegal proceeds and the profits that 
comes from illegal activities, that include, as well as drug crime, crimes such as terrorism 
and the weapons trade etc.319. Moreover, this convention considered ML crime as a 
separate offence not just the result of other crimes320. Furthermore, due to this 
Convention, member countries issued a series of AML regulations; and it was the reason 
behind the European Union’s adoption of the First Directive in 1991 which will be 
discussed later. 
As a result of this Convention there was a new development in international cooperation. 
The concept of 'spontaneous information' meant that member countries could transfer 
any information about illegal proceeds to other member countries without prior 
requisition if it considered that this information was important for investigations321. 
4.3.2-The EU Anti- Money Laundering Directives 
The fight against ML has been a top political priority of the European Union322. It is based 
on the need to protect the financial system from misuse. ML is the hub of organized 
crime, it should be eradicated wherever it occurs and solid measures must be taken in 
order to trace, seize, freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime. Coordinated measures 
at community level are necessary to prevent money launderers from abusing the 
European Community’s borderless internal market for their criminal activities. Thus, the 
1989 Directive has led some EU Member States to criminalise the phenomenon and 
prohibit insider dealing 323.    
4.3.2.1- The First Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the 
Purpose of Money Laundering (91/308/EEC), 
 
As will be noted from the title of this Directive, the European Union focused on credit and 
financial institutions which could be used to launder the proceeds of criminal activities. 
Thus, the target of this directive was directly to prevent the banks’ financial systems being 
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used for ML operations; and member states were required to prevent the use of their 
financial systems for ML by criminalizing it and taking measures to identify laundered 
proceeds with a view to confiscation. The Directive was largely aimed at tackling drug 
trafficking offences; and the important recommendations were to prevent ML and induce 
the member states to involve their regulations in criminalization of the activity; that 
personal verification of customers should be required during the conclusion of business 
deals and that all documents and records relating to financial operations and customer 
identification be kept for five years. Also, that he privacy of banking systems should be 
limited in relation to the disclosure of operations suspected to be ML to allow reporting 
of any suspect operations of ML to the competent authorities and that there should beco-
operation between authorities - which are the judiciary authority, financial institutions 
and the law enforcement authority324. 
Gilmore has remarked that the content of this Directive was significantly affected by the 
measures of the FATF and especially by the 1990 recommendations. Furthermore, the 
intent of this directive was to have an effect beyond the internal borders, and it allowed 
member countries to determine the exact way to achieve the aims of the Directive325. As 
this study, has suggested, the aim of this Directive was to tighten controls in the financial 
sector which had been allowing criminals to misuse non-financial activities and 
professions and to hide the origins of their illegal proceeds. The vagueness of the scope 
of the underlying offences, to which the ML offences applied, caused problems for 
financial institutions wishing to apply it in the context of this Directive; for example, 
whether it should include any advice given about capital structure undertakings, changing 
money or offering money transmission services. The Directive needed to define this more 
clearly326. As a result, the European Parliament and the Council adopted another Directive 
to deal with these difficulties.  
4.3.2.2-Second Directive: The Broader Perspective of the Second Directive 
As this study, has argued, the First Directive failed due to developments in the means of 
ML such that this Directive was not able to adequately prevent it. Thus, the European 
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Council felt it was a necessary step to issue the Second Directive in December 2001. 
Through amending and updating the First Directive to curb the use of financial systems 
for the purpose of ML, the Second Directive was a re-working of the existing provisions 
established by the First Directive in two main areas. Firstly, it widened the definition of 
criminal activity and included all serious crimes including offences related to terrorism. 
Secondly, it extended the scope of the regulated sector to a number of additional 
professions such as lawyers, accountants, estate agents and casinos327. 
4.3.2.3- The Third Directive as a Comprehensive Authoritative Approach 
The Third Directive was adopted under the UK’s presidency of the EU, and shows the 
European commitment to fight against ML and terrorist financing after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. According to Gilmore and Mitsileg as, the Directive is to some extent a replica of 
the second Directive; however, it is more detailed and increases the scope of the 
regulated sector. This Directive, unlike the first two, specifically deals with terrorist 
financing 328. The main changes from the Second Directive are in the explicit coverage of 
measures to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT), the introduction of some new 
definitions such as PEPs and anyone having interests in, benefits from or business activity 
related to ML crime. It has detailed codification of CDD requirements with an explanation 
of when enhanced and simple due diligence should be undertaken. The 3rd Directive 
introduces a ‘risk-based approach’ to all of its CDD requirements329. CDD means that the 
banks have to get enough information about the customers, assess the risk that may be 
involved in that customer’s process and they have also to know the right CDD 
requirements for each customer, including the implementation of a standard level of 
CDD. However, Greenberg et al. have considered that there should be an increase in the 
level of CDD with customers because some PEPs could have a higher risk than other 
customers. PEPs are the important people in a country, such as any person who is working 
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or has been working in a foreign government; like a president, head of government, 
member of an executive council of government; Member of Parliament or any senior 
foreign political person330. Being in such positions might mean that some of these people 
could be involved in bribery and corruption and they could use their authority and power 
for that; therefore, they are marked as high risk. As a result, their bank accounts should 
be monitored to identify any possible ML. For example, Paulo Maluf, who is a major 
political figure in Brazil, is claimed to have looted money from Brazil331. I believe that this 
procedure is a way of applying CDD through monitoring the bank accounts of the PEPs 
mentioned above. 
4.3.2.4- The Fourth Directive (2014) 
The persistence of ML operations has pushed the European countries to make changes 
in the Third Directive and aim to achieve a more risk-based approach, with greater 
consistency of rules across the EU, simplifying cross-border trade and implementing the 
recommendations of FATF. According to the Financial Conduct Authority report, the 
proposals of the Fourth Directive on ML is to implement the changes in the FATF 
recommendations through increasing the levels of harmonization between the AML and 
counter terrorism-financing measures employed by member states. This involves a 
national risk assessment and may also include supra-national risk assessments332. Draghi 
suggests that the changes in this Directive include extending the scope of Third and 
Fourth ML Directives, through reducing the threshold for cash payments for traders in 
high value goods from EUR 15,000 to EUR7, 500. Also, the new proposal requires banks 
to implement CDD in operations of at least EUR 7,500. The scope of the Directive involves 
and strengthens the cooperation between financial intelligence units of the member 
countries, exchanges information and further extends and strengthens cooperation. In 
order to control the procedures of the transfer money for trade purposes through CDD, 
there is a new proposal about tightening measures against money transfers being used 
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by these traders to launder money across the EU. These measures will apply to 
transactions of EUR 7 500, a reduction from the previous threshold of EUR 15 000333. 
The aim of adopting the Fourth Money Laundering Directive (2015) and implementing it 
in 2017 was to improve the levels of AML and counter-terrorist financing regulations in 
the EU. Additionally, a new set of recommendations were issued by the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF)334. 
4.3.2.5-The Fifth Money Laundering Directive 
The fifth AML directive was passed in June 2018. The AMLD5 modifies the fourth Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (AMLD4) released only in 2015. The EU Commission 
proposed the revised AMLD in July 2016 as part of its Action Plan against terrorism 
announced in February 2016, after the attacks in Paris and Brussels335.  
This Directive established a new legal framework for European financial regulators to 
regulate digital currencies in order to protect against money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The new rules have added the most stringent transparency conditions directed 
toward the use of anonymous payments through pre-paid cards and virtual exchange 
platforms for money-laundering or terrorist financing336 and obliges the member states 
to create a list of national public offices and functions that qualify as politically exposed 
(PEP). This directive introduces strict and enhanced due diligence measures for financial 
flows from high-risk third countries; it also makes information on real estate holders 
centrally available to public authorities. The scope of the Directive involves lowers 
thresholds for identifying purchasers of prepaid cards; and, for the use of e-money, the 
threshold for identifying holders of prepaid cards will be further lowered from EUR 250 
to EUR 150. The Directive further enhances the powers of the FIUs and facilitates 
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cooperation and information exchange among authorities, which includes facilitating the 
exchange of information among FIUs and other relevant institutions337. 
4.4- The Basel Committee Statement of Principles- December 1988 
The Basel Committee Statement of Principles was issued by the Basel Committee, and 
concerns the banks’ systems and supervisory practices.  
4.4.1-The Objective of the Statement of Principles 
The target of the Statement of Principles is to protect the banking system by preventing 
criminal use of that system for the laundering of money; moreover, to strengthen the 
safety of the banking activity. Thus, the target of the Basel Committee Statement of 
Principles is to create an international agreement that allows financial institutions to play 
an important role against any operations of ML and to help the national authorities to 
fight against this crime338. 
4.4.2-The Principles of the Basel Committee 
The Basel Committee Principles target financial institutions to ensure their banking 
management prevents any ML operations through their banking system. According to 
Hopton, there are essentially four principles contained in the Statement on Prevention 
which are: the banks should make efforts to determine the true identity of the customers 
who request their services; the banks should respect the laws and regulations of the 
financial transactions in conformity with high ethical standards and local regulations; the 
banks should provide training in matters that relate to ML operations and they should 
make full efforts to co-operate with national law enforcement authorities to detect 
suspicious operations and take necessary measures to prevent any support or assistance 
to customers seeking to deceive law enforcement authorities in order to launder 
money339.  
The Basel Committee Statement of Principles creates an international agreement to a 
Statement of Principles that allows financial institutions to play a highly effective 
preventive role against any operations of ML. These institutions are potentially those 
most able to help the judicial authorities and the police fight ML. However, the negative 
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aspect of the principles of Basel Committee Statement is that it does not enforce 
adherence, and also there are no clear sanctions about the violation of these 
Principles340. 
The Principles of the Basel Committee did not oblige banks to report suspicious 
transactions that may relate to ML activities, the banks need only stop dealing, not 
provide services, sever relations with the customer in question and close or freeze 
accounts when they suspect that funds stem from a criminal activity. This demonstrates 
the bank secrecy rule was observed at that time341. However, the Basel Committee issued 
its ‘Core Principles Methodology’ which outlined CDD rules for banks in order to cover 
deficiencies I the ‘KYC’ rule and also to support application of the FATF recommendations, 
in particular those relating to banking rules342. 
4.5- The FATF Recommendations 
The FATF, an international governmental body, was established in 1989 by seven major 
industrial nations, which are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. The function of this organization is to track the proceeds of illegal 
activities, particularly those of the drug trade. Natarajan notes that this body has 
developed a series of recommendations that became the general framework of 
international anti-ML efforts343.  The FATF seeks to develop and improve banking systems 
to curb the prevalence of ML344.The FATF 40 recommendations, issued in 1990, 
addressed most of the ML areas covered by the Vienna Convention (1988); such as 
Recommendation 38 which states that member countries should consider improving 
their domestic laws to include the effective confiscation and freezing of illegal proceeds. 
Also, that ML criminalization should be not limited to just the proceeds of drug trafficking, 
but should involve the proceeds of other crimes as stated in Recommendation 1,4345.In 
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order to reinforce financial systems to combat ML, the FATF has focused on the following 
rules: 
According to the FATF recommendations 10 -12, banking institutions should collect all 
the details about customers which will allow them to know the ultimate beneficiary of 
the deals. Banks should not open accounts in fictitious names and should keep necessary 
records on national and international transactions for at least five years after the business 
relationship is ended. Recommendation 19 states that member346countries should oblige 
their financial institutions to submit reports on suspect operations to the domestic 
authorities347.  
Recommendations 26 to 29 state that countries should create a FIU that has the authority 
to detect suspicious operations of ML and ensures a suitable system to control financial 
institutions348.Recommendations 32 to 40 state that countries should establish a 
domestic system to prevent MLand make an agreement with other countries to take 
expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries to cooperate against 
ML349. 
The FATF also issued 8 recommendations in 2001 to combat the financing of terrorism. 
These eight recommendations were developed in addition to the existing forty 
recommendations to curb terrorist financing and induce countries to criminalize terrorist 
financing and freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; additionally, to induce countries to 
report suspicious operations related to terrorism and take immediate steps to cooperate 
with other countries against ML350. These recommendations are very important against 
ML and terrorism financing because they became a standard351, considered by the FATF 
to assess the extent of countries’ obligations in AML measures.  Thus, the FATF has 
developed standards which focus on the gaps in the regulations, such as obstacles to 
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international cooperation and the lack of human resources to combat ML operations. 
Although these recommendations are very important in the fight against ML, they do not 
oblige countries to follow them. However, they stand as a political pledge by the FATF 
members to struggle against the crime of ML352. 
In this case, the FATF made use of naming and shaming through the publication of 
blacklists. Blacklists can be seen as instruments that reduce the risk of developing the 
means of laundering money. In these blacklists, the FATF evaluated countries’ compliance 
with their Recommendations against money laundering and criminal.353 Verhage has 
shown that financial institutions assume that it is best to apply the compliance 
benchmark to the recommendations of the AML354. The blacklist is a severe warning 
about money-laundering and is used to encourage countries to revise their anti-money 
laundering procedures to conform with those adopted by FATF355. In this context, 
Bennett has considered that the blacklists should include useful databases which are 
helpful in providing some sort of negative clearance of customers. However, he also 
confirmed that the '' security concerns at government level and data protection concerns 
at the private level mean that practitioners and professionals are all but on their own 
when it comes to identifying potential AML-CFT offenders''356. 
4.6- The 2000 Palermo Convention 
Palermo 2000 was the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC); 
and is a UN-sponsored multi-lateral treaty. This Convention was adopted by Resolution 
55/25 of the UN General Assembly on 15 November 2000. The Convention came into 
force on 29 September 2003 and involved three protocols which focused on organized 
crime which are: To Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children; Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components 
and Ammunition357. 
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The aim of the first Protocol is “to protect and assist the victims of trafficking in persons 
with full respect for their human rights.'' In addition, the aim of second protocol as well 
as promoting cooperation among state parties and against the smuggling of migrants was 
to ''protect the rights of smuggled migrants and preventing the worst forms of their 
exploitation which often characterize the smuggling process''.  The target of the third 
Protocol was to curb illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms and ammunition358. 
So, this Convention is an important step in the battle against transnational organized 
crime. Due to the seriousness of the problems featured in it, it seeks to enhance 
international cooperation among states ratifying the agreement in taking measures 
against transnational organized crime. 
The Palermo Convention also has provided a wide definition of ML, enlarging its 
underlying crimes; further, it was the focus of deterrence activities and international 
cooperation359. In contrast, Hyland argued that the Palermo Convention involved some 
weaknesses in its protocols, specifically that their implementation had weak provision 
through using volitional language such as ‘to the extent possible’ or ‘shall endeavour to’ 
which meant that there was no obligation to abide by them360. Moreover, Bashir & 
Abrahim noted that, although the target of the Palermo Convention was to prevent 
banking institutions supporting any criminal activities, and to protect and control the 
banks’ operations, this Convention did not oblige the signatories to design specific 
criminal policies against financial crimes361. 
However, this Convention provided some basis for urging banking institutions to protect 
their financial systems which the member countries could adopt as a source of interior 
regulations. This included: identifying customers, respecting the laws and regulations of 
financial transactions and an obligation to not provide incorrect information which 
hinders the activities of public authorities362. These procedures are important to follow 
when curbing ML operations because recording and keeping the information on the 
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customer under the CDD process is kept up to-date, allows banks to know their customers 
and form part of the international cooperation needed to detect ML operations. 
4.7- The International Criminal Police (Interpol) 
The International Criminal Police Organization is the largest international organization 
competent in researching, investigating and providing advice in general about offences, 
especially ML crime. It was created in 1923 in France, and is known as Interpol. 
The target of the Interpol is to ensure international cooperation and exchange between 
the police criminal authorities with different domestic regulations in different countries, 
as stipulated in international human rights agreements and to create and develop the 
organizations that participate in crime prevention363. Additionally, Interpol has adopted 
programmes against some significant crimes such as ML. These programmes involve 
training on the techniques of analysis and investigation into the information that was 
collected and exchanging information in areas of organized crime364. 
Through the application of Interpol's methods, Argentina successful arrested a convicted 
fugitive who was wanted by the US for drug trafficking and ML. This clearly demonstrates 
how the police have benefited from Interpol in tracking criminal fugitives anywhere 
across the world and arresting them. Interpol’s methods include the notices system and 
the secure communications system which operate well beyond national boundaries, 
making it difficult for a criminal to flee to another country365. In spite of this, Tyler & 
Gottlieb have pointed out there is a problem facing Interpol in the extradition of criminals 
due to some countries, like the UK, not accepting the red notices which are issued by 
Interpol as a basis for arrest366. 
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4.8- The Role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Anti- 
Money Laundering Efforts 
In 2000, in response to public opinion the IMF expanded its activities in the area of AML 
to include combating the financing of terrorism. Due to the threat that ML operations 
pose to economic and financial stability, the International Monetary Fund has made 
addressing this crime a priority. The efforts of the IMF have helped national and 
international AML activity and combating the financing of terrorism; as it has broad 
experience in exercising financial sector assessment and surveillance over members’ 
economic systems through a single comprehensive assessment 
methodology367.  Additionally, the IMF started supporting a trust fund which 
complements existing accounts financing the fight against ML and the financing of 
terrorism in its member countries368. In March 2001, the Executive Board of the IMF 
reviewed the Fund’s AML/CFT strategies, which are: the increased inclusion of AML/CFT 
issues in surveillance and in fund-supported programmes; assessments under the revised 
methodology and strengthened staff participation. 
Thus, as Blair and Brent have considered, states have to ensure their financial institutions 
implement the sanction rules which have been adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
such as the sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for activities related 
providing sanctuary and training to international terrorists369. 
4.9- The Islamic Regulation of Money Laundering 
Islamic regulations did not address ML directly, but focused on the sources of illegal 
money. Thus, in this context, this study will suggest that the definition of ML in Islamic 
regulations relates to how Islamic rules addressed the means of ML and its criminalization 
of this phenomenon. 
4.9.1- The Definition of Money Laundering in Islamic Regulations 
Islamic rules have addressed ML crime through the identification of what constitutes legal 
and illegal funds. On this basis, Irresha has defined ML as all the actions whose aim is to 
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legitimize illegal gains by mixing them with legal proceeds or by transferring their value 
to an ultimately legal entity370. 
4.9.2-The Means of Money Laundering in the Islamic Regulation Perspective 
As this study, has suggested, Islamic regulations do not use the term ‘ML operation’ 
directly, but address this phenomenon by criminalizing the means for this crime which 
are the primary crimes of ML like theft, the trafficking of human organs, drugs or women 
and children; the weapons trade; counterfeiting money, corruption, or riba (An Islamic 
term which means ‘benefits or interest accrued through delaying the repayment of a 
debt’ which is prohibited). Thus, we can say that Islamic regulations do have a focus on 
the criminalization of the means of the ML. Furthermore, ML operations in the 
perspective of Islamic regulations, includes any action involving an intention to disguise 
illegal proceeds371. Examples of this might be hiding illegal gains through the creation of 
fake companies or making bank transfer operations with stolen money. As a result, in the 
Islamic perspective, the money will not become legal after it was laundered in any way, 
because it was acquired by means which are criminalized in Islamic law. 
4.9.3- The Criminalization of Money Laundering in Islamic Regulations    
Islamic moral values call for all earnings to be legitimate; thus, seeking to make illegal 
gains appear legitimate, as in ML, is not allowed by Islamic law. Under Islamic regulations, 
ML is incompatible with the principles of Islam; thus, Islamic regulations criminalize all 
illegal activity, including the intention to disguise the origins of illegal proceeds, 
counterfeiting money or corruption. The proceeds from any action not allowed by Islamic 
rule cannot be regarded as legal gains372. Thus, Islamic regulations have criminalized the 
means of MLas ML as mentioned in Appendix C: 
4.10- Conclusion 
As launderers, have developed the means of ML; which has become endemic almost 
throughout the world, there has been a parallel global development in the means of 
curbing this crime by international conventions. The global battle against ML crime 
started in the 1980s, and these conventions addressed this phenomenon by criminalizing 
                                                          
370 Irresha, A. (2004) The money laundering offences in the light of Shari’ah and the law. Nayef University of the 
security science, Riyadh (p.20). 
371 Tofangsaz, H (2012) A new approach to the criminalization of terrorist financing and its compatibility with Shari’ah 
law. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol.15, No 4 (p.403). 
372Irresha, A. ibid (2004 p.130). 
107 
 
the means for it. For example, the Vienna Convention has focused on the proceeds of 
drug trafficking and the following conventions expanded this to include other means 
relating to this crime such as corruption and using financial institutions and the banking 
systems. 
These conventions induced the member countries to involve their domestic regulations 
as the necessary measures to ensure the curbing of this crime. For instance, the member 
countries were obliged to prevent ML by criminalizing the actions of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of gains or property. To assist this, the member countries were 
supposed to include in their domestic regulations the necessary measures for 
international cooperation to fight this crime such as extradition. Thus, international and 
domestic laws have focused on criminalizing the means of ML.  However, long before this, 
Islamic regulations addressed the primary crimes involved in ML crime through directly 
criminalizing activities such as the drugs trade, the trafficking of human organs and 
women and children, the weapons trade, counterfeiting money, corruption or riba 
operations.  Furthermore, Islamic regulations included curbing the development of 
means that are used during ML crime, such as hiding illegal gains through the creation of 
fake companies  
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Chapter Five: The Anti- Money Laundering (AML) 
legislation in the UK. 
5.1-Introduction 
London is an important international financial centre for cross-border bank lending and 
there are many foreign banks in London373. A large number of the firms that are working 
in oil and mining are listed or registered the UK, which is responsible for 25% of the 
international trade in the field of the oil and commodities trade. 
The collapse of the BCCI bank in 1992 might be one of the reasons that pushed the UK to 
develop their AML regulations; as this bank, had committed a huge fraudulent operation 
that had laundered a large amount of money. The bank was eventually closed due to the 
regulations against ML374. The other reason for the BCCI bank’s collapse was globalisation 
and the principles of the global trade which permitted the transfer of capital between the 
states by deregulation and a loosening of banking controls in order to facilitate a 
smoother flow of capital at a global level375. 
Despite the UK taking some procedures against the corruption in the extractive related 
to its application of procedures against corruption.  This chapter will address the 
development of AML strategies that have been taken to prevent financial crime in the 
UK.  The aim is to analyse specific UK legal provisions relating to ML; notably, the Proceeds 
of Crime Act (2002) and the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds 
Regulations 2017 (MLR 2017), in order to, find out how it is protecting public money. It 
will also explore of the extent of the effectiveness of this approach against this crime, and 
whether it impedes financial and commercial activity. Additionally, this chapter discusses 
and evaluates also the advantages and disadvantages of the UK AML legislation in order 
to find out what lessons, can be learned when addressing gaps in the Libyan AML 
regulations, rather than suggesting that a foreign AML system can be imported 
wholesale, and assesses if it could be used in Libya to address the illegal sale of oil as 
follows: 
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5.2 -The criminalization of Money Laundering in the UK, 
 
5.2.1-The Proceeds of the Crime Act (2002), 
 
This Act, which received Royal Assent in 2002, came in to force in 2003.  It substantially 
changed all the principles that relate to ML crime. ML is defined according to Article 327 
In Section Seven, which stipulates that: ‘’ (1) A person commits an offence if he (a) 
Conceals criminal property; (b) Disguises criminal property; (c) Converts criminal 
property; (d) Transfers criminal property; (e) Removes criminal property from England 
and Wales or from Scotland or from Northern Ireland’’ (See the National Archives).  
The UK had previously created a forfeiture system through the Drug Trafficking Offences 
Act (1986) to deprive drug traffickers of the fruits of their criminal activities. However, 
this system was limited because it was restricted to the proceeds of drug trafficking 
alone376. Thus, the POCA (2002), in the Article described above, adopted a wide definition 
for the identification of illegal money proceeds, which was also further clarified by two 
points: Firstly, the title of this Act clearly indicates that this Act is related to the proceeds 
of crime in general, rather than to a specific crime. Secondly, Section Seven of this law 
gives a wide definition of ML to include all illegal proceeds such as illegal transfer, 
disguising and hiding illegal property; and the law did not identify any specific crime that 
had generated the illegal money proceeds377.  This was also confirmed by Fossat et al378. 
I believe that it is clear that the UK has made significant steps in fighting ML by adopting 
a wide definition of this crime in the POCA (2002). This Act attempted to include most of 
the means of this crime as a way of preventing it, in line with the global trend in curbing 
this offence and to implement to the European Second Directive379(see Chapter 4). 
Moreover, this Act went further and adopted the recommendations about ML activities 
connected to the financing of terrorism that was to be contained in the European Third 
Directive, which was issued later in 2005. 
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The POCA (2002) has defined ‘criminal property’ as any benefit obtained by any person 
through criminal conduct, or any property representing the same (in whole or part and 
whether directly or indirectly)380. It is unimportant if the crime was committed in the UK 
or abroad, on condition that if this action is not criminalised by any Act of the country 
where the crime happened, it must be treated as if it had been committed in the UK and 
is punished by the relevant Act in the UK by more than one year in prison. The AML regime 
in the UK has affected companies that are working abroad; and specifically, when they 
use a 'facilitation payment' in the form of bribes or corrupt payment. Furthermore, any 
company getting involved in such tainted deals and receiving such payments can be 
tracked in line with UK ML legislation.  
The question has arisen about whether the AML system seriously impedes financial and 
commercial activity in the UK. However, the protection of commercial activity from 
corrupt money is very important, as London is a financial commercial centre. Therefore, 
criminalizing commercial bribery ensures the continued growth of the national economy, 
protection of corporate assets, shareholders’ interests and property interests as well as 
penalising violations of civil law duties and curbing unfair competition in the UK381. 
Illegal ML through banks and other financial institutions is an impediment to the 
implementation of policies aimed to liberalize financial markets and strengthen 
international and national transparency in financial markets. It also threatens London as 
a financial centre; assists the spread of corruption in the market; creates an environment 
conducive to the existence of bad market reputation and destroys credibility and thus 
distorts the general shape of the financial markets in London. Furthermore, ML 
undermines competition within the financial sector and artificially hinders the activity of 
some weaker financial institutions, which are thus influenced by the temptations of the 
launderers. This crime is characterised by new investors and financial institutions with 
great capital and investment capabilities and the courage to enter risky investment fields, 
which has a negative impact on honest businessmen and investors, distorts honest 
competition and results in low economic growth382. 
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In spite of AML legislation, a relatively easy way of ML in London is through the 
professional services of its markets and institutions. Moreover, there is a high level of 
opposition to AML strategies in the City of London383 due to the belief that AML efforts 
can have a damaging effect on commerce by preventing money flowing into the national 
economy. Consequently, there exists very strong, principled opposition from certain 
lawyers about the reporting of suspicious operations, as they consider that the 
relationship between them and their clients should be sacrosanct384. Additionally, AML is 
said to have negative effects on economic growth by applying the Basel Committee 
proposals, whose restrictions place obligations on financial institutions which are difficult 
for some banks to accept385. Another negative effective is seen as being the ''decreased 
attractiveness of the City’s services and institutions''386.  
The UK has taken action to address ML crime and applied the international principles 
against this crime, although some of these procedures are seen as inconsistent with some 
human rights; for instance, the implementation of KYC procedures, which requires 
customers to provide their personal details to the financial institution as well as the 
source of their wealth. There also criticisms of the freezing of suspicious funds as a threat 
to property and financial rights; for example, in this case of a customer making 
transactions which do not fit the usual pattern that results in the denial of access to 
financial services due to the regulations of AML. The question arises about the amount 
of disclosures and evidence required from the customers about their wealth sources 
sufficient to prove their innocence. Such AML procedures could be acceptable if there 
was always a reason behind these obligations on the customer, however, there are not387. 
In spite of these objections, the NCA’s report for the year 2014/2015 discloses that the 
SARs received led to 22 arrests and denial of £46,375,449 to criminals388; thus, I believe 
that these procedures are a very important means of fighting this crime; whereas authors 
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such as Marta Bokiej has considered that these procedures need to be scrutinised and 
revised in line with human rights389.   
The POCA has criminalised actions which assist ML operations. Article 328 (1) considers 
that ML activities include any arrangement regarding criminal property; and stipulates 
that “A person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an 
arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, 
retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person”390. With 
this in mind, the Article has included counselling, aiding or abetting or procuring and has 
identified that any attempt, conspiracy, incitement of crime, abetting, facilitating and 
counselling through any of the activities mentioned above which is confirmed by term 
'facilitates (by whatever means) as mentioned in the above text. 
However, it should be noted that the person under consideration is not indicted in this 
crime under certain circumstances; as Article 327 (2) stipulates that “a person does not 
commit such an offence if- (a) He makes an authorised disclosure under section 338 and 
(if the disclosure is made before he does the act mentioned in subsection (1) he has the 
appropriate consent; (b) He intended to make such a disclosure but had a reasonable 
excuse for not doing so; (c) He acquired or used or had possession of the property for 
adequate consideration; (d) The act he does is done in carrying out a function he has 
relating to the enforcement of any provision of this Act or of any other enactment relating 
to criminal conduct or benefit from criminal conduct”391.  
Additionally, the part (7) Article (329) of the POCA stipulates that the crime committed if 
anyone acquires, uses or has possession of property that he suspects or knows represents 
the proceeds of crime; and states that ‘‘a person commits an offence if he: (a) Acquires 
criminal property. (b) Uses criminal property. (c) Has possession of criminal property ‘’392. 
Additionally, this Act has also criminalised acquiring ‘criminal property’ which is 
possessed, acquired or used while in the knowledge or suspicion of its criminal 
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source393.Additionally, this Act has also criminalised acquiring ‘criminal property’ which is 
possessed, acquired or used while in the knowledge or suspicion of its criminal source.  
Thus, the POCA was made to reform and update the previous UK laws that related to ML 
crime and the illegal origins of the property. It addresses all the forms of ML and 
criminalises the failure to report suspicions of ML operations. This law involves all criminal 
property, when it is suspected or known that the property constitutes or represents 
benefits from criminal conduct; and includes money, (all real, personal, heritable or 
‘moveable property’, intangible and incorporeal property, property obtained by a person 
who has an interest in it, and other intangible or incorporeal property)394.  
The UK has adopted the Criminal Finances Act (2017), which is one of the most important 
pieces of anti-fraud and anti-corruption legislation to be passed in the UK. It aims to 
improve the rules to prevent the money laundering through the reform of the Suspicious 
Activity Reports (SARs) and focuses on some guiding principles such as implementing 
procedures for risks identified in the risk assessment and performing due diligence of 
staff and clients in proportion to the risks. This Act amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 
(2002) and introduces two new corporate offences of failing to prevent the facilitation of 
tax evasion. 395. Regarding this, the Criminal Finances Act (2017) has added two new 
corporate offences for failure of corporates to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion 
based on Section 7 of the Bribery Act (2010). These two offenses are failure to prevent 
the facilitation of UK tax evasion offenses and failure to prevent the facilitation of foreign 
tax evasion offenses. These two crimes cannot be committed by individuals; whereas they 
can be committed by a person acting for or on behalf of a body, acting in that capacity on 
behalf of that legal person396. 
5.2.1.1-The Procedure of Anti- Money Laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) 
In its attempt to combat ML crime this Act also created the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA).  
The function of the Agency is to follow and recover the proceeds that were made from 
illegal operations whether there is a criminal conviction against any person or not. The 
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aim of this confiscation is to return the proceeds which were generated from a crime397. 
The important focus of this text is not the defendant but the proceeds that came from 
the criminal conduct whether or not the person who made this action is guilty of criminal 
conduct398.  
The Agency was originally established to trace and investigate the ownership of property 
that had derived from criminal activity, and was requested to obtain its costs from money 
which it confiscated399, and to deprive the defendants from enjoying the benefits of the 
illegal proceeds in compliance with FATF Recommendations 10 and 22,about keeping 
adequate and accurate information can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by 
competent authorities. The ARA was to combat this crime by using its authority for 
criminal confiscation, taxation or, uniquely, civil recovery; and employing financial 
investigation to recover assets anywhere. The Agency trains its financial investigators and 
the police and monitors their performance400. 
Although, this Agency has achieved its aims in reducing criminality and training financial 
investigators; there are, however, difficulties in achieving its aim of recovering assets 
because of the poor quality of referrals. This was particularly the case in the early days of 
the Agency and because of weaknesses in the Agency’s internal processes, such as no 
using of identifiable targets and deadlines, with the result that there was little progress 
with cases. Additionally, almost a quarter of the Agency’s staff left in 2006 resulting in a 
high turnover of staff, which led to a lack of job stability at the Agency. An additional 
difficulty is that there is no main database which includes all the information related to 
the work of the Agency, which it could refer to if necessary401. 
The POCA gives the Director of the Agency the authority to exercise the functions of the 
Inland Revenue if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that proceeds were acquired 
by illegal actions. This does not just apply to individuals but it also can be applied to 
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companies or partnerships. Additionally, the Director of the Agency can assess any 
income or capital gains in this way402. 
However, the Criminal Finances Act (2017) has made some changes related to recovering 
illegal assets in part 1 of this Act: Under the Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWO). The 
person who is suspected of involvement in or association with serious criminality is 
required to explain the origin of assets that appear to be disproportionate to their known 
income. In this case, the deposits of a suspicious person should be Identical to their 
regular income. A failure to provide a response would give rise to a presumption that the 
wealth was illegal and recoverable, in order to assist any subsequent civil recovery 
action403. The requirement for the making of an unexplained wealth order is that the 
value of the property is greater than £50,000404. In this case, the Proceeds of Crime Act 
(2002) was amended through granting civil recovery powers to the Financial Conduct 
Authority, to recover the illegal property without the need for the owner of the property 
to be convicted of a criminal offence405. Additionally, the Criminal Finances Act (2017) 
has made some changes related to the disclosure orders, which has given a power to the 
law enforcement officer to require anyone that they believe has relevant information to 
an investigation, to answer questions, provide information or to produce documents406. 
5.2.1.1.1- Criticisms of the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) 
Despite the UK’s significant efforts to respond to the obligations laid down by 
international conventions in fighting ML phenomena demonstrated by its issuance of 
AML regulations; criticisms have been directed at the POCA (2002). For example, Davies 
argues that this Act was created without full knowledge of the volume of ‘dirty money’ 
that existed. Davies also believes that there is a hidden reason behind the issuance of the 
POCA; namely, to make full use of the existing taxation powers407. He added that this Act 
was a “very dangerous and draconian legislation to be introduced”408. On the other hand, 
the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), using the same methodology as the IMF to 
estimate ML, found that the amount of money involved worldwide in laundering offences 
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was £23-57 billion in 2000 and fell to around £19-48 billion by 2005, and was equal to 2-
5% of global GDP409.  
It is probable that the UK already knew the volume of money involved and the level of 
risk in addressing ML before it issued the Act. The evidence for this is that an estimate of 
this crime had already been made by the IMF, which put the level at 2-5% of global GDP, 
(see Chapter 3). The UK achieved a reduction rate in ML of 58.15 percent in 2007; this 
suggests that the AML regime under the POCA (2002) is potent enough to secure 
convictions, whilst not being overly severe or onerous410. This goes a long way in 
demonstrating that criticisms against it do not have much credence. 
5.2.1.1.2- Reporting Obligations under the POCA (2002). 
The POCA require anyone in the UK who has had financial dealings with a person or 
business, which involves a ML offence to report it. They are obligated to submit a Serious 
Activity Report (SAR) to the National Crime Agency (NCA) if they know or suspect or have 
information about any individual related to ML operations during the course of their work 
in the regulated sector. They have to be aware that Section 333 of the POCA criminalises 
the making of a report, which could affect the tracking of ML in an investigation, which is 
being undertaken by law enforcement authorities. Section 333 stipulates that: “A person 
commits an offence if; (a) He knows or suspects that a disclosure falling within section 
337 or 338 has been made, and (b) He makes a disclosure which is likely to prejudice any 
investigation which might be conducted following the disclosure referred to in paragraph 
(a)”411.  
5.2.1.1.3- The Obligations of the Regulated Sector against Money Laundering 
Under the POCA, the regulated sector has to take some necessary actions against ML, 
which include: Implementing training programmes for staff; implementing the principles 
of CDD that includes identifying and knowing the customer; devising a programme to 
fight against ML, which should include a system of the internal reporting of suspicions or 
knowledge of ML operations; record keeping and identifying an employee as the 
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‘nominated officer’ to supervise the making of appropriate submissions of SARs to the 
NCA and the implementation of the MLRs.   Companies have to have a system for 
reporting suspicious operations to the nominated officer who has to ascertain that the 
report which has been made will give rise to suspicions. If there are, they should make a 
prompt report to the SOCA412. If there are no strong grounds for suspicion and the 
evidence is not sufficient to make a suspicious transaction report, they should make file 
note of this case which can then be used as the basis of a later report if there are sufficient 
grounds for it. Similarly, the company should continue with the deal that is the subject of 
the report to facilitate the observation of this transaction. This is because refusal to 
continue with this deal it may be ‘tipping off’ the customer, who may realise that the deal 
is being regarded as suspicious413. Regarding this, Harvey has stated that the obligation is 
geared towards enabling members of the regulated sector to spot transactions which are 
out of the ordinary and thereby places them in a position where they have a duty to 
report414. 
5.2.2- The UK’s Money Regulations (MLR 2017). 
 
The issuing of these ML regulations was as a response to the Prevention of the Use of the 
Financial System for ML and Terrorist Financing; that was decided by the fourth Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council; and they replace the Money Laundering 
Regulations (MLR 2007). The aim was to introduce a new and improved Act into the UK, 
through the reform of the Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and focus on some guiding 
principles such as implementing procedures for risks identified in the risk assessment, 
and the performing due diligence of staff and clients in proportion to the risks415.  Its aim 
was also to introduce a new and improved Act into the UK, which was entirely appropriate 
for curbing ML crime416. 
Additionally, the MLR 2017 has addressed ‘due diligence measures’ in part 3, which 
requires the identification of the customer through personal documents, data or 
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information; ascertaining the nature and purpose of the business on the basis of related 
documents and the identification of any beneficiaries. This must be undertaken if the 
‘relevant person’ happens to fulfil one of the tasks under this regulation which stipulates 
that “ (i) enable the relevant person to obtain from the third party immediately on 
request (or at the latest within two working days) copies of any identification and 
verification data and any other relevant documentation on the identity of the customer 
or its beneficial owner’’417. 
It may be very difficult for small or medium sized firms to meet the requirement to 
determine the identity of every client they deal with; and they may face problems, 
especially when dealing with foreign customers. For example, there may be difficulties in 
ascertaining certain details, such as clients’ real surnames418. Haynes added that there 
may be problems with the requirement to determine who the ‘beneficial owner’ of the 
funds is. There will be no credibility of client information because those who are acting 
illegally simply will not submit this information. Thus, requesting this information will 
yield no benefit if the customer does not provide it.419 
The 2017 Regulations extend the principle that companies have obligations, which are to 
implement the rules on CDD measures and ongoing monitoring, make identity checks on 
potential clients, keep records of their operations and train their staff on how to identify 
potential ML operations and when they have to report suspicious activity420. The 
regulations make directors and senior management subject to imprisonment sanctions 
and fines if the companies which are managed by them fail to respond to the 
requirements of the 2017 Regulations421.  
However, although the Regulations (2017) kept the principal requirement that you must 
perform client due diligence (CDD) before establishing a business relationship and when 
you identify any factors relevant to your risk assessment of the (CDD), they had expanded 
to become more prescriptive than the previous regulations in 2007 when suspicious 
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operation meant carrying out CDD checks on corporate bodies422. If the client is a 
corporate body, its name, company number or other registration and the address of its 
registered office had to be obtained and verified, and, if different its principal place of 
business. In addition, unless the corporate body was a company listed on a regulated 
market, reasonable measures had to be taken additionally to determine the law to which 
it was subject and its constitution or other governing documents and the names of the 
board of directors423.  The trustees were obligated to keep up-to-date records of all the 
beneficial owners of the trust, involving all the details referred to in part 44(2)424. 
For these purposes, the status of the person engaged in the aforementioned conduct is 
irrelevant. However, both the individual and the corporate body are the subject of the 
POCA (2002) regardless of the nature of their business; and fines can be imposed on 
anyone who breaches regulations whether they are corporate entities or individual 
directors, managers and officers and individuals. However, if the ML is for terrorist 
purposes, severe punishments can be imposed on those who commit a serious ML 
offence, for example, imprisonment for up to 14 years under Article 18 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000425. 
5.2.3- The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2018) 
The aim of adopting this law was to use it as primary legislation after Brexit; and involves 
implementing the UN sanctions against ML crime, thus ensuring the existence of full 
powers against money laundering and terrorist financing threats. Thus, this Act makes 
additions to sanctions regulation, the detection, investigation, and prevention of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, as this study will explain later. 
So, this law protects the UK from the risk of breaching its international obligations 
following withdrawal from the EU; and to maintain EU law as it was at the date of 
withdrawal from the EU by transposing it into national law. This law gave the government 
new powers to operate its own sanctions regime, through the powers it gave to the 
Secretary of State and the Treasury to impose sanctions regulations for the purposes of 
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compliance with UN obligations:426 It continue to implement the UN sanctions regimes in 
order to meet national security and foreign policy objectives; and to keep anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures up to date, helping to enhance the 
UK’s domestic security and comply with international standards427. 
By this law the government expanded financial sanctions reporting requirements to 
include: firstly, that persons of a prescribed description inform the authority of prescribed 
matters and to retain certain records; secondly, authorising an authority to require 
persons of a prescribed description to provide information; and finally, for powers to 
inspect and copy prescribed information and related powers of entry428. Furthermore, 
this law obliges Ministers to report to Parliament to assess the progress of a register of 
beneficial owners of overseas entities429. 
This law has been criticised for giving the minister powers to amend the regulations to 
impose new sanctions under Section 41 in addition to those already specified in Sections 
3-8.430 So that means this law has given the Executive power to change primary legislation 
by issuing secondary legislation, which will be a risk to Parliamentary 
Sovereignty.431Additionally, under Section 12, the law has also given the government 
power to designate persons not only by name but also by description. 
These powers are wide to be able to issue regulations relating to money laundering and 
terrorist financing offenses and activate the reporting regime. In some cases, this power 
involves flexibility in dealing with emerging issues in this area. However, it also reduces 
parliament’s role in overseeing regulation.  it might be could to public and engagement 
in the development of these changes. 
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5.3- Bodies Established against Money Laundering crime in the UK 
5.3.1- The Financial Service Authority 
The (FSA) was created by the Financial Service and Markets Act (2000)432. It is a non-
governmental body and made its first appearance in 1985 under the name of The 
Securities and Investments Board Ltd. This name was changed to the Financial 
Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association in 1997. It started to 
exercise statutory powers, which were given by the new Financial Services and Markets 
Act (2000)433. Further, the FSA assumed the role of the Securities and Futures Authority 
(SFA) that was supervising the trading in shares and futures in the UK. The FSA is 
controlled by parliamentary committees; thus, it has public, political and also legal 
accountability, and has to report on how well it has achieved its objectives434.The 
Financial Service Authority works independently of the government, even though its 
board is appointed by the Treasury. It has a statutory target to curb the extent of 
operations which are used for any purpose connected with financial offences that involve 
money-laundering. Additionally, the FSA also has the authority to supervise the 
compliance of most credit and financial institutions under the ML Regulations. These 
institutions are obligated to comply with the measures and requirements set by the FSA; 
and this authority is able to take action against them if they fail to response to the 
required standards435.  
5.3.2.1-The objectives of the Authority and the Financial Services and 
Markets Law (2000). 
The legal aims of the FSA could be described as follows: achieving market confidence, 
which means maintaining public confidence in the financial system; raising public 
awareness and promoting public understanding of the financial system; securing an 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers and reducing financial crime, which 
means reducing the use of business practices for criminal purposes or activities436. 
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In the UK, the authorities of the Bank of England, Financial Services Authority (FSA) and 
the Treasury were all responsible for maintaining financial stability. As a result of that, 
this system failed to achieve the objectives because they failed to be fully aware of the 
basic problems that were building up in financial system.  Furthermore, they could not 
take advance actions to avoid the instability of financial markets and also failed to deal 
with the financial crisis when it had just started437. Additionally, this failure may have been 
due to, there being no institution that had the responsibility and authority in the UK to 
control all systems of AML and to identify the weak areas. Lord Turner, the chairman of 
the FSA, and Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England described this as 
potentially destabilising for financial stability, referring to this problem as ‘underlap’: “a 
phenomenon whereby macro-prudential risk analysis and mitigation fell between the 
gaps in the UK regulatory system''438. As a result of these shortcomings that arose during 
the government’s programme of reform to renew the UK’s system of financial regulation, 
the Financial Services Authority failed to curb the effects of the financial crisis, thus failing 
to protect the UK’s economy during the financial crisis. That is why it was abolished on 1 
April 2013 and its responsibilities divided between two new agencies -the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Bank of 
England439. 
5.3.2- The Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK 
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) was created by the Financial Services Act 
(2012) to protect the UK’s financial system. Its objective is to accomplish this by ensuring 
the safety of the companies that aim to curb negative effects on financial stability440. The 
PRA is a part of the Bank of England, and its responsibility is the ''prudential regulation of 
banks, building societies and credit unions441. 
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5.3.2.1-The Role of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
The Financial Conduct Authority is responsible for ensuring that relevant markets 
function well, and to regulate all financial services firms442. Its role includes protecting 
consumers, keeping the industry stable, and promoting healthy competition between 
financial service providers. This body is a non-governmental authority, financed by 
charging fees to members of the financial services industry and governs all financial 
companies which submit services to consumers in order to maintain the integrity of the 
UK’s financial markets443. The PRA does not look to operate a zero-failure regime, as it 
allows the banks to fail in ways that ensures no significant disruption to the supply of 
critical financial services. As Bailey444 has stated: “This will not be a zero-failure regime, 
but one where firms can fail in an orderly way without major detriment to the wider 
system”445. The Financial Conduct Authority has created the Office for Professional Body 
Anti-ML Supervision, which will be running by the early of 2018 and will work to improve 
the workings of the different bodies and sectors which related to AML446.  
So, all firms authorised under FSMA (2000) have to take steps to reduce financial crimes 
as well as ML. This ACT obliges anyone seeking to conduct regulated activity in the UK to 
apply to the FSA for permission under Part 4 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(2000). In this case, section 206(1) of the FSMA 2000 has given extensive enforcement 
powers to apply the disciplinary measures (such as suspending permission to carry on 
regulated activities) if an authorised person has contravened a relevant requirement 
imposed under this law.447 Although, the FSMA 2000 is related to market abuse, it could 
be applied to criminal offenses that, in certain agreement with the responsibilities of the 
FCA, would have criminal prosecution powers.   
Thus, in the cases of market misconduct which might involved a violation of the criminal 
law and the market abuse at the same time; the FCA has the power to decide whether to 
proceed to criminal procedures or to impose a sanction under the category of market 
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abuse, in accordance with Section 402 of the FSMA 2000448. At the same time, Section 
402 of the FSMA 2000 has also given power to the FCA to take proceedings against insider 
dealing by applying Part 5 of the CJA (1993)449. A statutory obligation has been placed on 
the FCA to issue a statement of detailed policy in the Enforcement Manual 168. This policy 
comprises several factors which are to be regarded as guidance for the FCA on whether 
to prosecute rather than take a civil action. Amongst these factors, the FCA’s Handbook 
stipulates that the seriousness of misconduct will be judged by whether criminal 
prosecution is likely to lead to a significant sentence450. 
Moreover, in case if there are loss-suffering victims due to wrongful action by the insider 
dealer, the criminal law will be applied. It is therefore noticeable that protecting the 
victims and one of the aims of the FCA granted by the FSMA 2000 are compatible, also 
that the FCA will consider the impact of the behaviour on the market, i.e. whether the 
misconduct has led to a detrimental effect on the market or has seriously damaged 
market confidence451. 
The important regulatory tools that are available to the FCA to use against ML are 
financial penalties, suspensions, restrictions, conditions, limitations, disciplinary 
prohibitions, and public censures. However, the FCA has some other tools it can deploy 
if it considers it appropriate to address the issue without the use of formal disciplinary 
sanctions. The aims of the FCA in imposing the sanctions is to uphold regulatory 
standards, maintain market confidence and deter financial crime452. Thus, the FCA has 
the following powers to impose sanctions, ‘’(1) It may publish a statement: (a) against an 
approved person or conduct rules staff under section 66 of the Act;(b) against an issuer 
under section 87M of the Act;(c) against a sponsor under section 88A of the Act….;’’453The 
FCA also has protective measures or remedial action could be taken such as ‘’ (a) varying 
and/or cancelling of permission and the withdrawal of a firm’s authorisation and (b) the 
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withdrawal of an individual’s status as an approved person and/or the prohibition of an 
individual from performing a specified function in relation to a regulated activity’’454. 
According to the National Risk Assessment (2017), the procedures of anti-money 
laundering have been improved through creating a new supervisory function within the 
FCA called the Office for Professional Body AML Supervision (OPBAS), which has been 
given the power to oversee the adequacy of the AML/CTF supervisory arrangements of 
professional body supervisors in the UK. This includes strengthening the overseeing of 
the AML/CTF supervisory regime to ensure that all AML supervisors provide effective 
supervision, as required by the 4MLD455.  Due to the significant emerging risk of money 
being laundered through capital markets, the FCA and UK law enforcement agencies 
continue working together. For example, in 2017 the FCA imposed a fine of around £163 
million against the Deutsche Bank, which is its largest ever fine for AML/CTF456. The FCA 
thus has a key role in preventing misuse of the financial system through creating a hostile 
environment for criminal money and it is working to ensuring financial services firms have 
adequate safeguards to protect themselves from money laundering. The majority of UK 
banks know the importance of the AML/CTF controls, and spend £5 billion annually on 
compliance with the AML principles457. 
5.3.3-The Bank of England 
The Bank of England has a responsibility to maintain financial stability by protecting the 
financial system. The Bank of England, the PRA and FCA co-operate to reduce the main 
risks to their own objectives which are; - ‘’To promote the safety and soundness of banks, 
building societies, credit unions, insurers and investment firms; and to secure protection 
for policyholders’’458.   
5.3.4- The Financial Policy Committee in the UK 
To strengthen the fight against ML, and in support of the objectives listed above, the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was established within the Bank in 2012. The FPC was 
charged with identifying, monitoring and taking action to remove or reduce systemic 
                                                          
454 Enforcement Guide, Chapter 7 Financial penalties and disciplinary sanctions (2018 p.4). 
455 National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing (2017 p.16). 
456 Ibid (2017 p.31). 
457 Ibid (p.35). 
458 FCA. The Prudential Regulation Authority, Available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/about/history/the-pra Accessed in 
25/32015. 
126 
 
risks. The FPC, which already exists in interim form, will be able to make 
recommendations and give directions to the PRA and the FCA on specific actions that 
should be taken in order to contribute to the achievement of the Bank of England’s 
Financial Stability Objective459.  
5.3.5- The Serious Organised Crime Agency in the UK 
SOCA was established by Section 1 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (2005). 
As part of its functions, it was to submit a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) about any 
suspicious activity that might arise. It was in operation in the UK between 2006 and 2013, 
and collaborated with many foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The 
Agency included the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the 
National Hi-Tech Crime Unit, the investigative and intelligence sections of HM Revenue 
& Customs on serious drug trafficking, and the Immigration Service's responsibilities for 
organised immigration crime460. 
SOCA derived its power from the bodies that it replaced. In the case of the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), it took on the responsibility “for the regime's 
Financial Intelligence Unit and its database of the Serious Activity Reports SARs”. That 
meant the SOCA, had the same investigative powers461. The work of SOCA is an important 
and indispensable contribution to AML through the collection, collation and analysis of 
information and making it available for use in investigations by other law enforcement 
agencies such as customs officers, police officers and the ARA. Analysis of this data that 
leads to the discovery of the end-users of suspicious operations; and all SARs related to 
this intelligence are stored in a unified-wide database462 that can be referred to by the 
competent investigation authorities mentioned above. 
5.3.6- The National Crime Agency 
In 2013, a new strategy to confront ML was launched by the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
by the Crime and Court Act (2013), replacing SOCA. The function of this Agency is to 
receive all the reports of suspicions operations related to ML and to analyse suspicious 
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activity reports (SARs)463. The aim of the National Crime Agency (NCA) is to reduce 
organised crime and gather, analyse and disseminate criminal intelligence and enable the 
prosecution of those responsible464. The (NCA) is working achieve these objectives 
through its intelligence centre465, and also by supporting and coordinating resources to 
combat economic crime in the UK – including law enforcement efforts on ML, bribery and 
corruption, asset recovery and asset denial, using the intelligence and evidence-
gathering, cash seizure and forfeiture, restraint and confiscation and civil recovery and 
taxation466. 
Through use of these strategies, the National Crime Agency report 2014/2015 shows an 
increase in cash seized in 2014 not just in respect of ML “totalling £13m, a 32% increase 
on 2013 (£9.8m) and a 91% increase on 2012 (£6.8m).”467 In the same way, the HM report 
added that through the activity of the NCA over £16 million in cash was seized and around 
150 related arrests were made since the NCA was created in 2013468. Theresa May, the 
then Home Secretary, stated that this new body was created and “merges several 
specialist crimes‑fighting forces with it, because of a perceived lack of joined‑up thinking 
and cooperation. It is commissioned to hunt down underworld crime lords and confront 
the growing menace of foreign gangs and cyber warfare in a coordinated way”469. 
However, criticism has been directed at the function of this new authority by some 
experts who believe that this function would undermine the importance of local policing 
in fighting terrorism470. 
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5.4- The role of the UK against this crime in the global money 
markets, and the extent of effectiveness of its regulations 
Finally, the question arises about the effectiveness of the UK taken in the oil markets 
against this crime, as the UK is an oil-producing nation and has very strong interests in 
the oil marketplace. Therefore, I would suggest that the UK government undoubtedly 
considers attempting to combat ML to be a serious issue. It has addressed this crime by 
issuing all these regulations backed up by strong punishments and created all the bodies, 
which are working together to achieve one objective- that of carrying out effective 
investigations to detect and deal with suspicious ML operations. The UK has made 
significant efforts to respond to the obligations laid down by international conventions in 
this area, such as the implementation of a risk-based approach and due diligence etc.  
Furthermore, in order to strengthen their position in global markets, it has taken specific 
action against corruption in the oil industry. In view of the UK’s special position at the hub 
of the global money markets with very strong interests in the oil marketplace, the ML 
issue is highly significant for the UK and for its links with the oil- producing countries, 
includes Libya. The UK initiated the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)in 
2002; and in 2014, obtained candidacy status and officially became an implementing 
country471. The target of the Initiative is to assist oil-producing countries, specifically the 
African countries, who could achieve benefit from their oil wealth, by addressing the 
general failure to transform resource wealth into sustainable development. The EITI was 
extended to become global, and over 20 countries have committed to its principles and 
criteria. The EITI works on strengthening revenue transparency in the oil and gas sectors, 
by intervening in the value chain at the collection of taxes and royalties stage472 such that 
oil and gas proceeds from these countries are more transparent. However, the limited 
success of the EITI stems from challenges that need to be addressed, such as not all the 
countries obligated to the EITI, not having completely complied with it, so the 
effectiveness of the EITI is limited473. According to the second UK EITI report in 2015, the 
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EITI has achieved successes by increasing the number of the companies participating; and 
42 oil and gas companies and 18 mining and quarrying companies participated in 
compiling the report. This report also stated that the UK has received £904 million in 
revenue from extractive companies for a range of payments included within the scope of 
EITI, in 2015474. On the other hand, although, there are 48 member countries within EITI, 
only 31 had achieved enough transparency to be compliant with its standards475. This 
reflects how crucial the ML issue is for the UK and how, by fighting against corruption in 
the oil industry in developing countries, the UK is working to strengthen its position at 
the hub of the global money markets, the UK is also an oil-producing nation and has very 
strong interests in the oil marketplace.  
Although Libya is one of the African oil-producing countries, it is not a member of the 
EITI, although it was invited to join in 2011. Libya has no commitment to the EITI, and 
there is evidence for a high level of corruption, as noted in 2016 by the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index, and the increasing oil smuggling means that 
there are hundreds of millions of dollars of state funds in secret accounts from oil 
revenues476,as this study, has noted. 
When considering the UK’s AML legislation, the Managing Bribery report pointed out that 
there are some vulnerabilities and that “most intermediaries in our sample did not yet 
adequately manage the risk that they might become involved in bribery or corruption”477. 
Nevertheless, this report added that the majority of brokers working in this area were 
successfully managing the bribery and corruption risk. However, some of the risk ratings 
were determined solely from the risk of the jurisdiction concerned, and failed to identify 
the cost and how intermediary was remunerated or to use risk assessments to ensure 
their systems and controls were adjusted to, and commensurate with, the risk 
identified478.Additionally, a HM Treasury report confirmed that points of weakness, 
mentioned in the FSA’s 2010 thematic review, were persisting in the sector. These were: 
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poor governance, weak and limited vetting of respective employees and that the details, 
relevant to ML operations that should be going to senior members of the board on AML, 
were insufficient479. 
Thus, there seems to be a problem in the UK’s AML approach, which is linked - as this 
study pointed above - to the multitude of annual SARs that generated low-quality reports. 
Indeed, Mugarura adds that there is a challenge facing the implementation of anti-ML 
legislation that has rendered these laws hamstrung in practice. This is the continued lack 
of resources available for dealing with ML, resulting in a failure to address suspicious 
activities. In addition, the police have given a low priority to ML prosecutions480. Thus, 
the UK AML Acts are not effective due to inability of this Act to prevent ML by dint of 
property being bought, through false companies. The UK Acts are insufficient to establish 
effective tracking of the real owners of the money used to buy these properties and to 
identify the origins of the proceeds. This was confirmed by Liew and Reuter who refer to 
a British report that noted that in 2002, “purchasing property in the UK was the most 
popular method identified481. The same problem exists in Libya, in that the procedures 
for reporting are quite weak and have allowed ML, which has resulted in economic 
instability482. 
Furthermore, this deficiency in the UK Acts is relevant to the problems of Libya as London 
is considered by some Libyans as a safe haven to laundering their illegal money through 
buying expensive real estate. This has been confirmed by the LIBYAN AHBEARE, which 
added that there are some members of Libya’s previous regime living in London and 
benefitting from their illegal proceeds483without any legal actions being taken against 
them by the UK authorities484. 
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Additionally, the money is being used to fund terrorist groups.485 By means of buying cars 
and sending them to Africa money can be moved; furthermore, agencies are used to 
transfer the money in smaller amounts to avoid detection (see section 2). This has a 
negative effect on the political situation and the civil war in Libya funding the armed 
militia, as reported by Arab News on 14/11/2015486. 
Thus, the UK has taken positive steps towards eradicating corruption in the extractive 
industries field through its commitment to the Transparency Initiative. It is clear that the 
UK has had an important role in setting up the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, which has obliged companies registered in the UK and working in this field, to 
be clear about payments made to governments in other countries related to oil, gas and 
mineral commodities trading included in the EITI mandatory reporting requirements.  The 
aim of this initiative is to root out corruption, including that in companies working in 
countries such as Nigeria, Angola and Libya. In spite of this, the UK has been criticised for 
often failing to take action against corruption. Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
UK is a facilitator of international corruption; as there are very significant financial flows 
that go through the City of London. Finally, the UK has adopted quite clear rules about 
political exposed persons and requirements of CDD487. 
5.5- Reporting Procedure for Suspicious Transactions 
POCA (2002) requires any person in the regulated sector who knows, or suspects or has 
reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that there is attempt of ML to take 
action488. These procedures were an attempt to respond to the 40 FATF 
recommendations that clearly detail the reporting procedures for suspicious 
transactions, and that involve the member countries having to take action to report 
suspicious transactions and regulate this procedure through their domestic regulations. 
Recommendation 19 states that member countries should oblige their financial 
                                                          
485 See Minister of Oil in the Government of Tripoli for RT: Silence of the international community led to an increase 
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institutions to submit reports on suspect operations to the domestic authorities 489(See 
Chapter Four). 
There is however some criticism about the use of bank employees to report on suspicious 
operations. From 1993, the banks could make these reports without incurring liability to 
their clients or being bound by secrecy; however, the bodies created to deal with reports 
relating to ML operations have not responded effectively to the unexpectedly large 
amount of information received490. 
Stokes and Arora argue that professionally regulated sectors have become the 
'policemen' in the way of struggling ML. In practice, banks are placed in a unique position 
with regard to ML, as the banks have given their employees powers to observe and report 
on suspicious ML operations.  Simply, cashiers and frontline staff are right there when 
dirty money is initially placed into banking system; and the first stage of the ML process 
is when money is first introduced into the banking system491. 
Nevertheless, is argued here that using the banks in this way is effective and that the 
participation of the banks in reporting suspicious operations is important, as it could 
contribute to curbing ML crime. The evidence for that is the large volume of reports made 
about suspicious operations of ML, which has reached the bodies established for this 
purpose. The number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) received by the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) are increasing, and, according to the SAR annual 
report, there were 381,882 in 2014/15492. This is due to the employees involved reporting 
any suspicious financial transaction, in cases where there is the slightest suspicion. The 
reports thus made are based on the quantity and not the quality of the transactions. 
However, Goldby has suggested that a method should be found to determine the number 
of SARs that are weeded out as “noise” or identified as defensive reporting, and details 
of the findings should be reported in the SAR annual reports493. 
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Thus, there seems to be a problem in the UK approach to combating ML which is linked 
to the multitude of unnecessary annual SARs that are generated. The reason for 
employee caution is that UK legislation has criminalized failure to report suspicious ML 
operations, which has resulted in staff submitting reports immediately when there is the 
slightest suspicion, in order to avoid criminal prosecution. Regarding this, Campbell 
argues that the danger inherent in criminal sanctions in this context is over-reporting, 
meaning those in the regime are "drowned in data", with questionable benefit494.That 
led to an over-proliferation of reports all of which as yet they are not able to respond to. 
The large number of SARs about suspicious persons and transactions are arguably a 
condemnation of the system, as these will cost a large amount to process and also 
negatively affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK's approach against ML495. 
However, SARs will be developed to be more efficient in reporting on the risk and 
compliance activities by improving its AML supervision teams; and the pilot scheme 
started in 2016496, In co-operation with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) employees 
have been taken on in the UK’s FIU to work with the NCA to improve sensitive SAR 
intelligence, and the number of embedded officers increased in 2015/16 in HMRC, their 
target to identify undeclared assets and income hidden abroad497. 
In 2018 The National Crime Agency received a number of reports which flagged up 
potential money laundering, terrorist financing and other suspicious activity, and it has 
reported receiving 463,938 so-called suspicious activity reports, or SARs, nearly 10 
percent more than for the preceding year498. 
Through compliance with AML laws the banks are an effective means of preventing 
money launderers from using banks; however, although this compliance will protect the 
banks’ reputation and integrity, it also brings significant compliance problems for banks 
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as well as having the potential to adversely affect their operations499.  Thus, the banks 
ideally have to achieve a balance between compliance with AML laws and reasonable 
protection of customer confidentiality; however, it appears that compliance with AML 
takes precedence500. 
In order to make AML regulations more effective, the UK has sought to identify significant 
intelligence gaps specifically in the ‘high-end’ ML through strengthening, the intelligence 
picture and intervening to disrupt the threat. This effort is supported by appropriate legal 
powers, by stronger co-operation to increase their knowledge of high-end ML techniques 
and instruments, and by building effective strategies to disrupt threats in this area. 
Additionally, in 2014 HM Treasury sought to collect information on using digital 
currencies and to identify the risks associated with it and how it provided opportunities 
for illicit use. HM Treasury has noted that the illicit activity in digital networks meant that 
it had become an inadequate form of currency. 
MLR (2017) in part 2 .19 (1), explains that ''A relevant person must (a) establish and 
maintain policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively the risks 
of money laundering and terrorist financing identified in any risk assessment undertaken 
by the relevant person under regulation....''501 
Accordingly, the report should be prepared by the employee who suspects the 
transaction or activity for the ‘nominated officer’, appointed to deal with any suspicious 
action that may be related to ML operation. In this case, the nominated officer has to 
suspend the deal suspected of ML and provide a report to the NCA. However, if the 
employee wishes to proceed with the business which has been reported he or she must 
get the consent of the NCA. This means that in relation to the activity, which is suspected 
of being criminal under the POCA (2002),502 any further business or consultation is 
conditional on obtaining consent from the National Crime Agency (NCA). 
The reasons for considering a transaction or activity suspicious are that the business 
activity is unusual; or that the customer has tried to make exceptionally large cash 
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payments; or the behaviour of the client is strange or maybe that the activity does not 
make sense commercially. Thus, all uncommon activity should be checked carefully to 
detect any anything suspicious.503 
There seems to be problem about assessing whether a financial operation is suspicious 
or not; and this appears to be because the employee working on a transaction has to 
decide whether the available information is enough to determine whether the operation 
is unusual and if it gives rise to a reasonable suspicion. Thus, it is extremely important to 
concentrate on the term of ‘suspicion’, as it has a significant bearing on the stages of the 
AML strategy, specifically on providing reports.  
The Joint ML Steering Group has pointed out that suspicion is based on “(a) degree of 
satisfaction and not necessarily amounting to belief but at least extending beyond 
speculation as to whether an event has occurred or not”504 and “Although the creation 
of suspicion requires a lesser factual basis than the creation of a belief, it must 
nonetheless be built upon some foundation”505. Similarly, in the Court of Appeal in K v 
Westminster Bank, stated that the idea of ‘suspicion’ used in reporting ML operations is 
more than just ‘fanciful’, but is related to information about this operation. It considers 
that the interpretation of suspicion is the same in civil law as it is in criminal law506. 
However, suspicion does not necessarily have to ‘’be ‘clear’ or ‘firmly grounded and 
targeted on specific facts’ or based upon ‘reasonable grounds’’507 as the POCA seemed 
to imply. 
The POCA states that non-compliance with making a report to the NCA, as soon as 
practicable after the information is received, is an offence, and specifically the failure to 
report any suspicious ML movement by the regulated sector is considered an offence508. 
In other words, if the nominated officer fails to submit a report on suspicious activity 
he/she will be prosecuted and, if convicted, the punishment sanctioned under the POCA 
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is a prison term of up to five years and/or a fine509. The POCA also criminalizes the act of 
making disclosures510, which have possibly had a negative effect on the ML 
investigation511. 
In 2003 the UK attempted to address legislation for AML by reviewing laws512, issued since 
adopting the POCA (2002). This law covered more related serious crimes, and clarified 
the rules for reporting suspicious operations, which included punishments for failing to 
report. Management controls are very important in fighting ML and preventing it; and 
businesses are obliged to issue management controls to show that employees who may 
come into contact with businesses that launder money, are given the opportunity to take 
appropriate procedures to stop this illegal action or quickly report it513. This implies there 
needs to be an active internal control system to identify the suspicious activities and 
report them to the aforementioned nominated officer. 
5.6- The Preventive Measures 
The UK has taken further steps in AML by establishing some preventive measures to curb 
ML operations at their financial institutions. These measures relate to the procedures that 
relevant institutions should take, which are the CDD principles as follows: 
5.6.1-Record Keeping 
The importance of the banks’ record keeping procedures, as required by section (12) 
paragraph (1) of the ML Regulations (1993)514,is that it ensures that there is an audit trail 
which provides customer and transactions details that could assist in any financial 
investigation at any time by a law enforcement institution. Thus, as part 4 of (MLR 2017) 
requires, customer records must be kept up to date and be available on the demand of 
the competent authorities. These records should include information about the client’s 
identity, the firm’s business relationships and data about the transactions and kept for a 
period of not less than five years515. 
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The UK’s ML Regulations (1993) were adopted prior to the Third EU ML Directive on 
keeping records related to financial operations to prevent using the banking system to 
launder money. The UK regulations regarding record-keeping were revised and enlarged 
in the 2017 Regulations516. 
Hopton considers record-keeping an essential part of all AML systems, due to its 
constituting the evidence of ML actions.517 While the manner of keeping records and their 
location of the records are not identified, access to the details should be available when 
needed518, and must be provided to certain authorities as soon as they are required. The 
records must also be kept in a safe way and should be protected against any security 
breach. Failure to do so can also lead to prosecution and/or regulatory sanctions519; 
although this does not necessarily entail the retention of original documents.520 
Financial institutions are required to keep the necessary records related to any national 
and international financial operations conducted, as stated in the FATF recommendations 
10 -12521 (see Chapter Four). Thus, it is that the UK has complied with international 
obligations by including this recommendation within their regulations. Encouraging 
institutions to monitor transactions and keeping detailed records of transactions has 
specific importance for each of the processes of monitoring and record-keeping by the 
providers of financial services to customers. Their vigilance in these matters has a major 
impact on the detection of suspicious transactions522. 
5.6.2-Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) 
There is absence of public registries that should be involved in providing information 
about the beneficiary owners, including PEPs and their family members and associates 
who may need to have their data verified523. As Simonova has remarked, the FATF has 
induced member states to address this problem and defined the PEP as “an individual 
who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function. Due to their position and 
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influence, it is recognised that many PEPs are in positions that potentially can be abused 
for the purpose of committing ML offences and related predicate offences, including 
corruption and bribery, as well as conducting activity related to financing 
terrorism”524.However, the UK has a specific definition for the PEP, i.e. that any 
“politically exposed person” or “PEP” is an individual who is entrusted with prominent 
public functions, other than as a middle-ranking or more junior official; the “family 
member” of a politically exposed person includes— (A) a spouse or partner of that 
person; (B) children of that person and their spouses or partners; (C) parents of that 
person’’525. The existence of customers who are PEPs in financial operations poses an 
elevated risk; which necessitates taking certain procedures as stipulated in the (MLR 
2017) as follows: ‘’A relevant person who proposes to have, or to continue, a business 
relationship with a PEP, or a family member or a known close associate of a PEP, must— 
(a) have approval from senior management for establishing or continuing the business 
relationship with that person; (b) take adequate measures to establish the source of 
wealth and source of funds which are involved in the proposed business relationship or 
transaction with that person; and (c) where the business relationship is entered into, 
conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship with that person”526. 
Certain banks however have weaknesses in their systems of AML controls. This is 
confirmed by evidence that 15 banks ignored applying the requirements of the AML 
regime, which led the UK to take steps to assist in attempting to recover money that was 
transferred out of the country by former Nigerian President General Sani 
Abacha527.Financial institutions are obligated under the MLR (2017) legislation to apply a 
risk-based approach to due diligence procedures with the PEPs through taking the 
aforementioned action to determine whether a PEP is the real beneficiary of financial 
dealings528.  
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However, in practice, a problem has arisen in applying a risk-based approach to the PEPs, 
there was disproportionate application of these rules to medium-ranking and junior 
officials. To address this issue, the UK has adopted a proportional, risk-based and 
differentiated approach to different categories of PEPs under section 30 of the Bank of 
England and Financial Services Act (2016), which has given power to the Secretary of State 
to clarify that the definition of a PEP does not include middle-ranking or more junior 
officials.  Thus, there is a very important balance in exercising this principle, as not all 
PEPs pose the same risk of ML, and a risk-based approach can differentiate between 
lower and higher risk PEPs. This must be clarified to provide firms with a good 
understanding about undertaking less rigorous checks on low risk PEPs. 
A Guidance Consultation from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), has identified some 
indicators that pose a higher risk by the PEPs. These include if PEPs are linked to a country 
characterised by the spread of corruption, political instability, weak state institutions, a 
weak AML system, armed conflict or non-democratic governing regime529. However, it is 
suggested that there is evidence that the UK is not in full compliance with the 
international AML principles of this AML strategy. This study has pointed out that some 
PEPs had been able to launder illegal money acquired by former Nigerian President 
General Sani Abacha. Also, some members of the previous Libyan regime had laundered 
money by using it to buy property in London.530No action was taken against these PEPs 
through AML strategies; and their actions resulted in negative effect on their national 
economies and increasing oil smuggling in Libya and other countries.  
In spite of the significant procedures created to protect the bank's system when 
transferring or depositing funds from possible criminal origins, including that from illegal 
oil selling, the FSA reports that a large bank in the UK failed to identify sources of a client’s 
wealth even though he came from an oil-producing country associated with very high 
levels of corruption. Thus, procedures that were used by this bank to disclose suspicious 
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operations were not effective and the PEP database checks of the bank were unable to 
clarify the customer was a PEP531.  
Similarly, the FSA has confirmed that a PEP customer from a high-risk country had been 
receiving suspicious money in the UK, the real source of his funds was illegal oil. This 
customer was operating through two close relatives who held high office in their country 
and one had been suspected of serious corruption532. 
Additionally, a government inquiry was requested by Global Witness for 'failures' of the 
UK anti-money laundering rules that had allowed some banks such as HSBC, RBS, Lloyds, 
Barclays and Coutts to handle over $700 million of laundered Russian money, as Worthy 
reported; adding that ‘’the profits UK banks can make from handling dirty money far 
outweigh the sanctions they currently face for getting caught’’533. 
5.6.3– Money Transfer Services 
FATF recommends that financial institutions be obligated to audit money transfers by 
collecting all the important data about such deals, such as the sources of the financial 
transaction involved and they must complete details about such along with addresses 
and account numbers (see also Chapter four). Thus, in accordance with this FATF 
recommendation, the UK has already taken measures that can be used to limit the 
physical movement of currencies and help in detecting any money which people are 
attempting to move across borders. 
The UK has therefore establishing legislation that requires financial institutions to control 
the movement of money. Specifically, it has amended the POCA (2002), the Terrorism Act 
(2000) and the ML Regulations (2003 and 2017) to establish a minimum limit of Euro 
15,000534 (approx. £10,000), over which a business needs to disclose the source of the 
money. This applies whether a deal is concluded in a single activity or has been taken 
through several operations that seem to be linked. The UK has also expanded the 
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regulation of the financial sector to include some other activities such as those of casinos, 
accountants, lawyers and estate agents535. As a result, there is confirmation that more 
than £2.5 billion worth of illegal assets have been frozen and £93 million returned to the 
original owners after 2010536. 
5.6.4-Training 
The UK has focused on training all staff who may encounter ML operations, as part 2 of 
the MLR (2017) stipulates that members of staff are “regularly given training in how to 
recognise and deal with transactions and other activities which may be related to ML or 
terrorist financing”537. A high standard of training enabling official employees to become 
expert enough to detect criminal activity is a vital part of ensuring that these employees 
have enough knowledge to identify suspicious small businesses538. 
Qatar’s Attorney General who is Chair of International Association of Anti-Corruption; 
considers training essential to improve knowledge and experience and to qualify staff to 
work effectively against this kind of this crime. He added that “the UN is providing 
technical assistance to help the countries to fight against the corruption, especially 
helping to train the judges, prosecutors and others”539.Similarly, the International 
Monetary Fund has noted that the FIU set up an ongoing training programme for police 
investigating the financial sector; and included modular training provided by the ARA540. 
5.7- Freezing and the Confiscation in the UK regulations 
The other way to retain criminal assets is by freezing them. The (ARA) is the authority that 
has the power to freeze offenders’ assets, and it can issue a restraining order freezing 
any dealings with assets owned by persons convicted of corruption. 
According to Rider, the UK, through the activities of the ARA, has frozen wealth of £100 
million, and there are also orders for freezing a sum of around twice that541. However, 
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there is a problem with converting the temporary freezing orders into final orders for 
confiscation. The reason for that is that the costs linked with such enforcement are not 
inconsiderable, as well as the long and complicated procedures of investigation in 
financial crimes that require a high level of experience542. Furthermore, the UK has frozen 
no more than 0.75 percent of corrupt global financial flows per annum for the period 
covering 2010-2012. This amount is relatively low compared with what has been 
requested from London as a financial centre.543 
It is the opinion of this researcher that the UK is working intensively against financial 
crimes, and has adopted various procedures to prevent this crime by regular modification 
of legislation, due to the developments in these types of crime and in line with 
international conventions. The procedures of UK anti money laundering need to further 
develop specialised competences and build legal expertise in this area, specifically in the 
areas of investigation, prosecution and law enforcement. The SARs Report has confirmed 
that the UK’s FIU has embarked on restructuring early in 2017, the target of which is to 
improve the time taken to respond to requests for details, and provide the flexibility 
needed to increase resources in response to priority areas if necessary. Further, it aims 
to provide more trained staff to deal with SARs, and exchanges with foreign FIUs and to 
improve the processing of searches and analysis through providing an expert cadre skilled 
in the daily use of available systems544.   
The tracing and recovery of illegal proceeds is still difficult, even though, the development 
of the Confiscation Act has been taken a long way, especially by enactment of the POCA 
(2002), and the Serious Crime Act (SCA) (2007). The minimum amount which can be 
seized is £1,000. Section 303545 of the POCA (2002) allows the Secretary of State to set 
the minimum amount by order, after consulting with Scottish Ministers.  Collins Martin 
and King Colin have confirmed that there are difficulties in recognising the economic cost 
and market size of criminal activity. On their own, monetary figures as to the amount 
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realised under the POCA tell us very little as to the effectiveness of asset recovery in the 
fight against crime, these figures fail to provide an adequate performance546. 
The target of the confiscation is to strip the criminal of illegal proceeds; and was 
introduced in England and Wales in 1986 by the Drug Trafficking Offences Act. This was 
because of the failure to recover the drug trafficking proceeds in the 1970s in the 
'Operation Julie' case547. Thus, the POCA (2002) includes a confiscation system in Parts 2 
and 4 which identify procedures to implement confiscation. For example, procedures for 
the application of Confiscation Orders included consideration of a suspect’s lifestyle and 
whether he /she has benefited from general criminal conduct548. However, there are 
some difficulties involved in confiscation. Firstly, the provisory measures to curb the 
movement of the assets may lead to confiscation before a suspect has been found guilty 
and sentenced by a judicial decision. Secondly, a high level of proof was required for the 
forfeiture, resulting in the low numbers of confiscations that were made. In an attempt 
to overcome this difficulty, the POCA (2002) has allowed the ARA to recover assets by 
suing to confiscate the proceeds of crime through the High Court, during which an interim 
Order to freeze suspect’s assets can be obtained. However, in such cases the burden of 
proof lies with the Director of the ARA. Furthermore, because the burden of proof is on 
the government, if a dispute arises, the government may well decide to choose the easier 
route by getting an economic punishment in a civil court, if there are difficulties in 
establishing a criminal charge. It is during criminal asset recovery that all the funds of the 
criminal will be considered derived from offence unless the contrary can be proved by 
him549. Regarding this, Callant suggests that civil confiscations are being expanded and 
he is critical of this “tendency to cast a broad net over the assets of offenders rather than 
just illicit assets''550. 
The government’s aim in issuing this Act was to make forfeiture easier and make provision 
for civil recovery when there is insufficient evidence to bring charges beyond reasonable 
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doubt.  Civil recovery focuses on the origins of the property not on the guilt of individuals 
and does not result in a conviction and imprisonment551. Article 317 (1) & (2) of the POCA 
2002 stipulates that ‘’for the purposes of this section the qualifying condition is that the 
Director has reasonable grounds to suspect that: - (a)income arising or a gain accruing to 
a person in respect of a chargeable period is chargeable to income tax or is a chargeable 
gain (as the case may be) and arises or accrues as a result of the person’s or another’s 
criminal conduct (whether wholly or partly and whether directly or indirectly), or….’’552.  
The Parts 1 and 2 of the Act have given the ARA the authority to confiscate gains obtained 
from illegal proceeds; moreover, the Director of this Agency has other powers set up by 
this Act such as the authority to appeal against a decision made by the Crown Court in 
order to ensure there is no wrong in law or fact553. The procedure of the forfeiture in this 
case I think will put the rights of people at risk, even if they are accused, as some of the 
forfeiture provisions, consequent upon conviction, further impact on the family of the 
person who was taken to court and affects third-party rights. Additionally, the forfeiture 
will affect human rights, specifically the right to quiet use of property554. Thus, the best 
procedure in this case is to freeze assets rather than use confiscation until the ARA has 
collected sufficient evidence to charge the suspect and judgment can be issued from the 
appropriate court. 
The UK’s mechanisms for confiscating the assets of crime are advanced compared to 
means that were previously used, such as criminal fines and criminal forfeiture555. Unlike 
criminal forfeiture, which is limited by an inability to confiscate criminal revenues if they 
are transformed from cash into other types of assets, confiscation is applied to all 
unlawful proceeds gleaned from crime, whether in cash or not556. To avoid the problems 
that have faced the enforcement of confiscation orders, some amendments have been 
suggested by the Home Office Working Group557; namely, to standardise the calculations 
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made in the confiscation orders; to put time limits on payments and to reconsider the 
period of imprisonment in cases of default by increasing it. The rules that relate to the 
interest payable on outstanding orders should also be clarified as well as stipulating which 
parties are responsible for execution558. Because of the importance of seizing illegal 
proceeds, the international conventions have obliged some countries to include in their 
legislation a section which enables their authorities to detain confiscated property which 
represents the proceeds of that crime559.Article 31 of the UN Convention on Corruption 
states that members “shall take, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic 
legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of the proceeds 
of crime derived from offences established in accordance with this Convention”560.This 
demonstrates the Convention’s view of the importance of tracking the proceeds of illegal 
activity, as this provides a mechanism to deprive the criminals of their illegal assets. 
Furthermore, these provisions are recommended for transnational action to assist in the 
freezing and control of criminal proceeds and furthering the aim of AML legislation. 
Harvey has considered that ‘’Despite its particularly assiduous application of anti-money 
laundering systems and procedures, the UK still appears on the list of countries in which 
money laundering is taking place,’’561 The cost of implementing these controls has a role 
in that. Thus, ‘’There is a need to have a clear idea of the objectives of legislation - with 
no clear measure of the amount of money laundering activity taking place it could be that 
demonstration of compliance rather than prevention of crime becomes an end in 
itself’’562. 
Although, the aim of the UN Convention on Corruption (2004) is to curb the proceeds of 
crime and to recover assets, achieving this requires national legislation against these 
illegal actions, and further promoting important principles against benefitting from illegal 
proceeds, such as tracking illegal wealth563.In the UK from 2010 to 2014 more than £2.5 
billion worth of illegal assets have been frozen and £93 million have been returned to the 
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original owners564.  The seizing and freezing enforcement is outlined under Section 295 
of the POCA (2002). This demonstrates the significant efforts by the UK that resulted in 
recovering all these illegal proceeds. 
 Although, criticisms have been directed against this system of confiscation it has distinct 
advantages, as this study has highlighted; and improvements have been made through 
compliance with international principles which have resulted in denying many criminals 
the benefit of assets illegally seized. 
Despite the UK regulations being very important steps in the fight against ML crime; there 
are still problems in the regulation of London as a financial centre.565 Moreover, these 
laws concentrate on the national market rather than also focussing on the international 
market, which it must do if they are to successfully curb this cross-border crime. This Act 
also made confiscation more effective. The rules of KYC allowed banks to obtain sufficient 
details about their clients, specifically the beneficiaries of financial transactions, in order 
to prevent the misuse of the banks’ facilities for ML purposes566. 
The UK has thus adopted a series of AML legislations and it has developed these by 
introducing some amendments to the regulations taken from the international 
conventions such as the EU directives and The UK has been eager to adopt its anti-ML 
regulations in conformity with the FATF recommendations, and has changed most of it 
relevant legislation as the international conventions and the FATF have requested. 
Therefore, the POCA (2002), the Criminal Justice Act (1991), the Drug Trafficking Act 
(1994) and the ML Regulations (1993) and (2003) were adopted under the EU directives. 
Nevertheless, The UK AML regulations have been in line with the FATF recommendations, 
for example, the UK has created the FIU, included the principles of CDD, taken up the 
procedure for reporting suspicious operations and other procedures that control 
suspicious money, like freezing and confiscation, despite this, there remains criticism 
directed at the UK AML regime, which concentrates on the lack of effective application 
of the UK's laws567. This is an important criticism which highlights limitations on the 
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benefits that should be the result of all the hard work in creating these regulations. These 
limitations concern the failure to address the large number of reports submitted about 
suspicious financial transactions and the low implementation of the confiscation rules. It 
is issues such as these that make it imperative to ensure that reporting and confiscation 
are effective. ‘Smurfing’ is one of the means used by money launderers when they 
deposite cash at the banks or transferring the money abroad; and to avoid detection, 
they divide a large amount of money into several smaller amounts568. and this also needs 
to be addressed. 
5.8- Conclusion. 
Many different AML regulations have been issued in the UK since early on, in line with 
the rules of the international conventions, such as the European Directives on AML. This 
has involved the criminalisation of ML in a wide form in the POCA (2002) as well as many 
other regulations and the bodies created to fight ML have been given wide powers. 
Additionally, the UK has enforced the basic rules of an AML regime, such as procedures 
for reporting suspicious transactions, that is reflected in the significant number of reports 
on suspicious transactions to the FIU. However, even though there have been a high 
number of reports, the investigations based on these notifications have been exceedingly 
low569. 
Despite strenuous national efforts to combat ML in the UK, there are some arguably 
minor criticisms of certain procedures. For example, the UK needs to ensure that AML 
measures are cost-effective to make firms able to meet their obligations by using a risk-
based approach and adopting the international obligations.570 The UK has failed to 
identify these costs and how intermediary is remunerated; and failed to use risk 
assessments. Additionally, there has been considerable apathy in the UK with regards to 
developing optimally effective AML and bribery policies. 
Despite criticisms directed against the UK's AML Act, this study has shown that the UK 
has attempted to adopt effective procedures against ML crime. Legislation on the 
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criminalisation of ML was updated in 2002 and 2003, where the offenses addressed by 
the legislation, are the concealing, disguising or converting of criminal property. 
Additionally, the UK created the bodies that work against this crime and attempted to 
address the problem that happened in the 1980s, through the era of financial 
deregulation that resulted in the attraction of large numbers of ‘foreign criminals in 
London571. 
In this case, the relevance of this information above that Libya should be learned from 
these lessons by filling the gaps mentioned above, which require changes in legislation 
and the support of financial institutions by the financial experts and training programmes, 
and legal transplants such as the procedures of reporting suspicious transactions, that is 
reflected in the significant number of reports on suspicious transactions to the FIU.  
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Chapter Six: Money Laundering by the Sale of Oil in Libya 
and the Legislative Response. 
 
6.1- Introduction. 
This chapter will consider the political effects of the efforts in AML in Libya and the history 
and development of legislation against ML, that has been adopted since that country 
became independent. Libya has issued so many different regulations since the early 
1950s, and the changes that have happened from then up to the present day will be 
traced and their impact assessed. It will be argued that Libya is aware of issues of AML in 
that it has ratified a number of treaties. However, in practice there is still a long way to go 
before international principles of AML are reflected in both legislation and actual practice, 
specifically in the illegal selling of oil. 
6.2- The political effects of the efforts in Anti- Money Laundering 
Libya is a major producer of petroleum; oil is extracted and refined in Libya, and the 
country’s economy depends largely on the sale of this oil. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) has noted that Libya's economy is heavily dependent on 
hydrocarbons which constitute 96% of the nation’s exports and which made up around 
$4 billion per month of net revenues in 2012. However, according to Taguri and Nasef, 
Libya has a weak infrastructure in health care and was ranked 87th from 191 countries 
by the World Health Organisation in 2000572. They believe that this was due to corruption.  
A pattern of authoritarianism has formed a part of Libya’s recent history, including the 
recent civil war; and this has allowed a high degree of corruption in spite of the national 
law criminalising it, and Libya’s subscribing to the rules of international conventions on 
corruption. This, and the regulations issued during Gaddfi’s regime, may in part explain 
why Libya was ranked 168th out of 182 on the Transparency International 2011 
Corruption Perceptions Index573. The chaos, the proliferation of weapons, the civil war 
and the armed factions required oil production sources and led to an increase in 
corruption; and in 2016 Libya was ranked 170574.  
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Libya does not have a constitution, and the legal framework of the country rests on a 
series of declarations and laws such as the Declaration of the Authority of the People 
(1977) and the Great Green Charter of Human Rights in the Age of the Masses (1988)575. 
In spite of many laws which have been issued since the early 1950s, offences of corruption 
have increased. The spread of corruption in Libya is due to many factors. One such is the 
‘Popular Revolution’ which began after Muammar Gaddafi’s landmark speech in April 
1973 at Zuwara576.The new system of administration that dates from this time involved 
selecting people for office by popular choice, suspending laws and replacing some 
government institutions with the Popular Administration. Hagger believes that the 
changes made by Gaddafi’s revolution resulted in many experienced and qualified people 
losing their positions.577 However, the Libyan oil and banks, during the king’s regime were 
also controlled by corrupt management578. Many leaders were thus replaced by under-
qualified people who were unable to prevent the corruption that spread through the 
majority of administration departments. 
The spread of corruption might also be explained by the absence of a constitution which 
Gaddafi suspended after coming to power in Libya at the end of the 1960s. His regime 
was characterised by a lack of democratic institutions and the rule of law giving the 
President absolute power. Other reasons include the old regime’s practice of ignoring 
these crimes, as already described by Idrissi, and the 1981 law on employees’ salaries. 
The latter needs amendment to ensure that Libyan employees do not use illegal means 
to augment their incomes to meet their basic needs579. In addition, oil smuggling must be 
curbed by bringing Libyan fuel prices in line with those of neighbouring counties. 
The end of Gaddafi’s regime did not mark an end to corruption and it still exists in many 
forms, for example the smuggling of oil to Malta and Tunisia through Zuwara580. Shaw and 
Mangan believe that smuggling oil through Libyan ports into Malta and Europe has 
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brought riches to a number of Libyan individuals581. Libyans have been able to use 
smuggling oil and other subsidised goods as a way of raising their standard of living. 
Smuggling oil from Libya’s militia-controlled oil facilities is still occurring and a ship 
containing illicit crude oil tried to sail from the rebel-held port of Sidra on March 8th 2014. 
This was without permission of the Libyan government, which, together with Cyprus 
requested that the oil be seized by US navy SEALS as the ship was near Cyprus in 
international waters. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2146 (2014) allows 
member states of the Security Council to inspect vessels that are suspected of having 
illegal crude oil from Libya as cargo and the UNSC has adopted sanctions against the illegal 
export of crude oil. It is imperative that there is national and international co-operation 
to curb these kinds of crimes; and that the regulations that have been issued be upheld 
and the laws against corrupt operations enforced. 
Nowadays, ML in Libya has had a significant impact on weakening national income 
through the depletion of capital. Capital has been smuggled abroad, leading to an 
imbalance between savings and consumption currency, according to the Audit Bureau's 
report, the Central Bank of Libya contributed to ML, which led to a reduction of reserves 
abroad, worth 72 billion dinars by the end of 2016. This was done through external 
transfers made by the Central Bank to foreign banks also the Audit Bureau's report stated 
that in 2015 there were a number of companies' and individuals’ accounts that were 
frozen, as they proved to be involved in the smuggling of large sums of money abroad 
through the supply of fake and manipulated documents, which affected the supply of real 
goods or services benefiting the State582. 
ML has had a major impact on monetary instability, wealth became owned by just a few 
people, which has impacted negatively affected society, and caused the depletion of the 
national economy. Money-laundering has contributed to the spread corruption, social 
crimes, administrative corruption and bribery583. The standard of living dropped due to 
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the provision of counterfeit goods and services; and there was a poorer level of banking 
services due to lack of liquidity584. 
The Libyan legislator being aware of the seriousness of the smuggling crime and the need 
to address, it concluded that the first step in this area was to fill the legislative vacuum 
by adopting a law specific to this crime. This was Law No. 97(1976) against smuggling 
commodities through customs. This law criminalises the smuggling of goods, and 
punishes anyone who commits the smuggling action by detention for a minimum of two 
years and a fine equalling double the value of the goods involved or one thousand LYD, 
whichever is greater585.  
On the other hand, the crime of smuggling goods was also within the scope of the crime 
that was criminalised by the Customs Act No 10 (2010), also called ‘Concerning Customs’, 
which also includes any smuggling that violates the laws of import and export. Since the 
oil and its derivative materials are imported and exported only by the government, any 
export that has been made by non-government bodies or without the knowledge of 
customs staff is contrary to the rules of import and export, and considered a smuggling 
crime by Article 45 of Law No. 10 (2010) (Concerning Customs)586, so controlling the 
smuggling of goods is the responsibility of customs officials. 
Although this law represents an important step in the fight against goods smuggling, this 
first step has stumbled as it is noted that up to now there is no independent law that 
criminalizes the smuggling of oil and its derivatives, and all that is there is the crime of 
goods smuggling which does not clearly include smuggling oil derivatives. 
6.3- Islamic Principles and Effective Changes to the Libyan Anti- 
Money Laundering Legislations 
Libya, as an Islamic country, has codified its legislation since 1971, when it adopted a 
decision by the Revolutionary Command Council (Article 1) "The Libyan Arab Republic 
emphasizes spiritual values and takes Islamic law as the main source of 
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legislation"587.That means that Libya must take into account commitment to basic 
principles of Islamic law in every legal issue. Based on this decision, legislation has been 
adopted that applies the principles of Islamic Shari’ah. 
Libya is an adherent of the ‘Maliki madhhab'588 (a school of thought) which is one of the 
four main approaches of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in Islamic Shari’ah589. The 
regulations it has adopted take the simplest of the madhhabs in Islamic Shari’ah590. Thus, 
Libya has adopted Law No. 89/1971 on Zakat591 (the obligatory charity tithe for Muslims), 
and the law of the moratorium No. 124/1972592 etc. 
However, after the abolition of the Revolutionary Command Council, the People's 
Congress system replaced it, as stated in a legal document, issued in 1977, which is known 
as the Declaration of the Power of the People (1977).593 In it, Libya considered Islamic 
Shari’ah as a code for the whole law of the country and prohibited any conflict with it. 
So, Libya is unique, not only in comparison with other Islamic countries, as Article 2 of 
this document states that "The Qur’an is the law of society in the Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya."594This principle was also affirmed in Article 2 of the Great Green 
Charter of Human Rights (1988), issued by the People's Congress. As this study, has stated 
in Chapter 7, with regard to criminal law, there is a generally accepted principle in (Article 
1) "There is no crime and no punishment except by text" which prevents any direct 
returning to the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah by the judge, because the point here is 
that the legislative text is the statutory text. 
Although, the Declaration of the Power of the People (1977) considered that Shari’ah is 
the source of the legal system, this Declaration provides guidelines for taking Shari’ah as 
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a method or sources of Libyan legislation, these guidelines are not up to the level of the 
Constitution, thus is not obligated to the courts. As a result, it is clear that the Libyan 
Legislator has failed to endorse Shari’ah as a source of the law as there is no law for 
implementing these guidelines. This confirmed by the Principle of the Supreme Court 
number 197/ق, 3.11. (1997)595, which was not implemented because the legislative 
authority in Libya, namely the People's Congresses did not change laws issued before the 
Declaration of the Power of the People in order to remain compatible with Shari’ah 
principles. This inaction reflects a lack of seriousness in considering Shari’ah as a source 
of the Libyan law. 
Therefore, the legal system in Libya falls far short of both Shari’ah principles and 
international AML regulations, and measures should be taken to rectify this. There are 
certain AML principles that should be involved in the CMLA 2005 such as measures for 
CDD to enable the banks to know who their clients are, so they can be monitored as far 
as ML is concerned, as this research will discuss.  
Many Muslim people consider that Shari'ah is God's law and thus that there is no need 
for any codification; furthermore, there are ideas to be found in Muslim cultures that any 
importing of rules or laws from other cultures would be in contravention of Islamic 
Shari'ah. However, in this case, this study has shown the reverse of that, and it has 
confirmed that adopting some of the procedures contained in the UK AML regulations 
would be not inconsistent with Muslim ideas on AML principles. Adoption and 
codification would enhance the principles of AML encapsulated in Shari'ah and make 
them more acceptable and easier to implement. This research has argued that several 
Shari'ah principles address the primary crimes involved in ML crime and endorse the 
criminalizing of activities related to ML (See Chapter 4 section 9). 
As this study, has argued above, Islamic regulations consider the means of actions, which 
in this case is ML. Shari’ah criminalizes the means of ML in two ways. Firstly, Shari’ah 
focuses of the result of the action; thus, if the action involved illegal proceeds- even if the 
action was legal- these proceeds are haram (unlawful) in the Islamic perspective. The 
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Islamic principle in this context, is to prevent to access to anything causing corruption596.  
So, any means leading to illegal gains are haram and are also illegal (haram) even if these 
means were originally legal. Secondly, Shari’ah criminalizes actions such as the creation 
of fake companies or making bank transfer operation of illegal gains, whether the target 
of the action was ML or not, as these actions are a kind of cheating which is not allowed. 
Consequently, all ML operations, Libya including operations through illegal oil selling, are 
prohibited under Shari’ah rules, as a result, all the illegal proceeds are haram (unlawful) 
and these illegal sums of money must be returned, this includes anything bought by this 
money. In the holy Qur’an, Allah says ‘And eat not up your property among yourselves in 
vanity’597. ‘Eating property in vanity’ can be interpreted to include all illegal actions to get 
gains. Similarly, Prophet Mohammad said “any activities build from soht (unlawful trade) 
will be cast into fire”598as this study has explained in Chapter four.  
6.4-The legal framework for Money Laundering crime 
Libya’s legal framework is based on a series of laws and declarations, which include the 
1977 Declaration of the Power of the People and the 1988 Great Green Charter of Human 
Rights in the Age of the Masses, the Penal Law of Libya; the Law of Economic Offenses in 
Libya No. 2(1979); the law of ‘Where did you get this?’ No. 3 (1986); the Lustration Law 
No. 10(1994); the Law of Drugs No. 7(1990) and the CMLA (2005) and its implementing 
regulations (2008). 
 
6.4.1- The impact of international law and agreements on Anti- Money Laundering in 
Libya 
Libya is obliged to include and follow international standards if it wants to deal with 
international institutions and banks. Liew and Reuter have noted that there are financial 
pressures by the US on the countries that do not play their part, by slowing down their 
international transactions and making it almost impossible for their banks to clear funds 
through other countries599. Abiding by international standards thus allows the Libyan 
Central Bank to conduct financial operations with those international financial 
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institutions who have requested this and ensures that the money which is transferred is 
legal, that there is information about its origin and that it is not involved in any suspicious 
operation. International standards are therefore adhered to in the Libyan regulations, 
and Official Financial Employee2, confirmed that: ''the state of Libya is obligated to 
involve and follow the international standards of ML regulations to be able to deal with 
the International Institution Banks''600. 
However, the interviews also revealed the impact of international law on anti-money 
laundering in Libya such that, although Libyan AML regulations have included some of 
the international rules, through adopting the international Conventions mentioned 
above; Libya has a weak commitment to the Task Force on Financial Action standards. 
According to Official Financial Employee2: ‘‘the proportion of Libya's commitment to the 
recommendations of the task force financial action is quite low’’601.  These shortcomings 
in the implementation of certain strategies in the fight against ML means there is a gap 
in the Libyan AML Act, as this study will be explaining later. 
6.5- Attempts to curb Money Laundering in illegal oil selling in 
Libya 
This section will discuss the effectiveness of Libyan penal law and other special regulations 
in preventing ML crime since the 1950s. 
6.5.1- Libyan Penal Law 
Such laws stipulate that anyone who receives or conceals goods stolen or obtained in any 
way by a felony or misdemeanour or enables others to obtain goods illegally is committing 
a financial crime and incurs a penalty. In this context, this study will discuss Libyan penal 
law from two perspectives – firstly, how it deals with the concealment of goods stolen or 
obtained from crime and secondly, the extent to which Libyan penal law criminalizes 
activities contributing to ML in order to find out why Libyan penal law is not adequate in 
curbing ML and third Criminalizing the Aiding of ML. 
6.5.2-How it deals with the concealment of goods stolen or obtained from crime 
Anti-corruption, which is the primary crime of the ML were first introduced in Libya as 
early as 1956. Libyan penal law deals with ML in two articles: firstly, Article 465 (repeated 
                                                          
600  (Official Financial Employee No.2, interviewed 12 August 2015). 
601 Ibid. 
157 
 
A) stipulates that a penalty of not more than two years should be given for knowingly 
receiving or concealing goods stolen or obtained in any way by a felony or misdemeanour 
or for enabling others to obtain goods illegally602. These regulations have considered 
some types of behaviour as crimes; such as the concealing of stolen goods, the fraudulent 
use of a false name and criminal 'participation' - for example, helping to prepare for the 
offence or just by hiding the evidence of the crime. These Acts are an important 
contribution against crimes of corruption as they criminalize earning illegally by any 
means, which is the primary crime of ML, as well as hiding these proceeds, which is also 
a form of ML. 
6.5.3- The extent to which Libyan penal law criminalizes activities contributing to Money 
Laundering 
Although this Act was an early attempt to indirectly curb ML, these regulations do not 
cover ML operations such as transferring money via the Internet and other modern 
means which were not established when they were issued. This point was confirmed by 
Judge7.2, who agreed that the criminal laws were not enough to stem the crime of ML, 
and that: ‘’the Act is not enough because it is not line with the development of the means 
of ML, which are currently through using new technology ‘’603. 
Such answers demonstrate that despite national efforts to combat ML in Libya, and the 
adoption of these Acts; regulations have not been adequate to curb ML and the national 
laws have not come into line with the development of the technology. However, the 
effects of international laws and agreements on AML also need to be considered. 
 
Although the aim of Article 465 is not to prevent ML directly, it contributes to anti-ML 
because it applies to a number of cases which may include the crime of ML. This is clear 
through the widening of the concept of the material element as a component of the 
concealment offence that not only involves concealment but is enlarged to include the 
receiving of things stolen or obtained from crime when knowing their source. It also 
includes enabling others to obtain advantage from the things that were stolen, which 
means that it includes electronic money transfers and smuggling. Moreover, the concept 
of the concealment is extended to include some of ML activities such as hiding and 
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possession which means that things can be considered ‘hidden’ if the individual has an 
authority over these things, even if they were not in his tenure. Additionally, the 
concealment may not be the crucial factor but it could be their value604; for example, the 
financial proceeds from things that were stolen, as confirmed by Article 465 above.  
However, this article did not include the banks that received a deposit of funds even if 
they knew that its sources were illegal; thus, it was not fully effective in controlling ML 
crime. Because of this deficiency, it was followed by the Economic Offences Act (1979). 
 
Article 460 of the Penal Law of Libya has identified that the crime of fraud occurs when 
''each person get illegal benefit for himself or others through using fraudulent means or 
by disposal of fixed or movable funds which are not his property and he has no right to 
dispose it or uses a fake name or representative. Fraud will be punished by a fine of not 
more than fifty Dinars or punishment will be confined to not more than five years if the 
harm is to the state or to its institutions''605. Simser considers ML that is achieved by 
establishing companies such as investment/trust companies; import/export firms; money 
service businesses and then mixing the illegal money with legal sums to hide their illegal 
origin to be fraudulent. 606According to Bolton & Hand the definition of fraud is ''criminal 
deception; the use of false representations to gain an unjust advantage''607.  Bara 
comments that the Libyan legislature considers that the offence of fraud only requires the 
offender to make the request, even if he did not get the funds608.Additionally, this law has 
addressed economic crimes such as bribery, misappropriation of public funds and the 
extortion of money among others. The legislator has stipulated the punishment of 
imprisonment against any public official who has committed this illegal action. 
Thus, ML operations by illegal oil selling are included in these criminalized behaviours, 
and this legislation should have contributed to preventing this crime; however, this crime 
has increased, as this study has explained above. Although this Act was an early attempt 
at curbing ML indirectly, these Articles did not stipulate what should happen if banks 
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607Bolton, R and Hand, D. (2002) Statistical Fraud Detection; A Review. Statistical Science Vol,17. No. 3, pp 235-255 
(p.215). 
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received a deposit of funds even when they knew that its sources were illegal and their 
role in disclosing this crime. Thus, this legislation was ineffective in controlling ML crime; 
and, because of this deficiency, it was followed by the Economic Offences Act (1979).  
6.5.4- The Extent to which Libyan Penal Law Criminalizes the Act of Aiding Money 
Laundering 
ML crime may be committed by one person who takes full responsibility for it, or it could 
be committed by more than one person, each one aiding by a certain amount. Aiding ML 
has different forms; it could be through incitement to commit the crime, by helping to 
prepare for the offence or just by hiding the evidence of the crime.  All of these are called 
‘participation’, and actions contributing to the offence are considered in two sections. 
‘Actions’ can refer to the components of the crime that was committed, where the 
perpetrator participates directly in the crime or with others- if there are multiple 
offenders. Other ‘actions’ are those which are not primary components of the crime, such 
as abetting the commission of the crime, facilitating the offence or a later action, such as 
hiding the evidence609. 
 
Penal law has defined a ‘partner in crime’ in Article 100 as: ‘‘firstly, anyone who incites to 
commit a component of the act of a crime if the act has taken place based on this 
incitement. Secondly, anyone who knowingly gives the actor or actors weapons or 
equipment or anything else, which was used in the commission of a crime with 
knowledge, helping them in any other way in the process or facilitating or being 
complementary to the commission of the crime. Thirdly, those agreeing with others to 
commit the crime which was committed based on this agreement’’610. 
By this definition, participation involves three kinds of activity- incitement, helping and 
agreement. The important activity related to ML is helping - which means helping the 
criminal in any way in the process or facilitating or being complementary to the 
commission of the crime.  In this context, there is a controversy about the extent to which 
these participation activities apply to ML. According to Mustafa, the ML operation can 
involve participatory activity by others; for example, the bank which receives deposits in 
fake accounts with the knowledge that the origin of these proceeds were illegal, and 
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transfers this money to help the criminals to hide the illegal proceeds, this bank would 
then be accountable for this operation611. 
Conversely, according to Tahar, the ML operation cannot be a participatory activity 
because it took place after a crime like theft or corruption, so the helping activities that 
happened after the end of the original offence cannot be seen as assisting in this crime, 
but it could be considered a separate crime like the crime of concealment612. In the same 
way, the causal relationship between the original crime and the partner's action must be 
considered; if there is no link between them there is no participatory activity. Thus, in the 
case of ML, the action of laundering comes later than the original crime, which means 
there is no causal relationship between the two crimes; as a result, there is no 
participation613.  Libyan law has however adopted the view that ML operations can involve 
participatory activity by others, which including different forms of assistance in 
committing the crime, as in Article 100 mentioned above (100)614. In this case, the offence 
of ML is linked to concealing goods stolen or obtained from misdemeanour or 
contravention because of the material element – i.e. the money. Laundering offences go 
hand in hand with concealment in cases when the offender hides funds that were 
obtained illegally. In this context, the crime of concealment is also ML; thus, Libya’s Penal 
Law has addressed financial crimes through criminalizing concealment. 
It is arguable that the crime of concealment should be both linked to ML crime and not 
treated as separate, as the criminal is concealing ‘the material element', concealment is 
therefore a central element of ML crime; which covers several different actives involved 
in the laundering of money. The other elements of this offence such as the act of 
camouflage, and also involves different forms of aiding and abetting as will be discussed 
in the section on the Libyan CMLA 2005. 
Although, by imposing these rules, the legislator wanted to protect public money, this 
legislation does not expand on what constitutes all the economic crimes affecting the 
national economy, and oil smuggling is not included. While it is sufficient to punish all 
those in the Libyan administration who are guilty,this law has not kept abreast of the huge 
developments in the field of economic crimes, which has entered an era of electronic 
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means of fraud and embezzlement, or the use of multinational companies and 
international banks in countries with banking secrecy; as well as the Libyan legislature 
also lacking the means of economic control615. 
Libya has nevertheless attempted to address the deficiency in the relevant previous 
legislation, by adopting the Economic Offences Act No 2 in 1979. This law criminalized any 
intentional destruction of oil installations or any public establishment, and it focused on 
the smuggling of goods, which were identified by Article 5 of this Act, namely: coins, 
valuables such as paintings or objects in precious metals, alloys, gold jewellery or precious 
stones616. Although this law is important to preserve the national economy by 
criminalizing these dangerous acts because they often produce large illegal proceeds; 
usually the criminals resort to laundering in order to enter these proceeds in to the 
legitimate financial system and this, in itself is an important original crime617. However, 
through studying this law, it is noted that up to now there are no independent and clear 
law texts that criminalize the smuggling of oil and its derivatives; all that exists is the crime 
of goods smuggling and damaging oil installations.  Thus, this law is very weak in fighting 
this specific ML operation. This law has imposed punishment on this action without 
identifying the mechanism that could be followed to disclose it; so, it does not contribute 
to curbing ML crime. In order to comply with pressure from international financial 
institutions and related organizations, Libya has attempted to address this deficiency, by 
adopting the CML Act (2005), as this study will discuss below. 
6.6- Confronting Money Laundering through Special Regulations 
Libya has attempted to prevent corruption and ML crimes by issuing some special 
legislation against financial crime; this section will explore whether these special 
regulations issued to prevent financial crime are adequate or not. 
6.6.1-The law of “Where did you get this?” No. (3) (1986) 
Libya issued Act No (3) in 1986 in an effort to combat corruption. Article 1 is important 
and states: ''no person may acquire money, benefit or material advantage illegally, and 
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16/6/2017). 
617 Abayuki, A. Economic Crime. Available at: www.policemc.gov.bh/reports/2011/.../634372734179936644.doc 
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earning is unlawful if it arises from favouritism, threats, violation of the law, abuse of 
occupational or professional status or influence or if the source of someone’s income is 
unclear or unaccountably exceeds his normal income’’618. This law applies to every 
official, whether permanent or temporary, working for the government or the local 
community and prohibits any person commissioned with a public service or entrusted 
with the task of implementing the law to disrupt the principle of equality and receive any 
advantage for himself or for any relatives or friends.  Also, it prohibits any official to use 
his position or influence to intimidate others and to obtain any benefit by compelling the 
officials of law enforcement to act contrary to the law. 
Thus, this Act is not limited to corruption by public employees, but also includes others 
by using the term ''no person'' in Article (1). This Act attempts to prevent corruption in 
general and has widened the criminalized behaviours to include any illegal means such as 
deception, fraud, threats…etc. It is also clear that the law targets official employees, who 
are required to disclose the source of their property and gives the legal authorities power, 
to follow them and to ascertain that these amounts in their possession are legal; and if 
they cannot prove the legality of the proceeds, power to confiscate them. 
This Act did not only contribute to preventing corruption, but went further and addressed 
ML operations by criminalizing hiding illegal proceeds, which is also a form of ML. This 
law, under Article 5, punishes any person who conceals money illegally with imprisonment 
and a fine not exceeding one thousand dinars619. However, this Act does not specify the 
criteria to be followed by the concerned authorities to detect suspicious ML operations, 
as this study has explained when discussing international AML principles. Furthermore, 
this Act does not cover ML operations such as transferring money via the Internet and 
other modern, means which were not established when it was issued. 
6.6.2- The Lustration Law No. (10) (1994) 
In order to protect public funds, Libya issued the Lustration Law No (10) in 1994. In Article 
6, theft and illegal earnings were criminalized as follows: ''theft and illegal earnings are 
considered to be all money or commission obtained by any person (subject to the 
provisions of this law) for himself or for others by taking advantage of his status or abusing 
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his professional authority ……''620. This text demonstrates that the aim of issuing this law 
was to curb corruption by criminalizing the means of corruption, such as theft or using 
illegal ways to obtain money. This Article also covers offences by a public official who 
obtains for himself or for another person a profit or benefit from the job in which he 
works, and criminalizes any such gain or benefit, whether the beneficiary is the employee 
or third parties. For example, if the accused took advantage of his position to hide the 
origin of illegally obtained proceeds, this action is illegal, and constitutes an important 
original crime of ML. This is because criminals often seek to launder large illegal proceeds 
within the financial system. Therefore, according to Kalid, the target of this regulation is 
the primary crime of ML621. 
6.7- Measure No. (1) (2002) of the Libyan Central Bank against 
Money Laundering 
Libya has attempted to adopt mechanisms against ML through the procedures of the 
Central Bank, which issued measure No (1)622in 2002, which involves AML procedures for 
all commercial and private banks, the Libyan Foreign Bank and all financial institutions. 
According to Decision No.1 of the National Committee on AML (2008), Article 1 stipulates 
that ''this Unit operates under the National Committee for Combating ML, it is managed 
by a Director, assisted by a Deputy and a number of specialists and expert staff in this 
area.”623 Article 2 adds that this Unit operates through three departments, which are the 
Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs, the Department of Inspection and 
Follow-up Investigation and the Department of Analysis of Reports and International 
Cooperation624. 
It has also included a definition of money-laundering operations, and identified guidelines 
that should be taken when opening accounts; for example, whereby banks are prohibited 
to open accounts that use a fake name or representative, and must always adopt the 
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account holder's name, as it is written in the passport or business license in the case of 
ordinary persons.  
Furthermore, the banks are obligated to establish an FIU to counter illegal ML, However, 
the vulnerability of Measure No 1 is that this publication, although it included all these 
important procedures, did not live up to the law. Thus, this led to Libya adopting Law No. 
2. (2005) on Combating ML.625  As a result of this pressure, the law was hurriedly enacted, 
which may explain why neither of the regulations properly involved some important and 
sensitive principles such as regulations on how to deal with PEPs etc, as will be discussed 
in this section, and why these regulations are ineffective and thus in practice almost non-
existent. 
6.8- Libyan Combat Money Laundering Act No.2 (2005) and its 
Executive Rules 
As this study, has argued, even though Libya issued several regulations against financial 
crimes, rapid global developments in technology meant the regulations were becoming 
powerless to prevent corruption and ML crimes. Thus, Official Financial Employee2 
answered questions on the criminalisation of ML saying: “In order to be able to deal with 
international financial institutions, Libya should be obligated to include the international 
standards relating to ML in their regulations’’626.Also, Official Financial Employee4 
asserted that: “the deal with the international institution banks is conditioned by an 
obligation to follow the international standards relating to ML’’627. Thus, in line with 
international attempts to curb ML offences, Libya issued the CMLA (2005). 
The important focus in this context is Article 1, which defines illegal funds as '' illegal 
property obtained directly or indirectly from a crime''628. The first paragraph of Article 2 
defines those guilty of an ML offence as follows: 
''anyone who perpetrates any of the following acts shall be considered to have committed 
the crime of ML: Possessing, owning, using, exploiting, disposing of in any manner, 
transferring, transporting, depositing, or concealing illegal property in order to disguise 
its unlawful source. Disguising the true nature of illegal property, concealing its location, 
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method of disposal or movement, rights related to it, or its ownership or possession. 
Participating in the above acts in any manner whatsoever’’629.Article 2 para. 2 defines 
when the funds become illegal: ''property shall be considered illegal if it was obtained 
from a crime ... ''630. 
However, some criticism has been directed towards Article 1 of the CMLA 2005, Official 
Financial Employee2 concluded that this Article’s criminalization has not criminalized all 
behaviours that form ML631, additionally, that this law is not line with the Palermo 
Convention (2000), and that it did not include all behaviour that was criminalised by this 
Convention; such as the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air; or the illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms and their parts. Official Financial Employee4 
stated that: ‘’the law (CMLA2005) does not mention the text of the ’objective factual 
circumstances’’632. This is considered by the Convention as the element of criminal intent 
in the offences stipulated in Article 5, paragraph 2. To infer the existence of intent, the 
Convention stipulates that ‘’the knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or agreement referred 
to in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances’’633, 
which means that the objective factual circumstances could be used as a proof to show 
that the criminal has the ‘knowledge and intent’ to commit a ML crime634. On the other, 
hand, Orabi, who is a legal Member of the FIU has stated that ML should be criminalized 
by adopting a wide definition of ML crime which includes all behaviours mentioned in 
international conventions in this area635. 
However, this claim also is not accurate, the reason for that being the definition of the 
term ‘institution' in the Article above is quite wide and includes different kinds of financial 
institution; i.e. any bank, finance company, financial market, money changing shop, 
broker, or any other establishment authorized to carry out its activity by the Central Bank. 
Furthermore, other financial and commercial establishments authorized to carry out their 
activities by economic entities other than the Central Bank, such as insurance companies, 
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service bureaus and so on, are included.’’636. Thus, the definition is wide as it includes all 
financial institutions whether or not they are authorized by the Central Bank of Libya. 637 
 
Finally, although, Libya has attempt to prevent ML crime by adopting the laws that work 
against the primary crime of ML; these laws arguably have weaknesses, as this study has 
explained above. Libya is aware of AML issues in that it has ratified a number of treaties 
and adopted the CMLA (2005), however, there is still a long way to go to curb the ML 
operations in illegal oil selling. Although the economy of Libya is dependant largely on the 
sale of oil and oil smuggling has taken place, Libya has not adopted any special rules 
against the phenomenon oil smuggling. This was mentioned by Official Financial 
Employee3 who stated: ‘’there are no special rules and mechanisms to combat ML 
through the selling of oil, whereas all proceeds of oil sales made through the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are given to the Central Bank from the Libyan 
bank Arabs Abroad’’638. 
Oil smuggling is increasing and is taking place by modifying of fuel tanks in the vehicle 
carrying this fuel, making additional fuel tanks or carrying the fuel in special tanks that 
have been made for this purpose. This is confirmed by answers of the interviewees, as 
they suggested that this is due to the lack of monitoring of the borders by Customs and 
the lack of training. So, the aim is to identify gaps in the application of the AML Law which 
need to be filled in order to strengthen the application of AML measures in Libya in line 
with international standards, and specifically in comparison to the UK’s ML law, which 
does not have any specific legislative provisions on ML for oil. Finally, this chapter found 
out that a major reason behind the increase in ML crime are deficiencies in the CMLA, 
and the implementation of the laws in practice. Libya has attempted to be effective 
against ML crime, but, unfortunately, due to developments in the means of committing 
and these deficiencies in the legislation and its implementation, ML continues to rise. 
Specifically, the legislation is not in line with the international principles adopted against 
this crime and there is a lack of training programmes for the staff of the relevant 
institutions such as the FIU, banks and the Customs Authority, which need to be 
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addressed as this study will be explained later. This has allowed criminals to increase their 
smuggling of oil, because they understand there is an opportunity to conceal illegal 
proceeds. In addition, the weakness of the religious deterrent,639 and the spread of a 
culture of looting the state's funds are contributory factors, as are political instability, the 
existence of armed gangs and party political conflicts after 2011; as confirmed by the 
Amnesty International Report (2016/17). 640 Oil smuggling was estimated in 2015 by the 
Minister of Oil to cost in the region of 200 to 400 million DLY monthly641. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the costs of oil smuggling seriously weaken the national economy, through 
attrition, taking looted money from banks and converting them to foreign investments. In 
addition, national industrial projects are disrupted, due to the inability of providing 
essential parts, and the country loses its energy production. There is also the instability 
of the exchange rate for local currency compared with the stability of the foreign exchange 
rate, poor income distribution and the introduction the inferior goods to the domestic 
market, all of which results (in addition to the foregoing mentioned) in a weakening of 
national industries. These issues have negative economic effects on the country642and 
there are also severe political consequences as these illegal funds are used to undermine 
the country's political stability, support armed groups which commit crimes of kidnapping 
and murder and this has also led to an increase of the presence of ISIS in Libya643.The 
laundering of money might be by purchase of houses, palaces, and luxury property 644. 
The absence and insufficiency of the Libyan regulations will be explored next. 
6.9- Conclusion 
In an attempt to curb the problem of ML in Libya, many different regulations have been 
issued in Libya since early 1950s related to financial crimes. The various laws culminating 
in the ML legislation of 2005 have been described above. This chapter has demonstrated 
how the ideals of Islam have not been adhered to in practice, and the Islamic financial 
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transactions rules have not been developed in the Libyan legislation. Despite national 
efforts to combat ML in Libya attempted primarily through the ML Law (2005) which tried 
to respond the rules of the international conventions about AML and which involved 
criminalizing the behaviors of ML and establishing the FIU, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the crime of ML has increased.  This process has been facilitated by ignoring the 
government‘s tracking of corrupt operations through its institutions such as the banks, 
FIU and authorities such as Customs; as some ML transactions involve government 
officials. The regulations have not been adequate to curb this practice, and there is a 
need, above all, to establish a constitution for this country to ensure citizens’ rights and 
to amend the national law or policy in line with international conventions. The lack of 
customs observers on the borders with neighboring countries to limit oil smuggling 
operations and weak implementation of the procedures in the banks and the border 
ports against smuggling money which might be earned from illegal oil selling must be 
addressed and these institutions obligated to report on any suspicious operations to FIU. 
These amendments would include clarification of the ML law, effective law enforcement 
in every area to prevent corruption and the exposure of all the irregularities of the 
judiciary. 
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Chapter Seven: The Procedure of Anti-Money Laundering 
in Libya. 
7.1-Introduction 
This chapter will explore AML procedures in theory and practice under the mechanisms 
that were adopted by the CMLA (2005) and assess these mechanisms in practice. It will 
evaluate the extent of compliance with international principles in this area to curb ML 
operations in illegal oil deals, through analysis of evidence from interviews with the 
Official Financial Libyan Employees, about how this Act and its mechanisms are enforced 
in practice. This includes exploring what role the Libyan FIU and banks could play in anti- 
ML, and whether the Libyan FIU has been successful to date. This chapter will start by 
describing the current situation in the illegal selling of oil in Libya, and whether a new 
mechanism needs to be designed to stop the ML that is taking place due to this illegal 
sale of oil. 
7.2-The Mechanisms of Anti- Money Laundering in Libya 
Law No. 2 on Combating ML was passed in 2005, and its regulations identify the rules that 
should be followed by the financial institutions for the detection of suspicious operations 
through some bodies created to work against ML. These mechanisms will be discussed in 
the following sections: 
7.2.1- The Creation of the FIU at the Libyan Central Bank 
The FIU was established under Article 9 of CMLA (2005) which stipulates that: ‘‘the 
Central Bank shall establish a unit called the FIU to combat money-laundering activities. 
Reports on suspicious transactions shall be sent to the Unit from all concerned financial, 
commercial, and economic establishments, and information on these transactions may 
be submitted by any person or entity’’645. This Unit is the institution established by 
domestic laws in most countries that have adopted the approach of the international 
conventions and responded to international norms and standards to combat the endemic 
nature of ML. According to Otman and Karlberg, the creation of the FIU is an important 
step in fighting ML crime and reflects the determination of country authorities to curb 
ML646. The International Monetary Fund has stipulated that cooperation with other 
                                                          
645 See the Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article (9). 
646 Otman, W and Karlberg, E. (2007) The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning, 
New York, Springer Science &Business Media (p.298). 
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countries should be included in its functions647. It was intended that because this Unit will 
be exercising its functions under the supervision of the Central Bank, it will be able to 
follow suspicious operations, collect the reports and adopt the appropriate action. 
The FIU is obliged to transfer its investigations' papers to the Governor of the Central 
Bank, if the result of the investigations has led to the identification of a ML offence. Article 
10 (1) of the ML law stipulates ''the Unit described in paragraph 1 of the preceding article, 
after reviewing the case referred to or reported to it, shall inform the Governor 
concerning the information and reports in its possession, so that the necessary measures 
may be taken''648. This is also confirmed by Article 11 of the Executive Rules649.  
Although, Libya complies with the FATF recommendation by creating this unit by means 
of the CMLA (2005), the FIU has faced some general challenges beyond the scope of its 
direct work, including the accusation that there is not sufficient knowledge about 
reporting on financial institutions, businesses and non-financial professions. Specifically, 
the FIU is not sufficiently aware of the obligations these organisations have in combating 
ML, such as cooperating with the FIU and developing training programmes to deal more 
effectively with the different types of risks associated with ML, as this study will discuss 
later.   
7.2.2- The Subsidiary FIU at Bank Branches 
Libyan legislature did not stop at the creation of the main FIU at the Central Bank, but 
went further by obliging financial institutions to establish subsidiary FIUs at bank 
branches. The function of this Subsidiary Unit is to monitor the activities of customers of 
the subsidiary banks and other financial institutions under Article 9 (2), which stipulates 
that ''all banks operating in Libya shall establish a subsidiary unit called the Subsidiary Unit 
for Information on Combating ML650. The FIUs are responsible for monitoring all activities 
and transactions carried out by the bank or financial institution or by those who deal with 
them, when such activities or transactions are suspected (such as large exceptional cash 
payments that are not in line with their business) and it being linked to money-laundering 
                                                          
647 International Monetary Fund. Financial intelligence units: an overview -- Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, Legal Department, Monetary and Financial Systems Department: World Bank, Financial Market Integrity Div 
(2004 p.5). 
648Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 10 (1).  
649Executive Rules of the Money Laundering Law Article (11). 
650 See Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 9(2). 
171 
 
activities or activities involving the deposit or transfer of funds whose source is 
unknown651. 
The mandatory creation of subsidiary FIUs also includes other financial institutions 
licensed by institutions other than the Central Bank; and Article 6 of the Executive Rules 
states that ‘‘each financial institution, whether licensed to practice activity by the Central 
Bank, or by another party is committed to establish a Subsidiary Financial Information 
Unit ...''652. 
These FIUs are the link between financial institutions and the main FIU in the investigation 
of ML, and are responsible for monitoring all activities and transactions suspected of 
being linked to ML activities involved in deposits or transfers of money of unknown source 
and to report to the main FIU. Article 21 of the Executive Rules enables the application of 
this as financial institutions are obliged to appoint an official who has both knowledge 
and experience to take responsibility for receiving reports on suspicious operations and 
reviewing records in order to carry out the functions of the Unit653 
7.2.3- The competences of the FIU 
This section will discuss the procedures of the FIU which are directed against ML to find 
out if these obligations are being performed line with international standards and also to 
find out whether these procedures need to be improved or not in the following areas: 
7.2.4-The Functions of the Main FIU 
7.2.4.1-Receiving reports on suspicious transactions. 
According to Article 9 of the ML law above, the competences of the FIU are: to receive 
reports on suspicious transactions, which may be laundering money; create a data base 
for recording information and investigate operations; exchange reports and information 
on suspicious transactions linked with ML operations with its counterparts in other 
countries and the disposition of papers concerning ML operations.   
So, under this Article, the FIU has the authority to be able to request and obtain all 
documents needed; to access database information that involves any details of ML 
operations, in whatever form this is; to analyse information and report on any ML 
operations and carry out the necessary investigations. It can also prepare reports on any 
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ML discovered and submit them to the Governor of the Central Bank. It is the obligation 
of the FIU at the Central Bank to receive reports on suspicious transactions from all 
financial and commercial establishments. This competence is not limited to collecting the 
reports from the financial and commercial establishments, as the Unit was further tasked 
to receive these from whistle-blowers654. This unit has to report on suspicious 
transactions to the Governor of the Central Bank, so that the necessary measures may be 
taken, according to Article 10 of this law655. 
 
In this context, a question arises as to whether reports on suspicious transactions should 
be submitted to the public prosecutor rather than to the main FIU; and whether the public 
prosecution can start a criminal trial based on this report or whether it is necessary to 
submit this report to the main FIU beforehand. The main FIU involves a number of 
specialists and experts in the field of AML, so it is the best department to investigate and 
collect evidence of suspicious transactions656. However, Article 10 of the ML law allows 
indirectly for the report to be submitted to the public prosecution by stipulating: '' if the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor receives a direct report concerning cases of ML, it shall 
take the necessary measures and shall inform the FIU of the Central Bank of Libya 
concerning the contents of the report''657. Thus, this article obliges the public prosecution 
to report to the main FIU, in cases where it receives reports on ML operations. However, 
in such cases, the authority of the public prosecution is not limited, and it can start a 
criminal trial as the aim of the report to the Unit, in this case, is to get the information on 
suspicious transactions and record it on the data base. 
7.2.4.2-Creating a database for recording information 
Article No 4 (5) of the executive rules of the ML law obliges the main FIU to create a 
database and provide relevant information to those bodies concerned. Available 
information on ML operations involves the national and international AML efforts; and 
the Unit has to update the database regularly and transfer this data to the judicial 
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657 Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 10. 
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authority and other competent authorities whilst preserving the confidential nature of 
the data and the information involved658. 
Libya should implement a system that requires financial and non-financial institutions to 
report all cash transactions exceeding a certain limit to a national central authority and 
to have an electronic database; and international conventions of which Libya is a 
member, require this. In the same way, paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the implementing 
regulations in the 2005 Act requires the agency to: ‘‘create a database, all reports and 
the information that is available to the Unit should be in the database.... ''659, this article 
thus imposes an obligation on the FIU to create a database that includes all information 
about suspicious financial operations; i.e. the notifications received about the operation 
and the details of any persons suspected of being beneficiaries and the type and size of 
the activity. This is extremely important information for the public prosecution and allows 
coordination with the local officials and with the competent authorities in foreign 
countries.  
Libyan legislators intended paragraph 5 of Article 4 to be sufficiently explicit about the 
functions of the FIU, in that it should receive information about suspicious ML operations 
and record it onto the database that should have been created for the purpose. Thus, it 
is clear that the Libyan legislature has attempted at least to follow the requirements of 
clearly international rule in this case; but the problem here is that the FIU has not 
established the database. The interview answers have revealed that there is no database 
that involves all the details of suspicious ML operations specifically at the FIU at the 
Central Bank, as the Official Financial Employee3 confirmed: “no database has been 
created since the Unit was established”660. 
Thus, the FIU has failed to comply with the stipulations of paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the 
implementing regulations for the 2005 Act to create a database. One of the biggest 
problems this presents is the inability to provide evidence to the Public Prosecution which 
will be required during the investigation stage; and this means there is a weakness in the 
enforcement of the AML rule, which reflects the weakness of the FIU related to customer 
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data collection that will have negative effects on exchanging information on transactions 
linked with ML operations, as a result, the unit will fail to follow the suspicious operations. 
7.2.4.3-To carry out investigative operations 
In compliance with international standards, Article No 4 (4) of the executive rules of ML 
law No. 3 /2007 obliges the main FIU to investigate suspicious transactions of ML. Any 
report that is received by this unit from the financial institutions or in any other way about 
a suspicion of ML allows this Unit to start an investigation. The Unit can work with finance 
controllers and other competent authorities to investigate operations suspected of being 
ML and transfer the money to the Governor of the Central Bank661.  In the same way, 
Article 10 of the executive rules has identified authority to investigate transactions 
suspected of being ML, to request further information about the suspicious operation and 
any necessary data on the client or the beneficiaries, and to view all records and financial 
institutions’ documents related to financial operations, additionally, any other 
information about the clients; and also to work with financial controllers and other 
competent authorities to investigate any operations suspected of being ML662.This means 
that the Unit had investigative powers under the CMLA (2005)and its executive rule No. 
3 /2007. The work of the Unit is an important and indispensable contribution to AML 
through the collection, collation and analysis of information and making it available for 
use in investigations by itself. 
 
To ensure the confidentiality of investigative procedures, Article 5(2) has criminalized 
divulging secrets about operations under investigation; and breaches are punishable by 
imprisonment and/or a fine. The article stipulates that ‘‘anyone who informs a person 
that his transactions are being monitored or investigated by the competent authorities 
because of suspicion that they are illegal shall be subject to imprisonment and/or a fine 
of not more than LD 10,000 and not less than LD 500’’663. Criminal breaches of 
confidentiality also include informing others about the investigation of the transactions, 
the aim of this being to avoid possible tampering with evidence664. Finally, under Article 
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32 of the executive rules, financial control institutions have to help the main FIU at the 
Central Bank665.  
In order to implement this, a specific body –the Analysis Department- was created as a 
part of the FIU when was established. The Analysis Department has the power to 
investigate in cases that are related to major crimes. The FIU is also responsible for 
identifying suspicious operations, tracking their development and initiating freezing 
procedures for any property subject to confiscation. It also has the power to use 
compulsory measures to procure records held by financial institutions and businesses as 
soon it wants by obliging the financial institutions to give out the information within a 
limited time as Article 13 of CMLA (2005) stipulates that: ‘‘all entities responsible for 
licensing or authorizing financial, commercial, and economic establishments.... shall 
develop appropriate tools for ensuring their compliance with the rules and regulations 
related to combating ML,  and shall inform the Financial Information Unit ....''666. The FIU 
also makes sure that the competent authorities have procedures to enable them to 
identify assets without giving prior notice to the owners. However, a problem was 
identified the Official Financial Employee3, namely that it has never been shown “that 
the Unit has requested any information from non-banking entities for analysis”667. 
This statement reveals a dereliction of duty by the FIU in its failure to request information 
from the non-banking entities in order to analyse them and properly continue the 
procedures of the investigation. This dereliction has resulted in a weak level of analysis 
of reports of suspicious operations. According to regulations, it is implicitly understood 
that the FIU is the only body that is deemed competent to have a supervisory role in the 
field of combating ML. However, as this study has argued earlier, the terms of reference 
of the FIU do not explicitly include the possibility of carrying out a field inspection for this 
purpose. This problem notwithstanding, there is a positive aspect to the functions of the 
FIU, which is that the AML Law and Executive Regulations have provided for sanctions on 
any unit or regulatory entity of other financial institutions if they breach their obligations 
as contained in the law. 
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Unfortunately, the interviews also revealed that the reasons behind increasing this crime 
as pointed out by Official Financial Employee 3 ‘’there are no statistics issued by the Unit; 
no publication of information and no reports on ML operations have been issued by the 
FIU’’668, which confirmed by Official Financial Employee 6669. Similarly, there is evidence 
of the weakness of the procedures resulting in a lack of relevant statistics being available 
for court cases. This point was confirmed by the Judges No.7.1 and No 2, who stated: ‘’ 
ML cases are very limited at the courts; the reason for that being that knowledge about 
this crime is limited’’670.The FIU at the Central Bank does not have the power to 
investigate clients, only bank employees. The Unit simply sends the relevant documents 
on suspicious operations to prosecutors. Recently, a case of suspicious ‘documentary 
credits ‘involving leading importers of food and pharmaceutical goods where fake goods 
were imported, dollars traded at black market prices and the evasion of custom duties 
has taken place. Traders transfer money to import goods at a subsidized price, but they 
transfer the money and do not import the goods. This is an example of financial 
corruption which should be controlled through collecting the personal details of the 
client, sources and direction of the goods and also by knowing all the details of the 
operation, as is confirmed by Official Financial Employee5, who stated: ‘’details of the 
documentary credits should be collected and transactions monitored to reveal fake 
companies.’’671.This has highlighted a problem, which is that in investigations of this 
nature it is unclear how the roles of the prosecutors and that of the main Unit are 
differentiated. To illustrate this problem - Official Financial Employee3 stated: ‘‘the exact 
roles of the Audit Bureau and the Unit in investigating suspicious ML operations are 
confusing’’672.   
7.2.4.4-Exchanging information on transactions linked with Money Laundering 
operations 
The FIU has another function, which is the exchange of financial information related to 
ML with foreign authorities that have the same jurisdiction. Such exchanges do not 
however need a specific agreement, Article 9(1) of the CMLA (2005) stipulates: “This Unit 
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may exchange information and reports on cases suspected of being linked to money-
laundering activities with its counterparts in other countries, in accordance with the 
international agreements to which Libya is a party or with the principle of reciprocity’’673. 
Thus, the responsibility of the FIUs at all the branches of banks, is to monitor all activities 
and transactions suspected of being linked to ML activities and to exchange information 
about them with their counterparts in other countries674. Article 7(4) of the Executive 
Rules confirms that, with the condition that this information should be not used except 
against the targets named in the submission675. 
Even though Libya has complied with the international standard by giving power to the 
FIU to exchange information with its counterparts abroad, abroad, however, the 
interviews also revealed the weak level of the cooperation of Libyan authorities with their 
international counterparts, which have confirmed that the FIU does not have 
independent financial disclosure. This means that the Unit cannot act independently in 
exchanging information with its counterparts. Furthermore, as Official Financial 
Employee 3 pointed out: “This Unit does not have fully independent operations; also, 
there are no mechanisms with which to exchange information with the other, counterpart 
Units’’676 
It was confirmed that, in relation to this competence, the FIU has undertaken only limited 
cooperation through the exchange of information with some countries; as Official 
Financial Employee3 remarked ‘’there is also cooperation with some countries, such as 
the United Arab Emirates, to exchange information related to ML’’677. He added that the 
areas in which there was cooperation on exchanging information were: “Gathering 
information on the bills of lading”; and added: ‘’...there is local cooperation with Customs, 
licensing offices and others. There is also international cooperation through the exchange 
of information with counterpart units in the Navigational Bureau and International 
Chamber of Commerce”678. 
                                                          
673 Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article9 
674Alfleah, M. Ibid (2012 p.157). 
675 Regulations, Executive rules of money laundering law rules No. 3 /2007 Article No (32). 
676(Official Financial Employee No.3, interviewed 12 August 2015). 
677 Ibid. 
678 Ibid. 
178 
 
The interviewee also remarked that: “the Unit is a member of the maritime navigational 
body that can collect information about the movements of ships and any information 
requested” and he added that: “Libya is seeking to be a member of the Egmont 
Group’’679and that it is: “a member of the FATF for the Middle East and North Africa’’680. 
These statements suggest that Libya is seeking to find a solution to prevent ML by 
adopting some of the international conventions. There are, however, some problems 
with implementation, as this study will discuss later. 
7.2.4.5-The National Committee for Combating Money Laundering at the Libyan 
Central Bank. 
Article 11 of the CMLA (2005)established this body and states: ‘‘...in accordance with this 
law, a committee shall be established called the National Committee for Combating ML, 
which shall be chaired by the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya or his deputy and 
shall include at least member from, the Central Bank, the Secretariat of the General 
People’s Committee for Financial and Technical Supervision (Ministry of Auditing), the 
Secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Justice (Ministry of Justice), the 
Secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Public Security (Home Office), the 
Secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Finance (Ministry of Finance), the 
Secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade (Ministry of the 
Economy), the Secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and 
International Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Customs Authority and the Tax 
Authority. 
The delegates shall be nominated by their respective entities after consultation with the 
Chairman of the Committee. The board of directors of the Central Bank of Libya shall issue 
a decree establishing the composition of the Committee and the remuneration of its 
members’’681. Article 12 considers the function of the National Committee for Combating 
is to: ''recommend the regulations and procedures necessary for combating ML and 
facilitate the exchange of information among the entities represented in the Committee 
                                                          
679 The Egmont Group is an informal network was established by the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) for the 
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and coordinate their activities.”682 
Additionally, Article 13 of the Executive Rules considers other functions such as the design 
of rules used to identify customers and the beneficiaries and their legal positions. The 
National Committee also has to organize rules about disclosures of the origins of any 
money entering the state, including all passenger data. In relation to this, Decision No 3 
(2008) identified the amounts which require passenger disclosure on entry into Libya. This 
decision has limited the amount in cash with which people can Libya without disclosure 
as a maximum of $15,000,000 (Decision of the National Committee No. 3 in 2008). Under 
Article 15, the Customs Department is expected to receive reports of the aforementioned 
disclosures683.In this case, the disclosure means that passengers themselves have to 
report the competent authorities at the border ports, about any money they are carrying. 
If they do not disclose it, or provide incorrect data about its sources and the purposes for 
which it will be used, the customs authority shall take the necessary measures to control 
the money or securities, as this might be suspected ML, which should be reported to the 
FIU. 
It should also be noted that if a passenger does not disclose amounts in his possession on 
entry into Libya and the amounts were over the limit, the punishment in accordance with 
Article 5 (3) is a fine of not more than ten thousand dinars and not less than five hundred 
dinars. Also, the frozen money is the subject of a misdemeanour and will be released by 
the Public Prosecutor if it is not related to any other crime684.  
Thus, carrying money across borders to launder it is considered a crime when it has been 
obtained from an ML offense according to the Article above, constitutes a crime. 
Perpetrators are subject to the penalties provided for in the law; in the case of non-
disclosure of cash exceeding the limit and its discovery by customs, the customs officer 
responsible shall transfer the amount to the Attorney General to take legal action against 
the person concerned; the customs officer must also report it to the FIU. In such cases, 
the money is frozen if linked to ML operations, or released, if not related to any crime, 
according to Article 5, as noted above. 
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Article 15 has been criticized on two points: Firstly, a passenger is obliged to disclose 
amounts over the prescribed limit in his possession only during entry into Libya; there is 
no obligation to disclose what is in his possession if he departs the country. Secondly, the 
passenger is obliged to disclose only cash amounts in his possession but there is no 
obligation with regard to cheques. It has been suggested that this is an insufficiency in the 
regulations of Libya which needs to be addressed in order to fully control the movement 
of money and curb ML transactions in the smuggling of oil by disclosing the illegal 
proceeds earned in this way. 
7.2.5- The Preventive Measures 
The Financial Institutions should take preventive measures against ML Crime; and 
according to Article 1 of the ML Law, financial institutions are of two types: The first 
includes financial institutions licensed by the Central Bank such as the banks, finance 
companies, financial markets, money changing agencies and any other department that 
need to obtain a license from the Central Bank to conduct their business. The second 
includes businesses and financial institutions that need to obtain a license from a 
department and other than the Central Bank to conduct their business such as service 
agencies and insurance companies, all need take the following measures: 
7.2.5.1- Customer Due Diligence 
The financial institutions are required to implement CDD; which are measures that should 
be taken to protect the institutions from harbouring laundered money. In practice, this 
means that the banks should take measures such as risk assessment of financial 
operations, applying the principle of Know Your Customer (KYC) and also should not keep 
any unknown accounts or those with false names. These measures are discussed below: 
7.2.5.2- Identification Procedures 
In response to FATF recommendations to induce financial institutions to avoid allowing 
customer accounts with fake names and to establish identification procedures for their 
customers in accordance with the Basel Committee Statement, Article 17 obliges all the 
financial institutions to create a system for the identification of customers. Moreover, 
Article 19 of the Executive Rules has stipulated that all financial institutions implement 
the KYC rule (See section below on record keeping)685. 
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In the fight against ML, client data should be regularly taken, reviewed and updated to 
ensure that all the changes in their financial and personal details are recorded including 
their financial activities. These customer details help to detect both the criminals and 
collaborators who are facilitating the commission of these crimes. This data collection 
allows a tighter control of behaviour, as the examination and auditing of bank accounts 
may ultimately prevent the carrying out of any acts that are the subject of suspicion. 
Moreover, these details facilitate the coordination between the Central Bank and the 
relevant international institutions with regards to accessing the names of persons and 
institutions that are suspected of committing ML crimes. Enquiries conducted on 
suspected persons and organizations further knowledge of modern methods and 
techniques used in ML operations and help identify any new sources of ‘dirty’ money. 
Collecting client data has also facilitated the supervision of financial operations. In order 
to make sure that the principle of KYC is implemented, no anonymous transactions should 
be carried out; and false or fictitious names or secret numbers should never be used, 
whether to open accounts, collect deposits or accept, convert or handle money in any 
suspicious way. This is in compliance with the international conventions and the FATF 
recommendations about commitment by identification procedures. Libya has organized 
its procedures of Identification through Article 17 of the implementing regulations which 
stipulates that: “all financial institutions must establish a special system to know the 
identity of customers and beneficiaries....”686. 
Although there is no separate text specifying a punishment for breach of these 
obligations, the legislation has addressed this point in Article 5 (1) of the ML Law, which 
gives a general punishment for crimes related to ML, stating: ''any official or employee of 
a financial, commercial, or economic establishment who learns of an act in his 
establishment related to a crime of ML and fails to report it to the competent authority 
shall be subject to imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than LD 10,000 and not less 
than LD 1,000687. 
Nevertheless, in this case, Libya is not fully compliant with the FATF recommendation, as 
it seems that there is vagueness in Article 17, as it does not include clear and specific 
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details about precisely which information should be collected; although Article 29 of the 
implementing regulations does attempt to clarify the details that should be known. In 
practice, however, the procedures of identification and CDD are limited to identifying the 
customer through official documents and knowing the nature of the client's activities 
without taking into account the volume of activity or recording any details. It is suggested 
here that this is an important weakness of the AML Act; and that this defect in should be 
addressed by requiring identification and recording of the size of an activity, its details 
and the nature and the purpose of the relationship between the financial institution and 
the client. 
The interview data revealed another serious problem, the weak the mechanisms used 
against money laundering, in that some financial institutions are not diligent in their 
application of the principle of KYC; as some bank employees who work on financial 
transaction procedures accept copies of personal documents, which opens the door to 
forgery, in this case, the Official Financial Employee4 commented: “copies of 
identification documents from the customer are accepted by some of bank staff without 
having seen the originals of thee documents''688; and he added: ‘’there are also practices 
of recording the personal details from some clients who submit their names in different 
ways like hiding their surnames, for example, or their middle names''689. 
Accepting a mere copy of identification documents provided by the customer by the staff 
of banks who are working on the financial transactions procedures rather than insisting 
on the original of the documents could encourage forgery. This needs to be addressed 
through enforcement of the law. Financial institutions should be obliged to keep records 
that include all the details of customer identification and list which actual official 
documents such as passports, ID cards or driving licences were provided. In addition, all 
account files and correspondence should be kept. 
These disadvantages have a negative effect because absence of clients’ details makes 
tracking the deals difficult. Tracking should be done to ensure that the operations do not 
include money suspected of being illegal, thus, this deficiency has allowed launderers to 
hide illegal proceeds including those derived from smuggling oil. 
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7.2.5.3- Record Keeping 
According to the FATF recommendations, financial institutions are obliged to keep records 
of their customers’ data, such as copies or records of official identification documents like 
passports, identity cards or driving licences. In line with these recommendations, Article 
20 of the Executive Rules oblige financial institutions to keep records such as copies of 
official identification documents for not less than five years and stipulates: '' every 
financial institution should keep records and documents for the financial operations that 
are conducted, whether local or international….”690.  
These records are kept as a reference source of basic information about clients and also 
to prevent these clients from using the banks and financial institutions for ML purposes. 
Although there is no separate text specifying a punishment for breach of these 
obligations, the legislation has addressed this point in Article 5 (1) of the ML Law, which 
gives a general punishment for crimes related to ML, stating: ''any official or employee of 
a financial, commercial, or economic establishment who learns of an act in his 
establishment related to a crime of ML and fails to report it to the competent authority 
shall be subject to imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than LD 10,000 and not less 
than LD 1,000691. 
Financial institutions should keep all such records received by implementing the principle 
of CDD and have on file all copies of identification documents, accounts files and trade 
letters as discussed earlier. Also, the records should be available to the official authorities 
concerned with the ML processes as soon as they are requested. Employees of financial 
institutions who do not abide by this regulation are punishable under Article 5, as 
described in the section above. Moreover, these records should be available to the 
relevant authorities if they are necessary to facilitate the indictment and prosecution of 
criminals. 
Nevertheless, in this case, Libya also is not fully compliant with the FATF 
recommendation, in the procedures of keeping a recording of their customers’ data, the 
interview data revealed that apparently, a problem had arisen in the implementation of 
this rule, which is that the records that should be kept are not identified by the Act (2005). 
Even though Article 20 of the implementing regulations mentions records, it does not 
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actually identify which documents should be kept by the financial institutions. In other 
words, there is no regulation that stipulates which documents are required by law to be 
kept by financial institutions, and this vagueness is an imperfection in the law as 
potentially it makes it difficult to detect suspect operations due to fewer details being 
available to the relevant authorities. 
This was confirmed by Official Financial Employee3 who pointed out: “there are no 
guidelines on record-keeping and which documents relating to the financial activity 
account holders are required’’692 Moreover, there is another weakness in Article 18 of the 
implementing regulations, as it does not require financial institutions to provide records 
to the FIU within a limited time, only stipulating that: “.... each financial institution is 
obliged to notify the main unit of the operations, which are suspected to involve 
ML.....’’693. This problem is highlighted by Official Financial Employee3, who stated: ‘’there 
is no obligation on the financial institution to provide the records and the information of 
the financial operation to the competent local authority within a specified time limit’’694. 
Having accurate records about the people who may be associated with ML transactions 
is very important and the most effective way to detect illegal operations, as this study has 
mentioned earlier. The result of any lack in these details will allow suspicious persons to 
escape from investigation procedures, and make it easier for them to commit fraud or 
give them the time and opportunity to smuggle out the illegal oil proceeds. Thus, the 
absence of these procedures has left a gap in the CMLA (2005) that need to be filled if 
they are to assist effectively in disclosing suspicious deals that might involve the proceeds 
of smuggling oil.  
7.2.5.4-Risk assessment 
The methodology of risk assessment involves collecting all the necessary information that 
clearly identifies the nature of the activity, the reputation and the controls governing the 
corresponding banks. The mechanisms for detecting ML operations should be based on 
this risk assessment, using observation of transactions to determine the size of the 
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operation and to ensure that it complies with the legal measures which regulate such 
transactions. Financial institutions should also employ the principle of KYC. 
However, the CMLA (2005) does not include any guidelines on the necessary measures 
to implement CDD, although Article 19 of the implementing regulations clearly obliges 
financial institutions to apply the rules of CDD. The problem here is that these rules are 
not sufficiently explicit about which information should be collected. For example, they 
do not include guidelines for an appropriate risk management system to determine 
whether a potential customer or the actual owner of the assets is a political person at risk 
(PEPs will be discussed in more detail later).  Also, there are no rules requiring financial 
institutions to identify the actual owners, they focus on knowing the named customer 
without identifying the real owner; and there is nothing requiring financial institutions to 
obtain information on the purpose or nature of this relationship. Moreover, the law does 
not even identify the concept of the real beneficiary and there is an absence of a legal 
requirement for financial institutions to make intensive CDD on the categories of 
customers and business relationships that are high-risk. As Official Financial Employee3 
pointed out: “There are many commitments and necessary measures for the 
implementation of CDD that have been missed throughout the CMLA of 2005.”695 Thus, 
the Act is not in line with international standards and these deficiencies have left a gap in 
the CMLA (2005).    
7.2.6-Politically Exposed Persons 
CDD measures should also include an appropriate system regarding PEPs, in which the 
financial institution should carry out a risk assessment and determine whether the client 
is a PEP or not and take the appropriate steps to determine the origin of the customer’s 
funds so as to allow continuous control over the relationship with the customer's 
transactions, as the FATF has recommended.696(See also Chapter Four).  
However, the Libyan CMLA (2005) does not regulate how to deal with PEPs. Regulations 
should oblige any financial institution arranging a deal with a customer to request 
information which would allow the creation of an appropriate risk assessment to 
determine whether this potential customer, (whether as customer or beneficial owner), 
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is a PEP or not; including obtaining details of their family and related persons. However, 
there is no obligation to obtain the approval of senior management to deal with such 
customers; to take reasonable measures to determine the source of their wealth and 
funds or to monitor the working relationship with them on an intense ongoing basis. 
This was confirmed by the Official Financial Employee2 who stated: “the Law does not 
include the core obligations of the process of CDD such as risk assessment and the 
classification of all clients according to the degree of risk and knowledge of the client, 
details of financial activity and its size. Nor to identify the beneficial owners and also to 
verify the person who acts on behalf of that client, including any PEPs"697. In the same 
way, Judge7.1 added: “even though the law includes some rules against ML crime; the 
enforcement of these rules is difficult, because this crime is sometimes committed by 
political officials, and the law does not include them’’698. Thus, this very important gap 
has been revealed by the interview data, and reflects the lack of compliance with the 
international AML rules and the inefficiency of the CMLA (2005) in ignoring the very 
important category of people who are political officials who have a large role in carrying 
out ML.      
7.2.7- Reporting Procedures for Suspicious Transactions 
In accordance with the FATF recommendations that financial institutions should be 
required to report suspicious transactions or activity and to utilize financial information 
to CMLA 2005, Article 18 was enacted to oblige financial institutions to report suspicious 
transactions related to ML and stipulates: ‘‘.... each financial institution has to notify the 
main unit about suspect operations, which are likely to involve ML.... ''699. There are fines 
(see above) for financial institution employees who fail to do this700. The Libyan legislature 
has also confirmed that banks’ information must be kept secret; and Article 14 stipulates 
that: ‘‘all entities that obtain information and data in accordance with the provisions of 
this law shall maintain its confidentiality and shall reveal only the information required for 
use in investigations and legal proceedings against crimes of ML or other crimes described 
in this law’’701. Thus, financial institutions are prevented from acquiring customers’ 
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699Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 18. 
700 Regulations, Executive rules of money laundering law rules No. 3 /2007 Article No (18), 
701Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article (14). 
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information and data because of the principle of banking secrecy, except in situations 
where this information is related to ML operations. In such cases, information may be 
revealed by the bank for legal purposes. However, the Libyan legislature has also decided 
to establish a punishment for anyone who reports to the competent authorities in bad 
faith i.e. in order to harm another party. Article 5 (4) stipulates that: ‘‘anyone who reports 
a crime of ML to the competent authorities, in bad faith and in order to harm another 
party, so that legal action may be taken to discover the truth, even if the report is with an 
unknown signature or using a false name, shall be subject to imprisonment for a period 
of not less than one year’’702. 
In this case, Libya has adopted the international standard in reporting of suspicious 
transactions, which obliges financial institutions if they suspect that the sources of the 
money are from a criminal activity to submit a report immediately. The financial 
institutions are obligated to report in this way in cases where they suspected that the 
money has come from illegal sources, which mean that this amount does not need to 
reach certain threshold value to make a report. 
 
However, there is no instruction manual for the FIUs on how to deal with situations in 
accordance with this law or for individuals to identify by a simple means how to comply 
with it and how to report on suspect operations. Furthermore, Article 5 is not clear 
because it stipulates a punishment for anyone who reports to the competent authorities 
in ‘bad faith’703. Thus, Idrissi, who is the head of the FIU at the Libyan Central Bank, was 
able to confirm that no ML operations had been reported in Libya, as the aim of the 
former regime was to show that Libya has complied with the international standards of 
anti- ML procedures. In addition, that the ML Law falls short of international standards 
levels, which were not well understood when this law was prepared in 2005704. As a result, 
this law alone is not enough to prevent ML, and needs to be supported through the 
publications of guidelines facilitating citizens to report suspicious transactions without 
exposure to sanctions. This can be achieved by clarifying Article 5 of this law imposes 
sanctions on the citizens who reported suspicious transactions in bad faith; for example, 
                                                          
702Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 5 (4). 
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when investigations reveal that there was clearly nothing suspicious about the 
transactions in question. There also needs to be special training provided in the banking 
sectors and for financial department staff in commercial and government institutions.  
Measures against ML are encouraged as even though this law has imposed a punishment 
on those financial institution employees who are reluctant to make reports, it does not 
include any punishment against a person who provided a report if investigation reveals 
that no crime was committed. As Official Financial Employee6 remarked, “There are no 
restrictions on the reporting procedures for suspicious money and transactions. The 
evidence of that is that there is no punishment against anyone who submits a report, if 
the result of the investigation is that there is no crime”705. However, it seems that the 
mechanisms of reporting are unclear, as there is no manual on how to submit the report 
or about the collection of data about the suspicious operation, which result in confusion 
about the procedures of reporting, as Official Financial Employee3 stated: “there is no 
publications of guidelines facilitating citizens and institutions to report suspicious 
transactions’’706. Another financial interviewee confirmed that: “there has been no 
clarification on how to prepare and submit reports on suspicious operations”707. In the 
other words, in practice, the FIU has not yet prepared report formats or rules on reporting 
procedures. Furthermore, there is confusion about how the Unit and other institutions 
can work in cooperation. This is confirmed by Official Financial Employee1 who said: “the 
weakness in the AML mechanism was in the reporting, because reports are submitted only 
from the bank sector and not from other sectors, such as precious metal traders and 
lawyers’’708. 
With respect to necessity of reporting, Article 5 of the CMLA (2005)has identified the 
punishments for official employees if they ignore the requirement to report, and 
stipulates: “any official or employee of a financial, commercial, or economic 
establishment who learns of an act in his establishment related to a crime of ML and fails 
to report it to the competent authority shall be subject to imprisonment and/or a fine of 
not more than DLY 10,000, and not less than DLY 1,000’’709.  The law thus obliges financial 
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707 Ibid. 
708 (Official Financial Employee No.1 interviewed 12 August 2015). 
709 Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 
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institutions to report all operations suspected of being linked to ML, which is a 
requirement that is difficult for financial institutions to implement if the law and the 
executive regulations do not clarify how these Institutions are to identify the suspicious 
operations. In other words, the regulations do not give a definition of what might 
constitute ‘suspicious operations’. 
Furthermore, financial institutions themselves are obliged to provide the FIU with 
information, by Article 25 of the regulations that stipulates that: “the responsible director 
is obligated to provide all information that is required by the main Unit and ....’’710. This 
article ensures that Libya has complied with the international standard; but, the problem 
is that the financial institutions are not given any time limit. The result of this omission is 
that the Unit may not be able to start any investigation in relation to a suspicious ML 
operation, which was confirmed by Official Financial Employee2 since: “there is no 
obligation on financial institutions to provide records and customer information within a 
limited time to the competent local authorities’’711.  
So, these answers reveal a weakness in the AML mechanism and specifically the 
procedures for furnishing the main Unit with relevant data. The interview answers have 
revealed that expecting the financial institutions to provide the FIU with information 
without identifying a limit time leaves the door wide open for criminals to escape 
investigation. 
7.2.8 - Money Transfer Services 
Countries should make sure that they have taken measures to ensure that institutions or 
the people who are working on transferring money are registered and have got the 
required license to provide this service, as the FATF has recommended.712 Based on this 
recommendation, financial institutions are required to obtain accurate information on 
the originator of any transfer operation and they have to supervise and monitor the funds 
of suspicious transfer deals, which include any which do not contain complete originator 
information such as the name, address and account details.  
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711 (Official Financial Employee No 2 interviewed 12 August 2015). 
712 The FATF recommendation 14 (2012) 
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Libya should have measures that can be used to limit the physical movement of 
currencies and help detecting the money which people are attempting to move across 
borders. Countries should also be sure that the competent authorities have the legal 
authority to stop the movement of any money suspected of being linked to ML. However, 
in Libya, there is no legal provision which obliges people who carrying currency across 
borders to disclose that money, even though Article 8 of the 2005 Act does require the 
Central Bank to identify the maximum amount money that may be brought into the 
country and stipulates: “The Central Bank shall determine the maximum amount of funds 
that may be brought into the country in cash without having to declare it or disclose its 
source.”713 
As a result, multiple money transfers that may have been made without any control are 
helping to facilitate ML crime. As Official Financial Employee4 reflected: “There is no limit 
on the movement of money, because in 2010 the government allowed people to transfer 
a hundred thousand DLY without reference to the Libyan Central Bank’’714. This 
encourages the smuggling of funds and is a primary crime of ML. This was confirmed by 
Official Financial Employee2, who stated: ‘‘the weak area is that people are allowed to 
transfer money to any value, no matter how high, because the prevailing culture in the 
community is to deal with money as ‘cash’715. 
The interviews have demonstrated that there is no proper control on the movement of 
money and that this potentially facilitates an increase in ML. The solution to the problems 
that have been discussed here should be addressed by activating the role of the Customs 
Department and amending the regulations so as to require that customs declarations in 
the ports include disclosure of the movement of currency at departure as well as at 
arrival. Further, the Combating ML Act (2005) needs to be amended to limit the amount 
of money that can be transferred. 
Another problem has been uncovered by the Official Financial Employee2, which is that 
of using liquid cash. There has been widespread use of liquid cash as a means of ML in 
cash operations, as they involve a higher risk, and work to reduce dependence on liquid 
                                                          
713 Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering Article 8 
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cash so as to reduce the risk of dealing with it716. An initiative such as this could be 
implemented by providing mechanisms that encourage people to deal financially in other 
ways, such as using cheques and to increase the public awareness in this direction. 
However, in practice, the Libyan people have a cultural preference for using liquid cash, 
and this needs to be addressed by the mechanisms of AML in Libya. During the interviews, 
ideas about this were expressed. Official Financial Employee5 suggested that “dealing in 
money in the form of cash should be limited’’717. It was also suggested that: “sellers should 
be obliged to use cheques rather than cash, and regulations need to be issued to achieve 
that’’718. Also, Official Financial Employee2 added that based on his observations: “the 
movement of money should be limited by imposing a maximum amount’’719. 
Therefore, these problems seem to have contributed to increasing ML. Indeed, the 
widespread use of cash and its concomitant problems were discussed.  However, because 
the Libyan people prefer to use cash, additional denominations of coins and notes were 
issued, and the output of cash was increased in 2014. This is confirmed by a comparison 
with the Libyan budget in 2011; and it is clear that the issue of coins and notes increased 
from 15 billion in 2011 to 18 billion in 2014720. Which confirmed by Official Financial 
Employee 8721. Official Financial Employee5 suggested a solution to this problem and 
stated that: ‘‘the monitoring of suspicious money and transactions should be improved 
through the creation of a new mechanism to observe deposits, and comparing these to 
their regular income’’722. Another way of creating a new mechanism to observe the 
income of sellers and those of traders, lawyers and businessmen to detect the suspicious 
operations was suggested during the interviews. Official Financial Employee1 stated: ‘‘tax 
should be linked to the income of the sellers and certain professionals; and that will help 
to know their real incomes’’723.  
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It was also suggested that the detection of suspicious operations could be improved by 
monitoring any substantial increases in the amounts of money in clients’ bank accounts. 
Official Financial Employee6 commented: “there is a specific step that can be used to 
detect suspicious operations, which is to observe sudden increases in a client's bank 
accounts, whether in their personal or business account which does not match with their 
normal income. So, if there are such abnormal changes, this could be suspicious and 
indicate that ML is taking place”724. Which confirmed also by Official Financial Employee 
6725.Alongside this strategy, there are other ways to detect whether an account is linked 
to ML operations; such as clients deliberately trying to reduce deposits with the intention 
to evade the suspicion of ML726. In other words, the client could fragment a large sum of 
money so as not to expose himself to a charge of ML. Fragmenting large sums might be 
a way of avoiding a bank reporting the client to the relevant authorities because the 
amount is unusually large and the source of the money is not clear. Libya is not in line 
with the FATF Recommendation 32, which required from the countries to ensure that 
there is adequate coordination to detect the physical cross-border transportation of 
currency among customs, immigration and other related authorities. 
The Libyan Customs Department is required to coordinate with all relevant parties in 
order to unify efforts to combat ML. The Customs Department is an original member of 
the National Committee on AML, and the customs authority is one the bodies that are 
mandated to combat ML. The funds concerned may differ in kind and might be money or 
consumer goods, which includes the oil derivatives, in both cases smuggling is causing 
serious damage to the national economy and is the primary crime of ML, and it is the duty 
of customs to prevent these crimes727. However, the customs authority does not actually 
widely coordinate with the full range of other authorities in the area, as required by the 
FATF Recommendation 32. Arguably then, the role and functions of the Customs 
Department, as is the case with other agencies, do not effectively contribute to frustrate 
smuggling operations such as smuggling oil, which is closely associated with the 
                                                          
724 (Official Financial Employee No.6, interviewed 12 August 2015). 
725(Official Financial Employee No.8, interviewed 13 August 2015). 
726 Kern, J and Aberg, S. The Bank Secrecy Act: A Trap for the Unwary Businessman, The Metropolitan Corporate 
Counsel (2014 p.34). Available at: http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/29357/bank-secrecy-act-trap-unwary-
businessman (Accessed in 12/12/2015). 
727See Al Masaref Journal issued 16 (2013 P.7) Available at: 
https://cbl.gov.ly/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Masaref16.pdf (Accessed in 20/6/2017). 
193 
 
laundering of money. The Customs Department is also quite weak in enforcing the law, 
and does not provide sufficient information to the FIU. Thus, it does not effectively 
contribute to intercepting suspicious transportation of cash, which if the proceeds of 
illegal oil selling are legitimized through their transfer to real estate or smuggled through 
the banks out of Libya or used to create political instability, the proliferation of arms and 
support for wars within the country728 .Under the FATF Recommendation 2, countries 
should have national AML and they should designate law enforcement authorities, 
supervisors, and other relevant competent authorities to disclose ML operations and 
coordinate with each other.   
However, an important problem that was identified during the interviews was that the 
Libyan AML system suffers from an absence of police inspectors who have been 
specifically allocated to combat this crime. As Official Financial Employee 6 noted: “there 
is no police department dedicated to combating ML’’729 
The police have an important role in the criminal justice system, which is supposed to 
have responsibility for AML activity, due to this crime not just being related to commercial 
operations and bank transactions, but the extension of preceding crimes. These crimes 
need to be investigated, and information collected about how ML crime occurs. All illegal 
activities and practices which sources for the ML process are needing to be followed up 
to discover what businesses and activities are fuelling this crime. The problem that needs 
to be addressed is that although FATF recommendations expect countries to have 
effective mechanisms to implement AML policy, such as “the financial intelligence unit, 
law enforcement authorities, supervisors and other relevant competent authorities …” 
(Recommendation 2), and Libya has complied with this recommendation by establishing 
the FIU; there has been no establishment of police inspectors who are specially trained 
and dedicated to fighting this crime. This makes it difficult to effectively combat ML and 
the crimes that precede it. Similarly, in the procedures for the investigation and collection 
of information about ML operations, there are no testing devices which facilitate the 
detection of this crime. The absence of such facilities has resulted in some suspicious 
operations escaping detection. For example, there was a case of oil smuggling where the 
                                                          
728 Liang, C. (2016) The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights into Modern Terrorist Financing. Geneva Centre for Security Policy - 
GCSP No.10 (p.10). 
729 (Official Financial Employee No.6, interviewed 12 August 2015). 
194 
 
perpetrators were seized and the investigation procedure started; but the decision was 
made by the public prosecutor to stop the investigation. This was confirmed by Judge7.2, 
who added that the reason behind this decision being taken was a “lack of facilities for 
testing the material which was suspected of being smuggled. In this case, it was decided 
to stop the investigation in spite of the claim that it was smuggled oil’’730. Testing the 
material was impossible because there was no laboratory; hence the decision of the 
public prosecutor not to continue in this case of attempted oil smuggling. 
7.2.9-Training 
The means of ML have developed alongside the development of modern technology. 
International conventions have therefore tried to induce member countries to require 
their financial institutions to adopt training programmes for their staff. Through Article 
13 (10) of the implementing regulations on ML, Libya requires the AML bodies to provide 
training programmes for the financial institutions employees and stipulate that they must 
provide: “training programmes for employees in the main unit, and sub-units ...''731. 
However, according to Article 13, training is limited to employees of the FIU while it 
ignores employees of the Public Prosecutor who are less knowledgeable about the rules 
and mechanisms of AML. As a result, there can be misunderstandings about the 
implementation of ML regulations, as confirmed by a Judge7. 1: “there is no training 
programme on ML to clarify matters for the staff of the Public Prosecutor or for judges to 
understand the rules of AML’’732.  
This problem was also highlighted by Official Financial Employee3, who said: “The Public 
Prosecutor’s employees do not have sufficient knowledge to make distinctions between 
ML and smuggling, and were confused as to how their role and that of the Unit 
differed’’733. And the Official Financial Employee1 added: ‘’there is no training programme 
for employees who work in the field of controlling anti-crime operations and who are also 
working against ML”734. 
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These answers reveal that training programmes for AML employees are weak in these 
institutions, or even completely absent, particularly in non-banking institutions. All 
employees who work in the field of controlling anti-crime operations, including the 
employees of the courts, were found to have less knowledge than the staff in financial 
institutions working against ML crime. As a result, there is confusion in the FIU about how 
to deal with the Public Prosecutor. The interviews tend to suggest that there is a problem 
with a lack of clarity about the mechanism of submitting information to the Public 
Prosecutor, due in part to lack of knowledge by non-financial staff working against ML 
crime at all the related institutions. There was also evidence that there is no judicial 
precedent at the courts, as Judge7.1 reported: “there is no judicial precedent at the courts 
to help the judges to understand this crime”735. 
7.2.10-International cooperation 
International cooperation to combat ML crime is dealt with by Article 15 of the CMLA 
(2005), in line with Recommendation 38 of the Committee on International FATF. As this 
study, has discussed in Chapter Four, Libya has ratified a number of conventions with 
AML provisions such as the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and 
Psychotropic Drugs (1988), the Strasbourg Convention (1990) and the Palermo 
Convention (2000).  In compliance with these conventions' requirements, Libya has 
prepared the basis for the provision of the widest possible, rapid mutual legal assistance 
with respect to investigations, effective prosecution and procedures related to offences 
predicated on ML. These are discussed in the following sections, with regard to requests 
received from the relevant foreign authorities about legal assistance methods and 
tracking funds obtained from crimes, as required by the Conventions.  
7.2.10.1- Mutual legal assistance 
Libya has allowed for judicial cooperation in the field of mutual legal assistance through 
authorizing the competent judicial authorities to track or to freeze suspect funds or 
proceeds. Article 15 of the CMLA (2005)gives power to the Prosecutor General to track 
ML operations when requested by other countries, and stipulates that: “the Prosecutor 
General may, at the request of a judicial entity in another country, order to pursue the 
property obtained from a crime of ML or the means used in such crime to be tracked or 
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frozen…’’736. However, there is a condition imposed by this Article, which is that, the 
country that requested the cooperation: “… has ratified an agreement with Libya for 
judicial cooperation or based on the principle of reciprocity’’737, as this study will discuss 
in the following section.  
The interview answers revealed that, even though Libya is a signatory to the Conventions 
mentioned above, its national legislation on AML has not adopted the principles of legal 
assistance; thus, there still seem to be some problems in this area. Article 15 of the 
Executive Rules (2007) has identified these measures as being limited. In other words, 
the CMLA (2005) does not include legal assistance rules on areas such as the 
investigation, the establishment of the case and the judicial proceedings which relate to 
these illegal activities. Official Financial Employee2 commented: “there is no legal basis 
that gives enough authority for mutual legal assistance in the procedures that relate to 
the investigation of ML cases and the establishment of a lawsuit.”738 The result of this is 
that the measures of international legal assistance are limited due to not all the 
procedures that could help in international cooperation being mentioned. 
The other problem that arises is that there are no rules in the AML law which require the 
local authority to comply with or respond to another country’s request for legal 
assistance within a specified period. This means the Act does not identify a time limit for 
responding to requests for legal assistance, which can end in time being wasted while 
waiting for the reply. As one financial employee remarked: “there is no mechanism that 
helps to avoid the long time that is often spent in responding to the request of another 
country about activities that relate to legal assistance’’739. This is another weakness of the 
AML law, as omitting this important rule will help criminals to escape the law and 
successfully hide their illegal proceeds of smuggling oil derivatives across the borders of 
neighbouring countries. 
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7.2.11- Confiscation and provisional measures 
7.2.11.1-Freezing 
Freezing the funds of the illegal proceeds is an important procedure in the methods of 
AML. The second paragraph of Article 5 in the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs (1988) stipulates that: “each party shall also adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, trace, and 
freeze or seize proceeds...''740. Additionally, Recommendation 38 of the FATF 
Recommendations stipulates that: “the countries should ensure that they have the 
authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries to 
identify, freeze...’’741. Libya has complied with these international rules and it includes 
power to be the freeze illegal funds in the CMLA (2005). It has also given power to the 
Libyan Central Bank to freeze illegal proceeds that related to ML operations through 
Article 7, which stipulates that: “the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya may freeze 
funds in accounts that are suspected of being linked to the crime of ML, for a period not 
to exceed one month”742.  However, as the article imposes the condition that proceeds 
can only be frozen for one month, this produces a weakness in this mechanism of AML, 
due to time possibly running out before the case appears in court. As the Official Financial 
Employee 4 noted: “...the FIU should be given powers to keep this money frozen long 
enough for the relevant documents to be transferred to the Public Prosecutor; and the 
Public Prosecutor should also have the power to freeze the proceeds long enough to 
transfer the case to the court and avoid having to transfer the money back to the customer 
prematurely”743. 
There is also legislative weakness in the freezing procedures specifically related to 
laundered property.  This is because there is no law that organizes the freezing 
procedures in cases such as these and allows a specified body to track the suspicious 
proceeds that have attracted a request that they be frozen. Official Financial Employee2 
remarked: “there is no legal text about implementing freezing procedures for laundered 
property taken from other countries and neither is there one that gives powers to a specific 
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institution to implement the international rules of the freezing that relate to terrorism’’744. 
So, the interviews reveal that the procedures for freezing are not sufficient to retain 
money suspected of being illegal proceeds. 
Specifically, some answers given in the interviews reveal defects in the AML legislation in 
this respect; notably, the limited time available to those institutions that are fighting to 
curb ML operations to freeze illegal proceeds. This defect gives an opportunity to 
criminals to retain money that should be frozen, if the time limit expires during the 
investigations. As the Official Financial Employee 4 noted: “...the FIU should be given 
powers to keep this money frozen long enough for the relevant documents to be 
transferred to the Public Prosecutor; and the Public Prosecutor should also have the power 
to freeze the proceeds long enough to transfer the case to the court and avoid having to 
transfer the money back to the customer prematurely”745. However, although Article 7 of 
the CMLA (2005) restricts the freezing of funds by the Governor of the Central Bank to 
one month, the second paragraph adds: ''the chief public prosecutor may issue an order 
to impound accounts, funds, or instruments suspected of being linked to a crime of ML, 
for a period not to exceed three months''746. Thus, the limitations on freezing suspect 
proceeds in the legislation are slightly mitigated by the granting of powers of confiscation. 
7.2.11.2- Confiscation 
The international conventions require their member countries to include in their 
regulations rules of confiscation that should apply to any money which is suspected of 
constituting illegal proceeds. Article 5 of the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs (1988) stipulates that: “each party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation ...''747. Additionally, 
Recommendation 38 of the FATF Recommendations stipulates that: “the countries 
should ensure that they have the authority to take expeditious action in response to 
requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property 
laundered... ''748,  
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The Libyan AML regulations thus include confiscation procedures for any money that has 
an illegal origin. The second paragraph of Article 15 of the CMLA 2005 stipulates that: 
“the validity of a judicial order issued in another country by the competent court or 
judicial authority calling for the seizure of property, proceeds, or means linked to a crime 
of ML or a related crime shall be recognized….’’749. However, the rules on confiscation 
contained in this Act are limited; and this has had negative effects on the recovery of 
funds that fall under the rules of confiscation.  
This weakness is due to the confiscation rules in the Act being limited. For example, they 
do not identify who has the power to collect the details about any money due to be 
confiscated; nor do these rules make money or property that has ideal value or which is 
derived indirectly from the proceeds of crime the subject of confiscation. Moreover, the 
Act does not create a body that has the authority to manage the confiscated assets or 
the frozen money and to track any money which is a subject of confiscation and freezing. 
Nor is any institution identified that is to collect and keep all relevant information, which 
was confirmed by Official Financial Employee3: who claimed that “there is no legislation 
that gives enough authority to competent institutions to track proceeds that should be 
confiscated’’750. 
The interview answers have revealed that the procedures for confiscation and freezing 
are not clearly outlined in the CMLA (2005); in other words, there is a gap in this law in 
the form of a vacancy for a competent body which will be given the power to track funds, 
manage funds which are under confiscation orders and to freeze illegal proceeds that are 
to be confiscated. The procedures for carrying this out should also clearer, as this section 
has explained above. Any weaknesses in procedures generally negatively affect the 
competent authorities in their recovery of funds that under a confiscation order. This 
weakness in AML legislation is a powerful explanation of the continuation of the crime of 
ML in Libya. 
                                                          
749 Law No. 2 of 1373 DP / 2005 on Combating Money Laundering. 
750 (Official Financial Employee No.3, interviewed 12 August 2015) 
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7.3-The Role of Regulatory Institutions in Controlling Money 
Laundering Crime 
The regulatory institutions monitor the application of the ML Law and have authority to 
give financial institutions a license to conduct of their business. For example, the Central 
Bank monitors commercial banks and banks specializing in finance and credit. These 
entities have two functions as follows; Firstly, the controlling role of the regulatory 
institutions is linked to that of the National Committee against ML Crime, as Article 27 
obliges these entities to investigate the extent to which financial institutions enforce the 
law and implement procedures against ML operations including identification procedures, 
and the KYC rule. They also have to make annual reports about the activities of the 
National Committee against ML Crime. Secondly, the role of the regulatory institutions is 
linked with the FIU in combating ML crime. Under Article 32, the Libyan legislature has 
obliged these entities to help it in the investigation of reports of suspicious operations 
related to ML. Furthermore, they must conduct the necessary procedures about the 
exchange of information and create databases about ML. Article 31 states: ''regulatory 
authorities should take all the necessary measures and means for the exchange of 
information and coordination with the main unit, about AML, including the establishment 
of a database of information available in this area''751. 
7.4-Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the ideals of Islam have not been adhered to in 
practice, and the initial anti-financial crimes principles decided by Islam have not been 
developed in the domestic legislations such as Libya criminal law and the AML Act (2005). 
It is still a work in progress. As a result, Libya has taken important steps in the fight against 
ML; and there are a number of regulations and rules that have been adopted in an 
attempt to curb it, including those relating to illegal oil selling. This legislation has 
criminalized ML activities and provides for confiscation and freezing the proceeds of 
crime. 
Libya has failed to reach the standards of AML practices as set out in this area. However, 
it has made an effort to participate in international efforts against this crime by ratifying 
some Conventions. However, subsequent failure to comply with the international 
                                                          
751 Regulations, Executive rules of money laundering law rules No. 3 /2007 Articles No (27, 31, 32) 
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standards may well be explained in terms of the actual practices of the bodies, which 
were created to work against ML crime. The problem is that the law is not always clear; 
furthermore, it is not being carried out properly, as this chapter clearly discussed. 
Introducing proper regulations which would fill gaps in the AML system would go a long 
way to avoid all this inefficiency. However, this chapter has also shown that this AML 
legislation and its mechanisms have some shortcomings and they are still not in line with 
the international standards of AML. There still needs to be more discussion and 
comparisons made between the Libyan approach and that of other countries such as the 
UK, which may help to fill gaps and rectify weaknesses. Regulations have to require both 
financial and non-financial institutions to be observant of financial operations; define in 
detail the functions of competent authorities and give them more power to track the 
activities of money launderers. Regulations should further facilitate international co-
operation and ensure that the competent authorities have effective powers to apply all 
the mechanisms adopted to combat ML operations. Finally, the absence of training for 
people who work in these institutions needs to be rectified so that they can effectively 
apply detection strategies in order to prevent ML. These detection strategies need to be 
monitored in accordance with the regulations relating to the fight against ML crime, not 
least as all these insufficiencies give criminals opportunity to hide proceeds obtained by 
illegal oil selling. 
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Chapter Eight: The Relevance of the UK Approaches to 
Money Laundering for Libyan Legislation. 
8.1- Introduction 
This thesis has examined the AML Acts in both Libya and the UK, and highlighted the 
efforts to adopt effective law against the crime in both Libya and the UK, have both 
attempted, with varying degrees of commitment, to comply with international AML 
standards. It has also explored weaknesses in Libyan AML which has allowed an increase 
in ML in the illegal selling of oil. This chapter will go on to consider the lessons that could 
be learnt to benefit the fight against this crime, by filling the gaps in the Libyan CMLA 
(2005) and the legal transplants. 
8.2- Anti- Money Laundering Lessons from the UK 
The AML laws of UK have evolved over a relatively short period. This thesis has shown 
how the UK formalized its law, by applying international AML standards in view of its role 
as financial centre, and as an oil-producing country. Efforts related to the legal framework 
and improving the mechanisms of AML have been unique in the UK because of the 
reduced threat of corruption and lack of organizational and resource complications that 
are evident in Libya, the political instability, existence of armed gangs and the weakness 
of the mechanisms the using against this crime. As this study, has suggested, the UK has 
made many significant changes on its AML policies over the last two decades752. The 
target of these changes has been to minimise the threats the UK faces as a one of the 
significant financial centre by improving the response to ML crime through creating new 
capabilities in the law enforcement bodies and establishing new legal power to curb this 
crime. Further, the UK has taken steps to support the observation system, to improve its 
effectiveness against this crime and to implement an effective international exchange of 
information necessary to address ML. 
This thesis has argued that in the UK, implementation of the law seeks to be compatible 
with the international AML principles. In spite of the UK adopting the ML Regulations 
(1993), the POCA(2002), the MLR (2017)and the Bribery Act (2010), there remain 
criticisms directed against the UK, and there are still some gaps in AML, such as the 
                                                          
752Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance (2016) Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications (Accessed in 15/7/2017). 
203 
 
difficulty of detecting suspicious operation when available details are insufficient which 
can make it almost impossible to identify whether the origins of the proceeds are legal or 
not.  The Bribery Act (2010) replaced all the UK’s previous anti-corruption laws753,and 
acts as a deterrent to financial rewards being offered as bribes, which is the intersection 
between corruption and ML. However, the regulations oblige financial institutions to train 
relevant official employees to know what the procedures are and what to do in relation 
to suspected ML transactions. Programmes organised by the MLR (2017) demonstrate 
the enthusiasm of the UK to improve the experience and the qualification levels of staff. 
Regardless of the criticisms that have been raised e.g. the confusing large number of SARs 
and some defects in its operation (see Chapter 5), it is clear that the UK generally 
implements AML procedures and monitors and controls financial operations. 
The MLR (2017) has established the Preventive Measures that are positive procedures 
related to the principle of ‘Know Your Client’ (KYC) and determine whether PEPs are the 
real beneficiaries. Taking this action is a major way to prevent this kind of crime or curb 
it. The money or value transfer services and cash couriers should also be under these 
measures to ensure that they will not be used to launder money. As the FATF has 
recommended, money movement in the UK has been controlled by adopting the ML 
Regulations (2003), which obliged financial institutions to request their customers to 
disclose the sources of their financial operations for amounts over £10,000, (as this study 
has discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3). 
On the same way, the UK AML is clear about collecting client details, its regulations 
ensured the existence of an effective system for collation of data and record keeping by 
creating a special body: The Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), which has played a 
vital role in applying procedures such as keeping a data base, investigating operations 
related to ML and making them available for further investigation. The UK is clear about 
the information that should be collected about their clients and their businesses; it has 
stipulated the details about the customer’s identity, the firm’s business relationships and 
data about the deals which should be available as source of information for investigation 
by the competent authorities (See Chapter 5, Section 5.2). 
                                                          
753Aaronberg, D & Higgins, N. (2010) All Bark and No Bite…? Archbold Review Sweet and Maxwell Vol.5, No.7 (p.7). 
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This study has examined how the UK adopted a wide legal framework for the concept of 
ML, which led it to identify the procedures that should be followed in reporting 
operations suspected of ML. This has resulted in an increase in the numbers of annual 
SARs received by the concerned body. However, the large number of SARs about 
suspicious persons and transactions can be seen as a condemnation of the system, as 
these will cost a large amount to process and negatively affects the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the UK's approach against ML754 (See Chapter 5).Additionally, financial 
institutions are required to satisfy themselves as to the identity of their customers; and 
there are several procedures related to risk assessment in financial operations which 
have been established. Activities which are probably linked with ML transactions involve 
record keeping and identification; and the records are identified by the MLR (2017). In 
contrast, the UK has a condition that the reporter must have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the transaction is suspicious. Article 331 (2) (b) of the POCA (2002) stipulates 
that ''... (b) has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting...''755, additionally, in the 
UK a mechanism has been adopted which is a strong step for reporting any suspicious ML 
operations, attempting to the curb this crime, and penalising anyone who failed to report 
the suspicious financial operation, as this study has clarified above. 
In practice, however, the situation is different; and this research has discovered that the 
UK has weak procedures for discovering the origins of the proceeds of illegal oil selling in 
Libya. Further, it has been demonstrated that the UK has failed to track the money that 
was hidden by the members of the Libyan regime, as this study has explained in Chapter5. 
8.3- The anti-money laundering procedures in Libya 
In this context, the FATF, issued AML/CFT recommendations, and adopted a wide 
definition of ML, which reflected the reinforcements made by the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention in this area. It has taken rapid tough action, and requested the 
member countries to establish practical measures against this crime. The World Bank and 
the IMF have also required several countries to implement the recommendations 
mentioned above to demonstrate their preparedness to work against this phenomenon 
and its related threats. This study has highlighted that at first, global obligations against 
                                                          
754 Preller, S. Ibid (p.243). 
755 Part 7 (331) (2) (b) of the POCA 
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ML focused on anti- drug trafficking and the creation of a front to enhance the war on 
drugs represented in the rules which were within the Vienna Convention (1988). This 
rapidly changed to a fight against ML, outlined in the Basel Statement of Principles and 
the FATF recommendations for increasing awareness of the problem of ML. In spite of 
adopting several regulations against financial crimes culminating in the CMLA (2005) and 
its Regulations, in practice, Libya neither lives up to international standards nor has made 
reforms which are sufficient to ensure the curbing of ML crime. Libya’s CMLA (2005) has 
been criticized by IMF; as, although Libya has pledged to enter some changes into this 
Act756, as the IMF has requested, it remains unchanged. 
Although Libya is an Islamic country and claims Islamic principles is as the source of its 
legislations, its law is not enough to curb the ML crime, specifically in the illegal selling of 
oil, which has negative effects on the national economy and the lives of its citizens. The 
CMLA (2005) does not appear compatible with international AML principles, and this 
thesis has also pointed out that laws and practices of Libyan AML don't fully implement 
the principles of Islamic rule either, in the same way as the AML procedures in Libya are 
not in line with global principles, as will be outlined below: 
8.4-The power of Anti- Money Laundering bodies 
Although Libya has attempted to comply with global AML standards by establishing the 
FIU, there also appears to be a very low level of enforcement of the existing regulations. 
The findings of this study and the views of its participants confirm that although Libyan 
law has given the FIU authorities power to review records and financial institutions’ 
documents related to financial operations, in practice the FIU has limited power. This is 
due to the terms of reference of the FIU not explicitly including the possibility of carrying 
out a field inspection for this purpose. In other words, the unit is unable to visit and 
inspect financial operations or adequately review financial documents in order to detect 
ML transactions, which has resulted in a weak level of analysis of reports of suspicious 
operations (See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.4.3). Additionally, this research has discovered 
another weak point in the system used by the FIU against this crime, which is that the 
CMLA (2005) does not identify a time limit for responding to requests for legal assistance. 
                                                          
756 See Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV Consultation, Prepared by representatives of IMF a consultation 2005 with 
Libya. Available at: file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/cr06136a%20(1).pdf (Accessed in 20/6/2017).  
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It is important for responses to be prompt, as a quick reply will assist in providing the 
documents of any suspicious operation for investigation procedures to use them as 
needed as evidence of illegal transaction. This weakness in the AML law must be 
addressed, as the absence of this important rule from AML law helps criminals to escape 
the law and hide their illegal proceeds (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2.7). 
Additionally, the participants of this study considered that there is another weakness in 
the mechanism used by the banks to curb ML. They point out that the door was left wide 
open for forgery by allowing copies of identification documents to be provided by the 
customer when important client details relevant to financial operations were required, 
rather than taking the information directly from the original documents (See Chapter 7, 
Section 7.2.5.2). This means that official employees in the bank accept a copy of the 
identification document without comparing it to the original that could be a forgery, and 
that it is much more difficult to detect forgery on photocopied document. This practice 
needs to be addressed, as it could be helping money launderers to escape justice. 
8.4.1- Exchanging information 
Although, the law that established the FIU in Libya has given it the power to exchange 
information with its counterparts in other countries, in practice, as the study has 
discovered through its participants, the FIU has limited co-operation. This is due to the 
FIU not having powers of full independent financial disclosure, so it cannot act 
independently in exchanging information with its counterparts. This weakness can result 
in inadequate co-operation which makes it more difficult to effectively track money that 
has been laundered (See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.4.4). 
These weaknesses could be rectified and the regulations against ML made more 
complete by adopting certain rules, identified in the chapter above, that are being used 
in the UK to prevent ML.  There also needs to be reform of the regulations which were 
issued against financial offences. These regulations should be consistent with 
international law so as to prevent corruption. The rule of law must be implemented to all 
persons equally and irregularities in the judiciary have to be exposed. It is also necessary 
to reform the ML law to issue guidance instructions and provide training, according to 
the requirements of international law. At the same time, ML crime is a co-operative 
criminal activity, committed by several criminals who are familiar with the different 
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means of committing this crime. Crimes such as ML require the perpetrators to be 
knowledgeable about the system; and require intensive action, and often co-operation 
beyond geographical boundaries. For these reasons, it is also not an easy crime to control 
without information and international co-operation and effort to achieve a 
comprehensive effectiveness against these illegal activities. Banks need in-depth 
comprehensive knowledge about the mechanisms and strategies that ML operations use 
and realize that these are complex and changing; and that fraudulent ideas or crimes may 
be generated by in-depth knowledge of a bank’s workings. 
The compliance of states with international law is the basis for effective AML; and 
countries should be internalizing the global rules in this field within their domestic laws. 
Countries should participate in international AML initiatives and, in their own national 
interest, should take all necessary actions to curb this crime. Countries should also co-
operate in creating a network for the exchange of resources such as any intelligence 
information related to the fight against financial crimes, which might be committed 
nationally or through cross-border financial institutions. In doing this the research has 
highlighted the precarious regulatory environment in Libya, which has led some citizens 
to deprive their country of valuable assets. Further, there are some laws that need to be 
changed, such as the Salary Act, the salaries of staff need to be increased ensure that 
they can meet their obligations. Changes also need to be madein how transactions are 
conducted with the banks; for instance, dealing with cash needs to be curbed. Adopting 
international rules needs to be fostered through the adoption of UN model treaties and 
soft law instruments, such as the Basel Committee’s guidelines on banking supervision 
and the FATF recommendations. This study has identified that the international AML 
framework in the context of the FATF and the bank for international settlement in Basel, 
Switzerland (See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5) have made useful rules which could be 
included within the domestic regulation to foster international co-operation, as this 
action has positive effects on AML strategy. 
8.4.2- Reporting 
Like the UK, Libya’s regulated sector is obliged by the CMLA (2005) to report suspicious 
activity. This is in line with the FATF 40 recommendations, which include their AML 
regulations whereby clear rules oblige their financial institutions to report on any 
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suspicious financial dealings, as well as establishing punishments against those who 
transgress these rules. Libya has nevertheless taken a positive step in obliging financial 
institutions to report on any suspicious financial transactions, under Article 18 of the 
regulations’ executive rules of ML, as this study has clarified in Chapter 7. For example, it 
has decided to establish a punishment for any an official who fails to reports operations 
involving suspected ML to the competent authorities. Article 5 (1) stipulates that: ‘‘Any 
official or employee of a financial, commercial, or economic establishment who learns of 
an act in his establishment related to a crime of ML and fails to report it to the competent 
authority shall be subject to imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than LD 10,000 and 
not less than LD 1,000''. (See Chapter 7 section 7.2.5.2). 
Regarding this point, several problems stand out, not least that the banks will be outside 
their original list of duties by having to assess the extent that financial operations involve 
ML or not. Thus, in this situation the question has arisen about how a bank could know 
the provenance of money it receives from its clients. This requirement also produces a 
need to increase the number of transactions which might be regarded as suspicious; and 
this is exhausting work for the FIU that has to receive and process these reports, as this 
study has explained above. 
Moreover, an analysis of a suspicious operation may reveal that it is not linked with any 
crime; and this may mean that the information received from the banks was uncertain. It 
is here, that, after in-depth analysis, the researcher believes problems can arise. Any 
reporting based solely on the suspicion of a competent employee and without specifying 
what constitutes ‘suspicious’, and without appropriate indicators which can be referred 
to when needed, may give rise to ambiguity and could lead to prejudicing the rights and 
freedoms of individuals, as such a report opens doors for an investigation based on the 
suspicion. That is why reports should not be based on an employee’s opinion and clear 
rules need to be made and adhered to in this area. Therefore, it is also very important to 
ensure that the staff members are given sufficient training to improve their skills in 
countering ML and assessing the potential risks related to financial transaction in order 
to protect the banks from ML757. Training has to be aimed at all relevant staff and make 
them able to effectively identify suspicious transactions, be aware of potential oversights 
                                                          
757Aspalella, A. ibid, (2013). 
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and have a good knowledge of the requirements and rules relating to the identification 
and reporting of possible ML and all relevant laws. 
In addition, the legislation does not stipulate any indicators, as a guide to determine what 
could be the basis for making a report. Furthermore, the Libyan legislation has also 
decided to establish a punishment for anyone who reports to the competent authorities 
in bad faith i.e. in order to harm another party (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2.7). 
Regarding this point, the problem that stands out is how to identify 'bad faith'. The threat 
of this punishment has made certain employees ignore their suspicions and omit making 
reports to avoid legal accountability; and this has a negative effect on AML strategy. 
However, there are also other weaknesses in the steps related to the reporting of the 
suspicious operations, such as the absence of a manual designed to clarify how to submit 
the report on the suspicious operations of ML, as the Act has stipulated above (See 
Chapter 7, Section 7.2.7). 
In order to fight ML effectively, it is important to design a code that aims to provide 
guidance and instructions to the financial institutions to know and understand the 
requirements for reporting transactions they suspect may relate to the activities of ML. 
Such a code will contribute to satisfying the national legal obligations which doubtless 
correspond with the relevant international standards such as the FATF 
recommendations. A manual that can generate important reports on suspicious 
transactions also plays an important role in the fight against ML and assists the FIU as it 
ensures that those responsible will produce high quality effective reports. 
The other weak point is that there is no clear time limit on obliging financial institutions 
to provide the information to the FIU, as this study has discussed earlier. The result of 
this omission is that the Unit may not be able to start any investigation on a suspicious 
ML operation as it relies on evidence being provided in time for the investigation to be 
made effectively. Furthermore, there is a weakness in the flow of details about suspicious 
operations and this lends a kind of privacy to the crime of money laundering which is 
related to the difficulties competent authorities have in gathering information about the 
original crime on which the ML is predicated. In order to be effective, any authority needs 
efficient tracking and collection of the information necessary to combat this scourge and 
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hold the perpetrators accountable. In reality, there are difficulties with the ease of flow 
of internal information between institutions and agencies, whenever they are requested 
to give the relevant information as part of their duties. For example, it could take several 
days for the Unit to acquire financial information from an institution despite the 
importance and necessity of this information. 
Thus, the weakness in the AML mechanism, specifically the procedures for furnishing the 
main Unit with relevant data, needs to be addressed to avoid any obstruction or delay in 
the procedures of investigation. Thus, the Libyan Act (2005) needs to be revised to 
include a specific limit time in which to provide the information to the FIU immediately it 
is required, to ensure timely provision of evidence and that the criminals will not have 
time to hide the suspicious proceeds. 
In Libya, in practice, the investigative powers of the FIU into suspicious operations are 
limited; and the FIU is only able to investigate bank employees, who may have committed 
misdemeanours related to ML crime. However, it cannot go further than that and include 
others who are related to suspicious operation, such as investigating the individuals or 
clients or the third party in the transaction – the brokers. In this case, the relationship 
between the FIU and the General Prosecutor's Office is a complementary relationship 
that should be built on the principles that are defined by ML law. These bodies need to 
work together in terms of the investigation, collection of all relevant information and the 
completion of the files, followed by the public prosecution, which in turn takes upon itself 
the powers of investigative and legal procedures to condemn or exonerate the accused 
before the case is transferred to the competent court. The importance of this 
interdependence is thus in the exchange of information, and in providing assistance in 
the investigation that will establish the lawsuit. However, in this case, the powers of the 
Libyan FIU are limited, as this study has argued above. 
It is therefore essential that those involved in the investigation can obtain any evidence 
against anyone guilty of perpetrating ML and related offences. They should have the 
power to seize related documents that might be of benefit to the ongoing investigation. 
Such documents can reveal many of the circumstances surrounding ML crime and enable 
the tracking of any suspicious person who might be involved in a ML transaction. The 
FATF recommendations have provided member countries with strong procedures and 
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the framework for AML; and encouraged member countries to improve their legal system 
to combat ML and protect their banking system from this crime. In the Basel Statement 
of Principles, member countries are urged to avoid the risk of discrepancy in domestic 
regulations in this field. 
8.4.3-The Preventive Measures 
8.4.3.1-Money Transfer Services 
Libya has left the door open for transferring money, and the internal regulations have not 
adopted a threshold for the movement of cash, cheques or deposits into an account; on 
the contrary, Libya allows the transfer of more than a hundred thousand DYL in a single 
transaction and there is no limit on transferring money or deposits. Furthermore, there 
are no controls or limitations on the movement of money, whatever the amount (See 
Chapter 7, Section 7.2.8). This is one of the means of ML and it results in risk of political 
and social damage and a drain on the domestic economy; so, to curb these risks, the FATF 
recommendation must be implemented, as has been done in the UK. 
8.4.3.2-Confiscation and provisional measures 
Libya has taken steps to allow the monitoring of activities suspected of being ML. These 
procedures have been adopted to comply with the relevant international conventions; 
(See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.11) and include the power to freeze illegal proceeds. 
However, the Libyan Central Bank has only been granted powers to freeze suspicious 
funds for one month. This time limit is a weak point in this AML strategy that can result 
in time possibly running out before the case is forwarded in court. Although, the 2005 
Act tries to conform with the conventions’ requirements about confiscation rules, the 
rules of the confiscation under this Act are also weak due to their not identifying who has 
the power to collect details about any money due to be confiscated as this study has 
argued above. 
The importance of freezing assets is that it is always the first step in any action taken, and 
the amount frozen in general is usually the only amount that will eventually be recovered 
by the relevant authorities. Thus, the orders to freeze should be kept in effect for a long 
time if necessary, until a final order is issued to confiscate these assets. Both freezing and 
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confiscation are very important mechanisms that could rapidly help to ensure the success 
of the recovery of assets in the early stages of an investigation. 
8.4.4-Training 
This thesis has shown that most judges, FIU members and financial institution employees 
in Libya have not been trained in the AML proceedings, (as some participants identified 
in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.9); regulations for this are absent; and the FIU is also not 
sufficiently aware of the obligations that financial organisations have in combating ML, 
such as cooperating with the FIU. Furthermore, it has insufficient knowledge about the 
development of training programmes, which aim to help staff deal more effectively with 
the different types of risks associated with ML. Thus, both the research participants and 
the relevant literature concurred that the inadequacy of provision of training 
programmes for employees who might come across ML, whether in the FIU or in the 
office of the Public Prosecutor or anywhere else that experiences ML transactions (as 
clarified in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.9) reflects the failure of the Libyan AML mechanisms; 
and has resulted in confusion and misunderstanding about how to detect suspicious 
operations. 
This highlights the importance of training and awareness for all employees who deal 
directly with customers and oversee financial transactions or for those who provide 
guidance. The training should include all relevant staff, including new workers, who deal 
with clients and include how to detect suspicious operations and prepare reports about 
it. Training should be systematic and ongoing; and the programmes should also include 
how to deal with the clients after reporting their suspect transactions; and deal in 
particular with personal responsibilities as defined by the law. The training on the 
procedures of investigation for the staff of the FIU and the Public Prosecutor must include 
ways to improve their knowledge about the rules and mechanisms of AML, as is supposed 
to be included in the training on the procedures followed by banks to help prevent and 
deter ML. 
Furthermore, in Libya there are no police inspectors assigned specifically to combat this 
crime, nor are there mechanisms which assist the investigation and collection of 
information about ML operations that also need to be supported by the provision of 
testing to facilitate the detection of this crime (See Section 7.2.8 of Chapter 7). Although 
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the CMLA (2005) has addressed international cooperation, it has not included specific 
legal assistance rules on areas such as the investigation, the establishment of the lawsuit 
and the judicial proceedings which relate to activities that are criminalized by the 
Conventions (See Section 7.2.10.1 of Chapter 7). 
Finally, although, the Central Bank of Libya has directed all the banks and other financial 
institutions to use procedures for collecting their customers’ details by applying and 
pursuing the principle of Know Your Client (KYC), the CMLA (2005) is not clear about what 
details should be collected from customers. It has also ignored the issue of PEPs and it 
does not regulate how to deal with them and how to assess risk to determine whether 
this potential customer (whether as a customer or beneficial owner) is a PEP or not, (see 
Chapter 7, Section 7.2.6). 
Libya also has a weak commitment to the FATF recommendations758, and consequently 
the Libyan standards are inadequate (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2.8). Furthermore, there 
are problems with the government’s tracking of corrupt operations as some of these 
involve government officials. A review of the literature and contributions by some of the 
study’s participants confirm that, although resolutions have been issued and applied, 
there are still concerns about the effectiveness of the regulations. Also, the low salaries 
of the Libyan official employees have led some of them to find other ways of 
supplementing their incomes which can involve corruption759. Finally, with regard to the 
illegal selling of oil, fuel subsidies have encouraged some people in Libya to smuggle oil 
in order to earn the difference between the international and local price which has had a 
negative effect on the fight against ML (See also Chapter 3, Section 6.1). Additionally, the 
pervasive corruption in Libya is also due to the legacy of the Gaddafi regime that has 
meant an absence of democratic institutions in Libya and a routine ignoring of these 
crimes by the old regime, (as considered in Chapter 3 Section 6.1). This has been 
confirmed by Transparency International, which ranked Libya 170th (See the Table of 
Results of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016)760.  In conjunction with this, fuel prices 
                                                          
758See Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV Consultation. Ibid. 
759Transparency team to Libya: "Managerial revolution" based on "administrative corruption" in Libya 2010 Available 
at: file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/1262.pdf (Accessed in 3/11/2014). 
760 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. 
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in Libya need reforming to be in line with that of neighbouring counties in order to stop 
oil smuggling. 
There is another issue regarding Libyan AML procedures, as in Libyan culture people 
prefer to use cash rather than the cheques, as this study has explained, and this is a 
problem for procedures of the monitoring of money movement at border points used by 
criminals to carry their illegal oil proceeds to Tunisia. Similarly, smugglers have availed 
themselves of weakness in monitoring procedures on all Libyan borders to smuggle oil to 
the neighbouring countries, and several Libyans have bought property in Tunisia as a way 
of laundering their illegal proceeds761; or have created fake companies and pumped 
money into them762.Moreover, the low standard of living of the individual is reflected in 
the low average per capita income763; which may act as further motivation for ML. 
8.5-Conclusion 
It is clear that in the face of increased ML crime, the UK has developed as one of the 
significant global financial centres. The United Kingdom seeks to protect its financial 
system as one of the most important and the largest financial centres in the world; and 
this has been through its support of international conventions such as the 2000 Palermo 
Convention and the Basel Committee Statement of Principles (1988), as well as through 
the regular modification of its laws in line with the international conventions’ 
requirements with robust AML measures such as CDD. Arguably, global AML cannot be 
successful, unless it is enforced through robust local and global institutions764. The picture 
portrayed by the Libyan AML regime is that it is inefficient and inaccessible due to a 
culture of corruption and insufficiency in its local application, and needs a legal transplant 
of some of the rules that mentioned above which will reform the relevant laws in Libya. 
Amendments would thus include clarification of the ML mechanism, such as the 
application of the CDD principles and the procedures for reporting suspicious 
                                                          
761 See ALQUDS AL Arabi. Enabling Libyans to own real estates in Tunisia, a waste of national sovereignty or an 
attempt to revive the economy? 2016 Available at: http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=625611 (Accessed in 18/7/2017). 
762 See Al-Shorouq. Is the only one to publish the most serious money laundering operations in Tunisia: billions ... and 
Libyan and Tunisian businessmen are involved 2016 Available at: http://www.alchourouk.com/171288/662/1 
(Accessed in 18/7/2017). 
763 See Libya Almostakbal. The Libyan economy and five years lean by Ghoul, H 2017 Available at: http://www.libya-
al-mostakbal.org/95/13766 (Accessed in 18/7/2017). 
764Mugarura, N. (2013) An appraisal of United Nations and other money laundering and financing of terrorism 
counter-measures.  Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol 16 No.3 pp 249-265 (p.255). 
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transactions, which could thus address the areas of weakness. In particular, members of 
staff need to be monitored and trained to give them the opportunity to understand and 
deal with activities that are linked to ML operations. Libya should review and adopt laws 
that are suited its local context, Thus, Libya needs to apply the legal transplant model in 
a transitional phase of Libya’s development through benefit from the positive procedures 
related to the principle of ‘Know Your Client’ (KYC) and determine whether PEPs are the 
real beneficiaries, any changes the legislation requires that conform to the rules and 
mechanisms used by the UK in these areas, must not be inconsistent with the principles 
contained in Shari'ah, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
Measures to fill the gaps and address the inadequacies will be recommended in the 
following chapter. Thus, Libya needs to apply the legal transplant model in a transitional 
phase of Libya’s development through benefit from the positive procedures related to 
the principle of ‘Know Your Client’ (KYC) and determine whether PEPs are the real 
beneficiaries.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendations 
9.1- Introduction 
This thesis has demonstrated the weakness of AML legislation in Libya and sought to 
identify the most viable and effective ways to improve the Libyan Act in these areas. The 
answers to the research questions were found and form the basis of the 
recommendations that have been listed below and throughout the discussion in this 
chapter. The literature and the experts who have participated have provided clues, which 
have demonstrated the extent of corruption, problems in knowledge acquisition and 
awareness of the issues, disorganisation, resistance to change, and a lack of available 
resources. All these needs to be addressed by changes in AML legislation, and it is obvious 
that Libya needs assistance from other governments and international bodies to 
overcome its corruption and infrastructure challenges. This knowledge was found to be 
less common in the government and the financial institutions; and this study has added 
evidence that a combination of disorganisation, resource issues, and corruption in 
successive Libyan governments have impeded progress in the struggle against ML. 
Similarly, this study has demonstrated that the understanding of ML is very weak, at both 
official and public levels; and the people are using means that assist in committing this 
crime, for example, they prefer to use cash rather than cheques (See Chapter 7, Section 
7.2.8). 
Most of the Libyan oil proceeds are in foreign banks, while the majority of the population 
live below the designated poverty threshold of $1 per day. There have been high profile 
cases involving senior Libyan who have smuggled public funds to foreign jurisdictions; 
therefore, it did not come as a surprise when Transparency International ranked Libya 
170th out of 176 countries in its Global Perception Index in 2016. In the previous year, 
Libya was ranked 161th out of a possible 167. This demonstrates that there has been no 
marked improvement in the corruption score, and weak mechanisms of anti-ML in Libya, 
means there are still illegal actions taking place and generating illicit money which will 
ultimately need laundering.     
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9.2-The evaluation of Anti- Money Laundering regimes 
There are arguments that the Libyan CMLA (2005) may not be effective because it 
addresses the wrong area by not targeting the feeder activities to ML. However, the 
researcher begs to differ because there is sufficient legislation to criminalize ML 
predicated offenses; and this study has confirmed that the CMLA (2005) has criminalized 
all the behaviours stated in international conventions such as the Vienna Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs (1988), and the UN Convention 
on Transnational Organised Crimes in Palermo (2000) (As discussed in Chapter 4). Libya 
took the steps towards complying with the FATF recommendations, thus, the 
criminalization of ML under the Libya CMLA (2005). There has been international 
criminalisation of the crime of corruption, which this study has identified as the main 
predicate offense to the crime of ML in Libya. Libya has availed itself the 
recommendations of FATF, through creating the FIU, which has authority over this, 
however, Libya has not met full international AML principles. Although, Libya seems to 
be concentrating its fight against this crime through the financial sector by obliging the 
banks to collect their customers’ details and reporting on any suspicious transactions, this 
study has found a weakness in this area, which is a lack of clarity about the information 
that should be collected and kept by the banks about their customers and to which they 
should be able to refer when needed, as this study has clarified (see Chapter 7, Section 
7.2.5.4). 
Additionally, this study has suggested that the mechanisms for international co-operation 
are very weak. In spite of international co-operation being a very important way of 
recovering the illegal money, as this study has explained, in the case of Libya, the money 
launderers of money have frequently used smuggling oil or illegal selling overseas to 
facilitate the process of placing tainted money into the mainstream financial system and 
to get it sent out of the country as legitimate. In some cases, this led to the freezing of 
millions of the plundered money in the foreign banks. Thus, to curb the crime the 
International community is enjoined to work together in formulating a framework to 
facilitate the repatriation of plundered wealth and thus reverse some of the damage 
inflicted on societies by corrupt politicians or officials. 
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 This research has also suggested that Mutual Legal Assistance is critical for prosecution 
and deterrence to the corrupt practices involved in smuggling oil, and a variety of 
instruments need to be developed to be able to prosecute perpetrators and deter corrupt 
practices. Libya will benefit from co-operation and mutual legal assistance in tracing the 
trail of looted funds, the recovery its assets and the repatriation of stolen funds. Libya 
needs effective co-operation with the countries involved and must reform the CMLA 
(2005) to give the FIU powers to exchange the information with its counterparts.   
Due to ignoring some important principles, the FIU has neither complied fully with the 
procedures of reporting nor with the procedures of CDD. Additionally, this Unit has not 
had the power to deal with counterparts in other countries in operations related to ML. 
These aspects are included in the international conventions and the FATF 
recommendations, such as the CDD rules. There is also a lack of any proper monitoring 
of the system specifically in the selling of oil, (See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.5.4); additionally, 
there is no specific law to prevent exit and entry of vehicles that have additional fuel tanks 
or carry the illicit fuel in tanks specific to that purpose. Also, the FIU has not complied 
with paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the implementing regulations of the 2005 Act, by failing 
to create a database about the details of suspicious operations (See Chapter 7, Section 
7.2.4.2). Additionally, the Libyan legislator has not properly regulated the transfers of 
funds; for example, there is no limitation on the maximum amount of funds that may be 
brought into Libya; moreover, anyone can transfer more than a hundred thousand DYL in 
a single transaction. Thus, multiple money transfers that may have been made without 
any control are helping to facilitate ML crime (See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.8). 
The other weak point in AML is that the Libyan Central Bank has only been granted 
powers to freeze suspicious funds for one month (See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.11). This 
time limit is a weak point in AML strategy that can result in time possibly running out 
before the case is forwarded to court. A further weak point is related to the investigative 
powers of the FIU in suspicious operation, as (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.4.3) has identified. 
This negatively affects investigations where related bodies detect the suspect operations. 
Electronic technology has been not sufficiently developed; and this technology is 
required to assist the country in developing the infrastructure of its financial system and 
to foster the banks’ ability to track financial operations, as it helps to detect suspicious 
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transactions and protect the financial system from misuse. The results of this study 
suggest that the Libyan legislation relating to financial offences needs to be reformed and 
areas of weakness need to be addressed. In particular, some of the banks have failed to 
apply CDD principles, because they allow copies of identification documents to be 
provided by the customer when important client details relevant to financial operations 
were required, rather than taking the information directly from the original documents 
(See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.5.2). 
Furthermore, the Libyan government encouraged the public to use cash by producing 
denominations of coins and notes, which were issued and the output of cash increased. 
At the same time, the financial institutions did not create a system to control the 
movement of money and observe the deposits by clients into the banks (See Chapter 7, 
Section 7.2.8). The other point that reflects the inadequate knowledge of the authorities 
that work against the ML crime is their ignorance of the provision of testing devices which 
facilitate the detection of this crime and the procedures for the investigation and 
collection of information about ML operations by banks (See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.9). 
Thus, the procedures for AML in Libya adopted by the CMLA 2005 are very weak, 
whereas, the mechanisms which are used in the UK could be adequate to curb this crime. 
Thus, in this case, measures can be taken to fill the gaps and address the inadequacies, 
as the recommendations below suggest. The study has noted, that the most viable and 
effective ways for the UK to improve the mechanisms used against ML are to remain 
aware, track the evolving threats, practices, and technology used for ML, while Libyan 
institutions seem to most need to adopting these policies to deal with the strong 
challenges of corruption. 
Additionally, the procedures of AML in Libya adopted by the CMLA 2005 are very weak 
regarding the mechanisms of reporting on ML operations. There is a need to improve the 
rules that prevent money laundering through reforming the Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) and focusing on some guiding principles such as implementing procedures for risks 
that have been identified in the risk assessment, and criminalising the failure to report on 
suspicious ML operations; also to include the Criminal Finances Act (2017) that introduces 
criminalising the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion; and to fill the gaps and 
address the inadequacies (as this study has clarified in Chapter 5 section 2.1). 
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The (KYC) Know Your Client directive is a principle that should be adopted by all Libyan 
financial institutions; as it requires keeping details of customers; calls for identifying 
clients and ascertaining relevant information about the client pertinent to their dealing 
with the financial institutions, including names, contacts and address  details, proof of 
address, source of income and a lot more; as stipulated by the Criminal Finances Act 
(2017). (CDD) Customer Due Diligence is one of the principles to be adhered to by 
financial institutions; and it requires them to go beyond the details of the KYC to 
investigate their client or customers to ascertain the veracity of the details of clients in 
their dealings with banks; and includes a continuous monitoring of the customers’ 
contact with the institution. 
The (PEP) Politically Exposed Persons principle enables financial institutions to follow 
closely the dealings of political figures from other countries with the banks. This process 
allows the financial institutions to track former political figures who have recently been 
in government in an Executive, Judiciary or Legislative position or served as an executive 
within the Departments etc; as these political figures pose a potential risk to regulated 
institutions. This has been stipulated in the Criminal Finances Act (2017). 
Additionally, the Preventive Measures that have been taken by the UK against this crime 
such as controlling money movement in the UK by adopting the ML Regulations (2003), 
which obliged financial institutions to request their customers to disclose the sources of 
their financial operations and the procedures that should be followed in reporting 
operations suspected of ML (as this study has identified in Chapter 5, section 7). So, all 
these procedures would be useful if adopted by Libyan financial institutions to improve 
the mechanisms used against ML to fill the gaps and address the inadequacies. 
The study’s questions and objectives raised in the introduction of this study find their 
answers within the context of the research findings such that the analysis thereof 
provides a logical background to the evaluation of ML in Libya. In the final analysis, the 
aim of this study is to evaluate ML Regulations in Libya, to discover whether ML legislation 
is a sufficient or not. This study has analysed the UK's ML legislation and the international 
rules relating to ML, and suggests that the importance of the global AML framework in 
the fight against ML and its predicate crimes cannot be underestimated. This view is 
inspired by the previous lack of a methodical knowledge of contemporary Libyan ML and 
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its countermeasures that are now offered in this thesis through an examination of Libya's 
special circumstances and the legislation which followed the implementation of AML. This 
study has found that the Libyan CMLA (2005) adopted by Libya is insufficient to prevent 
this crime and needs to be changed, as this study has discovered and explained. 
This study has noted that Libya is a member of the FATF for the Middle East and North 
Africa. There is the need to provide specific knowledge for the staff who work to curb this 
crime, furthermore, it is necessary for the public to know generally what this ML crime is, 
how it happens, its effect on their lives, its menace and how to curb or eliminate this 
crime. 
9.3-Contribution 
Additionally, this study clarifies the international standards and principles and controls to 
prevent ML crime, which has recently increased, and explains how Libya is not fully 
compliant with them. The research has revealed how Libya’s use of weak mechanisms 
against this crime has led to an increase in the phenomenon, particularly in relation to 
illegal sales of oil. Additionally, this study has also clarified the importance of training, 
which will assist in developing and improving the efficiency of staff who work against ML 
crime. Therefore, this research contributes to knowledge by clearly identifying the weak 
areas in AML, thus providing the competent authorities in Libya with an understanding of 
the adjustments required for the CMLA (2005) to be enough to prevent this crime (see 
Chapter 7); in addition to the recommendations that will be in this chapter. 
This study has also contributed through revealing how Libyan legislation relating to 
financial offences needs to be reformed, to deprive criminals of these illegal proceeds, 
and return the money that was stolen to the Libyan people. This study has provided the 
competent authorities in Libya with an understanding of the adjustments required for 
the CMLA (2005). These amendments would include clarification of the AML mechanism, 
such as the application of the CDD principles and the procedures for reporting suspicious 
transactions, and thus address the areas of weakness. Employees need to be monitored 
and trained to give them the opportunity to understand and deal with activities that are 
linked to ML operations. Libya should review and adopt laws that are suited its local 
context, and any changes the legislation requires that conform to the rules and 
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mechanisms used by the UK in these areas, which will be not inconsistent with the 
principles contained in Shari'ah, as discussed in this thesis. 
9.4- Conclusion. 
Countries should co-operate by participating in international AML initiatives, rather than 
acting alone on important issues to achieve national interests. They need to do more than 
just adopt regulatory regimes but go further in adapting their regulatory environment to 
accept international AML measures, as this study will recommend later. This could be 
achieved through the adoption of UN model treaties, because they have established a 
wide range of useful principles, codes of conduct and transactional practice rules. The 
FATF recommendations need to be adopted as they form the various dimensions of 
global AML and provide the general framework.  The transposing of this range of rules 
into the national legal system needs to be done with some urgency. While Libya has 
ratified international treaties, such as the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs (1988), and the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crimes in Palermo (2000), it’s clear that Libya has failed to adopt the FATF 
recommendations. However, the international measures of AML are difficult to 
implement across the board, unless they are enforced through robust local institutions, 
and, at the same time, co-operation with global counterparts must be in existence and 
active. Thus, in the case of Libya, this study has outlined that the prevailing precarious 
political, economic and social climate in that country today should be not overlooked. 
Important steps such as the adoption of a constitution, reform of institutions and 
development of the authorities’ jurisdictions to ensure the rule of law must be in place 
order to finally fill the gaps and address the weaknesses inherent in the current AML 
framework, as this study will be recommending in the next section. Thus, addressing 
these problems to the extent demanded to create viable solutions could be achieved by 
filling the gaps mentioned in last chapters by the legal transplants; and this would 
demand that challenges be continually pursued, which will almost certainly require 
changes in legislation and the support of financial institutions by the financial experts and 
training programmes. 
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9.5-Recommendations 
It is equally apparent that the existing regulations have problems with enforcement and 
in dealing with the institutions that fight this serious crime, such as the foreign FIUs. This 
study therefore makes several recommendations that it would be of great help and 
contribute to Libya having sufficient regulations with which to affect a reduction of this 
crime:  
9.5.1- First Recommendation 
 
Important procedures need to be taken to change the CMLA (2005) by taking anti-money 
laundering rules, which have been adopted in the UK using the legal transplants as 
follows: 
5.1.1- The relevant legislation should be changed to be included positive procedures 
related to the principle of ‘Know Your Client’ (KYC) and risk assessment that are applying 
the UK by using the legal transplants. 
5.1.2- The power to request full independent financial disclosure should be given to the 
Libyan FIU - as it is using in the UK- So that it is able to work independently in exchanging 
information with its counterparts, which can result in adequate co-operation and thus 
effective tracking of money that has been laundered. 
5.1.3- the CMLA (2005) has not fully included the guidelines on the necessary measures 
to implement CDD, and thus not clearly identified the information that should be 
collected about customers or ensured the existence of an effective system for collation 
of data and record keeping (as this study has clarified in Chapter 7). This must be rectified. 
5.1.4- Training programmes should be provided according to the requirements of 
international AML. Training programmes should be developed to give staff the skills to 
deal more effectively with the different types of risks associated with ML.  The result will 
be to build staff expertise; and it is important that given this revised Act, employees are 
able to carry out effective operation of AML.  
5.1.5- An Assets Recovery Agency for recovering the proceeds related to ML transactions 
should be created in Libya to control these illegal proceeds. 
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5.1.6- The Libyan CMLA (2005) should be amended to clarify on how to deal with PEPs 
and identify them and how to assess risk to determine whether this potential customer 
(whether as a customer or beneficial owner) is a PEP or not, according to the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2017 (as this study has clarified in Chapter 5 section 7.2). 
Furthermore, the Libyan Act (2005) needs to be revised to include a specific limit time in 
which to provide the information to the FIU when it is required, to ensure timely provision 
of evidence and so that criminals will not have time to hide suspicious proceeds, as this 
study has discovered in Chapter 7. 
5.1.7- The Libyan CMLA (2005) should be amended to clarify information that should be 
collected on banks’ clients and their businesses; stipulating the details about the 
customer’s identity, the firm’s business relationships and data about the deals which 
should be recorded and available as source of information for investigation by the 
competent authorities if required. 
9.5.2- The Second Recommendation 
Libya needs to take important measures that could be helped to curb ML crime as follows: 
5.2.1- There is a need to establish effective control over the sale of fuel, especially in 
border areas. 
5.2.2- Exports of crude from the oil ports should be monitored to control the quantities 
of oil leaving the country. 
5.2.3- Modification or increases in fuel prices should be made to match the fuel prices in 
the neighbouring counties in order to remove incentives for oil smuggling. 
5.2.4- Borders with the neighbouring countries should be monitored for the purpose of 
preventing the smuggling of oil and fuel. 
5.2.5- The law on Libyan employees’ salaries that has been operating since 1981 adopts 
the principle of equal salaries for equal work for all Libyan workers. Since its inception 
this law has remained the same and needs to be updated if it is to be appropriate to 
ensure that it enables workers to meet their basic needs. These measures could help in 
the prevention of ML. 
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5.2.6- Libyan foreign investment involves huge capital sums without overseas control; 
thus, this important investment should be monitored in order to control its revenues. 
5.2.7- Statistics about the information and reports on ML operation should be compiled 
and published. This will assist in raising awareness about ML crime. 
5.2.8- Libya should adopt necessary measures, including legislative ones to enable their 
competent authorities to confiscate laundered property, proceeds from or 
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of any ML offence. Such 
measures should include carrying out provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing 
assets, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such property for a long enough 
time to ensure the suspicious proceeds are not smuggled out, and to take any appropriate 
investigative measures. 
5.2.9- Financial institutions should take reasonable measures to obtain information about 
the true identity of the persons on whose behalf an account is opened or a transaction 
conducted; if there are any doubts as to whether these clients or customers are acting 
on their own behalf. 
5.2.10- It is also necessary that the competent authorities ensure the effective application 
of the all systems used against ML operations. 
5.2.11- There needs to be a campaign to raise public awareness of ML in terms of what it 
means for their lives and for the country, and how it can be curbed or eliminated. 
5.2.12- To increase collaboration with counterparts in other countries; to expand 
operations on the borders of the country and to arrest and prosecute criminals, thus also 
serving as a deterrent to others. 
5.2.13-During implementing the transitional justice, Libya as a country are undergoing 
transitions and they should use legal transplants against the economic crimes and 
address the violations anterior, punish the corruptors and develop measures to deter 
future violations. 
9.6-Further Research 
Given that good research should open doors for future research, this study may serve as 
a springboard for other research related to ML. 
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Generally, the study has discovered that Libya is susceptible to an intensified form of ML 
due to existing regulations, and there is a need for their amendment and proper 
enforcement. The CMLA 2005 is a sound basis for AML in Libya and when fully amended 
and implemented will serve a very good purpose. 
Given these features of the CMLA (2005) and the role of FATF in conducting periodic 
compliance assessment of member nations, it would be prudent that a further study is 
conducted into the extent of Libya’s compliance with AML policy, to evaluate it in the 
light of the FATF recommendations. This should be carried out particularly in the areas of 
reporting, data collation and investigation as part of a global effort to combat ML 
worldwide, the financing of terrorism and the control of monetary transfers in the 
financial sectors. 
It is clear that more research and development are desired in these areas, and that Libya’s 
financial and legal organisations may need an especially unique approach to optimise 
AML and implement account-freezing policies to fight corruption and related crimes. 
9.8- The implications of this research 
The main implications of this research are that it adds to the stock of knowledge on 
organisational practice by giving a perspective and understanding of the concept of ML, 
specifically on the negative implications of its prevalence, such as its destabilizing effect 
on the economic system and negative impact on social, political and legal aspects of life, 
such as corruption. The research has discovered that the CMLA (2005) adopted in Libya 
is sufficient to prevent this crime if properly amended. Such amendments could be taken 
from UK AML legislation and these changes need not be inconsistent with the principles 
contained in Shari'ah. These legal reforms should take place to bring regulations into 
conformity with Libya's obligations under international law. This study has highlighted 
that this needs to be implemented under transitional justice. 
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Appendix A:  The Historical Development of Anti- Money 
Laundering legislations in UK 
 
In its ML legislation, the UK attempted to address ML early on - even before the 
international community started to express concern about this issue. The UK had issued 
the Misuse of Drugs Act in 1971, but this law could not effectively address the 
development of ML means.  
Before the Banking Act was issued in 1979, there were no regulations applied to the 
financial sector in the UK; and only the Bank of England had legal power, which it never 
used, to regulate the banking sector.765At the same time, the London Stock Exchange, 
Lloyd’s of London and the commodities exchanges were based on the consent of market 
participants to perform their transactions, while some financial services sectors were 
working under legal provisions such as the securities dealers who were not members of 
the stock exchange, insurance companies and friendly societies.766Thus, based on the 
recommendation of the Hodgson767 Committee, the UK passed the Drug Trafficking 
Offence Act in 1986, which stipulated measures for the confiscation of illegal gains and 
criminalised ML768. This was followed by the drug-related AML provisions linked with the 
Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic (1988). 
The UK had begun to deal with the crime of ML during the 1980s; but did not recognise 
ML as an independent crime, as it was linked to other crimes and addressed under the 
Theft Act of 1968769 Mugarura notes: ‘‘The concept of ML in the UK can also be traced 
back to the House Lords’ decision in R v. Cuthbertson (1980). This decision revealed the 
failure of forfeiture laws to deprive the offender of the proceeds of crime''770; and he 
added that the reason for the failure of the forfeiture laws is that the powers of the court 
limited forfeiture of assets to tangible property and they could not be applied in the case 
of cheques or other intangibles.771 This situation arose in cases of defendants who 
                                                          
765 Pieth and Aiolfi ibid (p. 266). 
766 Ibid. 
767 Who was commissioned by the Conservative government 1986 as to how it could tackle the problems associated 
with confiscating the proceeds of crime. 
768Dorn,N. et al. Dug Market and Law Enforcement Routledge, London (2002, p.176). 
769Mugarura,N . (2016) The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed Countries 
Routledge, New York USA (p.2). 
770 Mugarura,N Ibid (2016 p.2). 
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confessed to charges of crimes of laundering over £750,000 some of which was 
transferred to overseas banks, when the court ordered forfeiture of assets.772This led to 
the adoption of the Drug Control Act (1986), which includes provisions for expanding the 
forfeiture procedures for illegal proceeds. 
The UK Attempted to address the ML crime by adopting the Criminal Justice Act (1988), 
criminalizing some of the patterns of behaviour considered as financial crimes by Article 
93 A which stipulates: “Assisting another to retain the benefit of criminal conduct” adding 
in 94 B: “Acquisition, possession or use of proceeds of criminal conduct” and 93 C: 
“Concealing or transferring proceeds of criminal conduct.”773Thus, this Act adopted rules 
against ML crime which coincided with the Vienna Convention against Illicit Drug 
Trafficking (1988) and it was issued earlier than the first EU directive of AML. It is argued 
here that this Act involves effective rules to curb key behaviour in ML; and as Brindle 
points out, this Act includes the proceeds of any crimes, which were criminalised by the 
Theft Acts (1968 and 1978), i.e. crimes of conspiracy, forgery or counterfeiting including 
the proceeds of non-financial crime774. The UK also issued specific ML Regulations in 
1993775. These regulations included principles that mandate banking procedures to assist 
in detecting financial crimes; and were improved in 1997 by created the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA) (2000), due to the development of the financial markets. 
Thus, the UK attempted to address this crime in 2010, by adopting the Bribery Act which 
repealed all previous UK corruption regulations which were inconsistent, anachronistic, 
and inadequate. The Bribery Act (2010) includes the criminalisation of the bribery of 
foreign public officials; and a person is guilty of an offence if their intention is to influence 
someone in order to obtain or retain business, or gain an advantage in the conduct of 
business...776 
Prior to this, the US had criminalized bribery by adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977; this law considered the behaviour of the persons and entities in making 
payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.  The 
                                                          
772 Ibid (2016 p.3). 
773Sections 93A, 93B, 93C of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
774 Ibid (1999 p.5). 
775Money Laundering Regulations (1993) Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1993/1933/contents/made 
(Accessed in 17/04/2015). 
776Section 1 UK Bribery Act 2010. 
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target of this law was to limit international corruption and to create a level playing field 
for ethical businesses. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was the predominant 
force in setting compliance standards for international businesses777 
So, according to this section, the Act seems to have a near-global jurisdiction as it enables 
prosecution of any person who commits any illegal action mentioned, wherever the 
offence was committed if it is linked to the UK. Furthermore, this Act is targeted against 
those taking advantage of the financial rewards of corruption, which may be laundered 
to disguise the origin; so, the Bribery Act might be had the same target of the AML 
legislations. In 1997, the UK government found that, as a result of the development of 
the financial markets, the regulatory framework was unclear and had become 
increasingly outdated with reference to the business activity of different financial 
institutions and thus needed reform to enhance confidence and protect the financial 
institutions from misuse. This led to the establishment of the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), in 2000 by the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) (FSMA)778. Whilst all these 
regulations were being issued by the UK in an attempt to prevent ML, the POCA was 
enacted in 2002. This updated and expanded all earlier AML legislation as this study will 
discuss below. 
The (FATF) has obliged member countries to adopt within their AML regulations 
principles to criminalize this activity and to adopt countermeasures of financial 
punishment against those that do not take any steps to establish AML policies779. As this 
study, has already stated, the UK is allowed to investigate suspicions of ML, thus issues 
of bank secrecy do not impede this. However, the international law office780 reported 
that in the UK, the banks should report any process that involves ML crime, so the banks 
should have reasonable suspicions of this before making any report and should not make 
a report unless they suspect the activity is related to crime. This will assist law 
                                                          
777 Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business. Crime, Law 
and Social Change. ISSN 0925-4994 (2017) available at 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/70211/5/Business%20Unusual.pdfAccessed in 17/02/2017. 
778See Pieth, M and Aiolfi, G ibid (2004 p.267). 
779 The FATF recommendations 21& 22 (2012). 
780International law office, (2008) US and UK Anti-money laundering requirements compared Available at 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=5e143642-6dd9-4b32-8d4e-cab33d724eea 
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enforcement access to information on the suspicious operations, which in turn makes it 
easier for them to assess the need to interfere with or stop the operations. 
The UK has been claimed to gain profits from ‘black money’781through its protectorates 
such as the Isle of Man. This island is a self-governing British Crown Dependency with its 
own parliament and it is a financial centre, where, due to its relatively low levels of 
income taxation was claimed as a ‘tax haven’ and was the favoured location for thousands 
of ‘shell’ companies set up by Mossack Fonseca’’782; as the control of ML there is weak783. 
The Isle of Man applies international standards to the highest level and it has no bank 
secrecy laws784 ; in spite of this: “the U.K. is an important enabler of corruption: It has 
stood by as its offshore jurisdictions and protectorates operate as safe havens for illicit 
wealth, which the Panama Papers make clear. The British Virgin Islands, for example, 
were the favoured location for thousands of shell companies set up by Mossack 
Fonseca’’785, as here too the control of ML is weak786.  Furthermore, Talani and et al have 
confirmed that the Bailiwick of Guernsey and Jersey also benefit from the political 
stability that the UK provides to them as dependencies of the British Crown, as they are 
all autonomous with regard to taxation and other domestic issues and also the are part 
of the European Union customs territory, but not subject to other EU rules787. 
The UK is looking to work closely with two British Crown Protectorates - the Isle of Man 
and Jersey that serve as tax havens- on previously undeclared UK tax liability for accounts 
the Isle of Man may have and to make a Foreign Account Tax Compliance agreement with 
Jersey.  Similarly, most British colonies are involved in ML by the legitimization of cash 
                                                          
781 Garside, J. et al. Mossack Fonseca: inside the firm that helps the super-rich hide their money 2016 Available at 
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782 Grimwood, G. (2016) After the international anti-corruption summit in May 2016: what next? the House of 
Commons Library Briefing Paper Number 7580, (p.38). 
783 See the report of the National Audit Office study team. Managing risk in the Overseas Territories Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (2007 p20) Available at: www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/07-08/07084.pdf 
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784 See the Memorandum from Isle of Man Government January (2009 p.3) Available at: 
https://www.gov.im/media/623363/treasurycommitteeiomwrittenevidencej.pdf (Accessed in 23/05/2017). 
785 Kaufmann, D and Gillies, A. From Panama to London: Legal and illegal corruption require action at the UK anti-
corruption summit, 9 May 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/05/09/ (Accessed in 
11/7/2017). 
786 See the report of the National Audit Office study team. ibid 
787 Talani, A. et al. (2013) Dirty Cities: Towards a Political Economy of the Underground in Global Cities Springer. 
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generated from smuggled illegitimate goods788 .  Thus, the UK is one of the countries that 
act as a passageway for a large amount of laundered money; and further that the ‘‘United 
Kingdom has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to why there are not stringent 
measures on its protectorates’’789. 
In Libya, tax evasion has spread due to the weakness of the Libyan Tax Legislation. The 
State of Libya was unable to fight the crime of tax evasion and prevent their risks, in the 
absence of policies and the clear strategies to resist it. which generated other crimes that 
have precipitated the serious economic crises that have threatened political stability790. 
The UK has suffered from ML crime, which has affected the political economic and social 
aspects of the country; and the cost of this crime was estimated at approximately £24 
billion in 2013791. This increased in 2015 according to the NCA which assesses that many 
hundreds of billions of pounds of international criminal money is laundered through UK 
banks, including their subsidiaries, each year792. Thus, compliance with the international 
convention's standards through the monitoring and prevention of suspicious banking 
operations as well as controlling the smuggling, illegal traders and the confiscation of 
their illicit proceeds, deprive criminals of such these proceeds. The spread of this crime 
may thus be limited through adopting and effectively implementing AML legislation. 
The UK International cooperation again the money laundering. 
Mutual legal assistance means that the nation is able to provide assistance to other 
countries in collecting information; and can transfer evidence from a judicial authority at 
the request of another country. Mutual assistance in criminal matters is one the 
principles of international judicial cooperation; and was involved in some international 
conventions, such as the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters that was 
adopted by the EU Council of Ministers in 2000. This convention was ratified by the UK, 
                                                          
788 Durden, T. HSBC Bank: Secret Origins to Laundering the World's Drug Money (2015) Available at: 
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Research Journal of scientific jurisprudence issued by the Faculty of Law University of Maserati 134 (2013). 
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who has also adopted the UN Convention against Corruption (2003) and the 
Commonwealth Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters793. 
In line with this principle, the POCA allows the public prosecution to exchange reports, 
information and transfer evidence on suspicious transactions linked with ML operations 
with its counterparts in other countries. Paragraph (1) of Article (74) of the POCA (2002) 
‘Enforcement Abroad’, stipulates that: “(1) this section applies if: .... (b)the prosecutor or 
the Director believes that realisable property is situated in a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom (the receiving country), and (c)the prosecutor or the Director (as the 
case may be) sends a request for assistance to the Secretary of State with a view to it 
being forwarded under this section.794 So in this context, the UK is allowed to provide 
legal assistance in criminal matters whether this is bilateral or not, i.e. whether 
international conventions were concluded with the other countries involved. However, it 
must implement assistance in the restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime if a 
bilateral agreement or other international agreement exists and in which this kind of 
assistance is stipulated795. 
In 2006, the UK issued the fourth edition of the Mutual Legal Assistance Guidelines which 
was published by the UK central authority, the Home Office. These guidelines outline 
details of the assistance that can be provided, the procedures to follow when requesting 
assistance and the explanation of the role of the central authorities in applying these 
requests796. Although HM Treasury has considered that Mutual Legal Assistance 
constitutes a difficult system; it has accepted that it is an important mechanism for the 
recovery of UK criminal funds laundered in other countries and the implementation the 
confiscation orders. Mutual Legal Assistance by prosecutors and investigators in the 
relevant legal systems to recover criminal proceeds is difficult, because orders can be 
issued by different agencies797.The aim of Mutual Legal Assistance is to collect data, 
evidence and documents which are relevant to the crime and that assist the investigation 
                                                          
793Raphael, M. ibid (2011 p.568). 
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795Raphael, M Ibid (p.568). 
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and prosecution of criminal cases, which usually takes the form of measures such as the 
ability to summon witnesses and issue search warrants798. 
Globalisation has provided, to some extent, a safe environment for this kind of crime due 
to its often-taking place across borders (see Chapter 3). This has resulted in countries 
addressing this problem through obtaining power of effective prosecution by facilitating 
international cooperation in this area. However, it seems a problem has arisen with this 
strategy, which is that the principle of sovereignty has impeded the operation of this 
cooperation and the consequent power to issue search warrants, enforce them, collect 
the data and summon witnesses799. 
Furthermore, there is no obligation on the state requested to provide the information; 
however, the ‘requesting state’ needs the power to enforce its demands; and on the part 
of the ‘requested state’ the action under investigation needs to have been criminalised. 
Administrative assistance also includes actions such as obtaining public records from the 
land registry or documents relating to the registration of companies, as well as contacting 
potential witnesses to know whether they agree to be witnesses in compliance with the 
demands of the requesting state800. Thus, international cooperation in the area of AML 
could be viewed as an important option in fighting this crime in countries which have not 
built the legal foundations against financial crimes within their legislations framework or 
that have weak legislation for tracking illegal proceeds smuggled across their borders for 
the purpose of laundering.   
The other problem is that some countries are not authorised to cooperate in all the 
aspect of criminal investigation. For instance, the UK will not co-operate in the case of 
asset recovery, unless there is evidence confirming that the illegal assets “are located in 
the country”801.Thus the implementation of requests for legal assistance could be faced 
with complex procedural steps, which make it too difficult to apply. One such is non-co-
operation based on the 'principle of reciprocity' or the precondition to use this 
information only for the purpose for which it was requested. This can also occur where 
                                                          
798 Chene, M. Mutual legal assistance treaties and money laundering U4 Helpdesk Transparency International (2008 
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799Chene, ibid (2008 p.2). 
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there is no specific authority that has responsibility to apply the ML law802. Another factor 
that could be the cause of delay in implementing a request for legal assistance is that 
some countries allow the individual concened to appeal against the exchange of personal 
details with the requesting country. Political factors thus have a significant effect on those 
who deal with cases of international cooperation in the area of sharing details of ML 
operations. The significance of international cooperation was confirmed by Qatar’s 
Attorney General; he added that currently there is no co-operation from the Arabic Spring 
countries with regards to countries working together to recover looted money803, which 
has made the tracking of the illegal proceeds of Libyan oil that hidden in different 
locations across the world, including the UK, more difficult and time-consuming to 
recover.       
However, the UK does not require a bilateral agreement to respond to a request for legal 
assistance; as it can provide other countries with the information and evidence needed 
to track an offence initiated overseas, whereas bilateral or international agreements are 
needed if the request is related to restraint and the confiscation of illegal proceeds804. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
802 Ibid. 
803 See the BELLA HADOD Program on the Al Jazeera channel 19/3/2016 Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/withoutbounds/2016/3/19 (Accessed in 29/3/2016). 
804 Pieth, M and Aiolfi, G. Ibid (2004 p. 306). 
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Appendix B: The interview transcripts and the 
contribution of the Participant. 
First: Decision Makers at the Central Bank of Libya:  
This interview is to contribute by determining whether the Libyan legal regime is 
effective in combatting money laundering, particularly in relation to illegal sales of oil. 
And the scale of money laundering crime from the illegal sale of oil in Libya. The 
proposed questions: 
1. What is your opinion on the current effectiveness of the Money Laundering Act 2005 
particularly regard to in illegal sales of oil? 
The answer was “there has been no clarification on how to prepare and submit reports 
on suspicious operations”. And “the weakness in the AML mechanism was in the 
reporting, because reports are submitted only from the bank sector and not from other 
sectors, such as precious metal traders and lawyers’’. 
2. Do you think it would benefit from reform? Do you have any suggestions? 
The answer was ‘‘tax should be linked to the income of the sellers and certain 
professionals; and that will help to know their real incomes’’.  
3- In your opinion what is the scale of money laundering crime from the illegal sale of oil 
in Libya? What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? 
The answer was there were not many cases of ML crime through the illegal selling of oil 
that had been registered: ‘’...oil smuggling did take place one time through a vessel that 
shipped oil from the port of Zuwara and headed to Malta, where it sold the shipment to 
another vessel in 2015’’. 
Second: Decision Makers at the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering 
at the Libyan Central Bank,   
This interview is to contribute by determine whether the Libyan legal regime is sufficient 
to combat money laundering, particularly in relation to illegal sales of oil. And the impact 
of international law and agreements on anti-money laundering in Libya in illegal sale of 
oil in Libya. The proposed questions: 
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1. Are there any problems with the enforcement of the Money Laundering Act against 
the illegal sale of oil in Libya? (If yes) What, in your opinion, are these problems? How 
might they be addressed? 
The answer was even though Libya issued several regulations against financial crimes, 
rapid global developments in technology meant the regulations were becoming 
powerless to prevent corruption and ML crimes. Thus, answered questions on the 
criminalisation of ML saying: “In order to be able to deal with international financial 
institutions, Libya should be obligated to include the international standards relating to 
ML in their regulations’’. 
The problem is that of using liquid cash. ‘’There has been widespread use of liquid cash 
as a means of ML in cash operations, as they involve a higher risk, and work to reduce 
dependence on liquid cash so as to reduce the risk of dealing with it’’. And could be 
addressed by “the movement of money should be limited by imposing a maximum 
amount’’. 
2. And what is the impact of international law and agreements on anti-money 
laundering in Libya in illegal sale of oil in Libya? 
The answer was although Libyan AML regulations have included some of the 
international rules, through adopting the international Conventions mentioned above; 
Libya has a weak commitment to the Task Force on Financial Action standards. ‘‘the 
proportion of Libya's commitment to the recommendations of the task force financial 
action is quite low’’.   
3. In your opinion, do you think the system that is used to control the banking 
institutions have been successful in detecting suspicious operations and the movement 
of money? (If No) What is the weak area? 
The answer was that the multiple money transfers that may have been made without 
any control are helping to facilitate ML crime. This encourages the smuggling of funds 
and is a primary crime of ML, ‘‘the weak area is that people are allowed to transfer 
money to any value, no matter how high, because the prevailing culture in the 
community is to deal with money as ‘cash’. 
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And the problem is that of using liquid cash. There has been widespread use of liquid 
cash as a means of ML in cash operations, as they involve a higher risk, and work to 
reduce dependence on liquid cash so as to reduce the risk of dealing with it. 
Third: Financial Information Unit at the Central Libyan Bank: 
This interview is to contribute by determine the scale of the problem and the FIU’s 
initiatives in combating this phenomenon. They will also help understand the 
cooperation level of Libyan authorities with their international counterparts, especially 
the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority. The purpose of this interview is to 
understand the structure and paradigms of money laundering prevention measures. The 
proposed questions: 
1. What is your opinion on the current effectiveness of the Money Laundering Act 2005 
particularly regard to in illegal sales of oil? 
The Money Laundering Act 2005 is not enough due to there “no database has been 
created since the Unit was established”. 
2. What are the mechanisms used against money laundering particularly from the 
illegal sale of oil in Libya? 
The answer was “that the Unit has requested any information from non-banking entities 
for analysis”. And there is “no database has been created since the Unit was established”. 
Although, Libya has attempt to prevent ML crime by adopting the laws that work against 
the primary crime of ML; these laws arguably have weaknesses, ‘’there are no special 
rules and mechanisms to combat ML through the selling of oil, whereas all proceeds of 
oil sales made through the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
are given to the Central Bank from the Libyan bank Arabs Abroad’’. 
3. Are there any problems with the enforcement of the Money Laundering Act against 
the illegal sale of oil in Libya? (If yes) What, in your opinion, are these problems? How 
might they be addressed? 
The answer was that “The Public Prosecutor’s employees do not have sufficient 
knowledge to make distinctions between ML and smuggling, and were confused as to 
how their role and that of the Unit differed’’. 
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4. In your opinion what is the scale of money laundering crime from the illegal sale of oil 
in Libya? What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? 
The answer was ‘’there are no statistics issued by the Unit; no publication of information 
and no reports on ML operations have been issued by the FIU.   Similarly, there is evidence 
of the weakness of the procedures resulting in a lack of relevant statistics being available 
for court cases’’. And ‘’...there was an attempt to smuggle oil through the gateway that 
was stopped in international seas in 2014,’’. 
5- Is there any regional or international co-operation in the enforcement of the money 
laundering Act?  If yes, what kind of co-operation and what does it involve? 
The answer was “This Unit does not have fully independent operations; also, there are no 
mechanisms with which to exchange information with the other, counterpart Units’’ 
Fourth: The Manager of Legal Affairs at the Central Bank:   
The interview contribute of this interview is to help understand the legal framework and 
accompanying restrictions that have been designed to stop money laundering, 
especially funds generated by illegal oil selling. Further, to explore the legal system of 
confiscation for keeping the money in the country to be used for the right purposes. In 
addition, to determine whether the Libyan legal regime is sufficient to combat money 
laundering, particularly in relation to illegal sales of oil. The proposed questions: 
1- What is the impact of international law and agreements on anti-money laundering 
in Libya? 
The answer was “the deal with the international institution banks is conditioned by an 
obligation to follow the international standards relating to ML’’. 
2. What is your opinion on the current state of the anti-money laundering Act and the 
mechanisms used against money laundering especially from the illegal sale of oil in 
Libya? Is the Act clear and consistent? (If no). 
The answer was the weak the mechanisms used against money laundering, “copies of 
identification documents from the customer are accepted by some of the bank staff 
without having seen the originals of thee documents'' ; and he added: ‘’there are also 
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practices of recording the personal details from some clients who submit their names in 
different ways like hiding their surnames, for example, or their middle names''. 
3. In your opinion, do you think the system that is used to control the banking 
institutions has been successful in detecting suspicious operations and the movement 
of money? (If No) What is the weak area? 
The answer was the multiple money transfers that may have been made without any 
control are helping to facilitate ML crime: “There is no limit on the movement of money 
because in 2010 the government allowed people to transfer a hundred thousand DLY 
without reference to the Libyan Central Bank’’. 
Fifth: The Manager of Auditing of the Central Bank of Libya:  
The contribute is to help understand the legal framework and accompanying restrictions 
that have been designed to stop money laundering, especially funds generated by illegal 
oil selling. Further, to know the limits or restrictions on the movement of funds. The 
proposed questions: 
1- What is your opinion on the current state of the anti-money laundering Act and the 
mechanisms used against money laundering especially from the illegal sale of oil in 
Libya? Is the Act clear and consistent? (If no). 
The answer was by providing mechanisms that encourage people to deal financially in 
other ways, such as “dealing in money in the form of cash should be limited’’. 
2. What is the procedure for detecting suspicious operations in money laundering from 
the illegal sale of oil in Libya? 
The answer was ‘‘the monitoring of suspicious money and transactions should be 
improved through the creation of a new mechanism to observe deposits, and comparing 
these to their regular income’’. Another way of creating a new mechanism to observe 
the income of sellers and those of traders, lawyers and businessmen to detect the 
suspicious operations was suggested during the interviews. 
3. Do you think this procedure is successful? (If no) How might the procedure be 
improved? Are there any means used by launderers that have been detected by this 
department? 
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The answer was recently, a case of suspicious ‘documentary credits ‘involving leading 
importers of food and pharmaceutical goods where fake goods were imported, dollars 
traded at black market prices and the evasion of custom duties has taken place. Traders 
transfer money to import goods at a subsidized price, but they transfer the money and 
do not import the goods. This is an example of financial corruption which should be 
controlled through collecting the personal details of the client, sources and direction of 
the goods and also by knowing all the details of the operation, ‘’details of the 
documentary credits should be collected and transactions monitored to reveal fake 
companies.’’. 
Sixth: The legal adviser at the Libyan FIU:  
The contribute the of this interview is to obtain accurate information that can be used 
to give a specific perspective on money laundering issues related to the illegal 
operations of oil and to find out the real facts and if there any figures. The proposed 
questions: 
1. What is the procedure for detecting suspicious operations in money laundering 
from the illegal sale of oil in Libya? 
The answer was “there is a specific step that can be used to detect suspicious operations, 
which is to observe sudden increases in a client's bank accounts, whether in their 
personal or business account which does not match with their normal income. So, if there 
are such abnormal changes, this could be suspicious and indicate that ML is taking place”. 
2- In your experience, are there any restrictions on the reporting procedures for 
suspicious money and transactions that are related to the illegal sale of oil in Libya? If 
there are, how might procedures be reformed? 
The answer was “There are no restrictions on the reporting procedures for suspicious 
money and transactions. The evidence of that is that there is no punishment against 
anyone who submits a report, if the result of the investigation is that there is no crime” 
3-Are there any problems with the enforcement of the Money Laundering Act against 
the illegal sale of oil in Libya? (If yes) What, in your opinion, are these problems? How 
might they be addressed? 
The answer was an important problem that was identified during the interviews was that 
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the Libyan AML system suffers from an absence of police inspectors who have been 
specifically allocated to combat this crime: “there is no police department dedicated to 
combating ML’’. 
Seventh: Two Former Court Judges: (contact with four retired judges of the 
Supreme Court of Libya):  
The contribute of this interview is to understand the context of the problem, and the 
convictions of people who have been involved in illegal oil selling and money laundering. 
This will help analyse the working nature of the legal authorities of Libya. The proposed 
questions: 
1. What is your opinion on the current state of the anti-money laundering Act and the 
mechanisms used against money laundering especially from the illegal sale of oil in 
Libya? Is the Act clear and consistent? (If no). 
The answer is the Law is not enough to curb ML crime due to that “even though the law 
includes some rules against ML crime; the enforcement of these rules is difficult, because 
this crime is sometimes committed by political officials, and the law does not include 
them’’. 
2. What is your opinion on the current effectiveness of the Money Laundering Act 2005 
particularly regard to in illegal sales of oil? 
The answer is “there is no training programme on ML to clarify matters for the staff of 
the Public Prosecutor or for judges to understand the rules of AML’’. He added that ‘’the 
Act is not enough because it is not line with the development of the means of ML, which 
are currently through using new technology ‘’. 
3. In your opinion what is the magnitude of money laundering crime in Libya by illegal 
sale of oil in Libya? What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? 
The answer ‘’the reasons behind increasing this crime that ''there are no statistics issued 
by the Unit; no publication of information and no reports on ML operations have been 
issued by the FIU''. 
4. What convictions have been recorded against people who have been involved in 
illegal oil selling and money laundering? 
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The answer ‘’ ML cases are very limited at the courts; the reason for that being that 
knowledge about this crime is limited’’. And he added “lack of facilities for testing the 
material which was suspected of being smuggled. In this case, it was decided to stop the 
investigation in spite of the claim that it was smuggled oil’’. 
Eight: Former: (Legal adviser of the Libyan National Oil Company): 
The aim of these interviews is to contribute providing fully understand the context of 
the problem, and how the oil smuggling has taken place in Libya, and the scale of money 
laundering crime from the illegal sale of oil in Libya. The proposed questions: 
1. How does money laundering take place? Also: How can it be prevented? 
The answer is ‘‘the illegal selling of oil derivatives is taking place through distribution 
stations to the neighbouring countries’’. He added “Security is obtained through 
observation of the border and through the link between the Customs Department and 
the border ports’’. 
2. In your opinion what is the scale of money laundering crime from the illegal sale of oil 
in Libya?  
The answer is ''the selling of oil is by international institutions to organisations that have 
been identified in advance, so illegal oil operations from the oil ports are impossible 
because of the difficulty in selling it (illegally acquired oil)’’ 
3. What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? 
The answer is ‘’so the provision of subsidy for oil derivatives has encouraged some people 
in Libya to smuggle it in order to earn the difference between the international price of 
the oil and the local, subsidized price.’’ 
Nine: The Libyan Ministry of Finance: 
The contribute of this interview is to discover facts which may be contained in 
documents that hint about the history of the problem and data on the losses of money. 
to determine the scale of the problem and the reasons behind this phenomenon 
The proposed questions: 
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1. Is it possible to identify the extent of proceeds of money laundering from the sale of 
oil in Libya? What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? 
The answer is ‘’there are no statistics issued by the Unit; no publication of information 
and no reports on ML operations have been issued by the FIU.   Similarly, there is 
evidence of the weakness of the procedures resulting in a lack of relevant statistics being 
available for court cases’’. 
And using liquid cash. There has been widespread use of liquid cash as a means of ML in 
cash operations, as they involve a higher risk, and work to reduce dependence on liquid 
cash so as to reduce the risk of dealing with it. An initiative such as this could be 
implemented by providing mechanisms that encourage people to deal financially in other 
ways, such as using cheques and to increase the public awareness in this direction. 
The other reson “The sale of illegal oil derivatives is happening through smuggling to 
neighbouring countries. The cause is the poverty in these counties and the low price of 
the oil derivatives in Libya compared to the price in these neighbouring counties”. 
2. What is the procedure for detecting suspicious operations in money laundering 
from the illegal sale of oil in Libya? 
The answer is “there is a specific step that can be used to detect suspicious operations, 
which is to observe sudden increases in a client's bank accounts, whether in their 
personal or business account which does not match with their normal income. So, if there 
are such abnormal changes, this could be suspicious and indicate that ML is taking 
place”. 
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Appendix C: Miscellaneous 
 
1- The creation the Basel Committee. 
The Basel Committee Statement of Principles was issued by the Basel Committee, and 
concerns the banks’ systems and supervisory practices. The Basel Committee was created 
by ten industrial countries 1974 in Basel, Switzerland. This was partly due to the collapse 
of some banks, such as the Herstatt Bank in Germany, and there were also some new 
risks raised805. One such was the potential credit risk when a contractual party fails to 
meet its obligations in accordance with the agreed terms806. The ten industrial countries 
that established the Basel Committee were: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
In December 1988, the Basel Committee adopted regulations and systems on Banking 
and Supervisory Practices – i.e. a statement of principles concerning ML. This statement 
was not enforceable until the member states decided to enforce the principles in 
accordance with their national legal regulations. 
The Bank for International Settlements added that the Committee continued to act 
against the risks - the mispricing of credit and liquidity risk and excess credit growth- 
during the following years until it published, in 1997, the basic principles of the 
supervisory system. At this point, capital adequacy- the ability of the components of 
capital to absorb losses- became the most important focus of the Committee's 
activities807. In 2012, a document was issued covering supervisory powers, the need for 
early intervention and timely supervisory actions; supervisory expectations of banks, and 
compliance with supervisory standards. The reason behind this was that the Bank for 
International Settlements considered that the development of the banking systems had 
recently eased the movement of money at global level808.  
                                                          
805 Pigman, G.A. (2005) Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State 
Governments and Non-State Economic Entities Diplomacy & Statecraft Vol.16, No 2 pp 385-401 (p.388). 
806Brown, K and Moles P. (2012) Credit Risk Management Edinburgh Business School Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh 
UK (p.2). 
807Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A Brief History of the Basel 
Committee (2013 p.2) Available at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf (Accessed in 1 Oct 2014). 
808Bank for International Settlements ibid (2014 p.2). 
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The target of the Statement of Principles is to protect the banking system by preventing 
its use for laundering money and to broadcast confidence in banking institutions through 
cooperation between financial institutions worldwide. Moreover, this Statement of 
Principles obliges internationally active banks to adopt the basic principles of the Basel 
Committee809. The Principles have the role of controlling the banking system to ensure 
financial stability and legal bank operations. In addition, they serve to combat ML by 
organised gangs that would generate huge proceeds, which in turn would finance new 
crimes810. 
2-Other money laundering means.  
2.1 -Drug Trafficking. 
In some countries, drug trafficking is the most lucrative criminal activity811. The United 
States became the main market for drugs that come from Mexico, as both countries share 
a long border. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) World Drug 
Report, the estimated annual revenues from the illicit drugs export trade from Mexico, 
Myanmar, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Afghanistan to the United States, Canada, Western 
Europe, Russia, and China, and the global estimated was US$88 billion812. 
The US decided to fight against drugs in 1970813and attempted to do this by following the 
trail of drugs to the US. However, criminal organisations have continued to traffic in drugs, 
and launder the money to make it difficult to identify its illegal origin. As a result, the 
international community adopted the recommendations of the FATF, which have 
impacted on the banking system, including the recommendations relating to reporting of 
suspicious transactions. These were aimed at tracking the sources of money, derived from 
organised crime and drug trafficking, as Tang and Ai have noted814. 
2.2- Human Smuggling and Trafficking. 
As this study, has mentioned above, there are many different methods of ML; one of them 
involves international migration. Therefore, it is not limited to a particular state, but 
                                                          
809Arner, D. (2007) Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law: Cambridge University Press (p.287). 
810 Bashir, H and Abraham, A. ibid (2011 p.86). 
811 Bagley, B. Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty First Century. one 
Woodrow Wilson Plaza Washington (2012 p.5) Available at: 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf [Accessed in 14 Jun 2016]. 
812United Nations Report. World Drug Report 2010 - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010 p.53) 
813 Sacco, L. N. (2014) Drug Enforcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends. Congressional research 
service (p.1). 
814 Tang, J and Ai, L. (2013) The system integration of anti-money laundering data reporting and customer relationship 
management in commercial banks. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol.16, No 3 pp 31-56 (p.232). 
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includes many different countries. This crime has many variants, differing from one place 
to another, where one of these is human trafficking; for example, smuggling women and 
children for many purposes, such as prostitution, sexual exploitation, the sale of human 
organs, forced labour, etc. In many cases, it is related to the exploitation of domestic 
workers, and the sale of children for adoption, forced marriage, and sex tourism. The 
smuggling of children is also linked to involvement of children in armed conflict, sexual 
exploitation of minors, and begging. Human trafficking, as one of the activities of 
organised criminal gangs, and even where there are no elements of organised crime, is 
an activity that generates millions of dollars at the expense of degradation of human 
dignity, and psychological and physical harm815. 
Human trafficking represents an important source of profit for organised crime only 
slightly less lucrative than drug trafficking, and arms trading and it generates billions of 
dollars annually in illicit funds. As an example, Bjeloper & Finklea have estimated that in 
2006, human trafficking in the US generates about $9.5 billion for organised crime each 
year816. In the same way, the NCA in 2017 has confirmed that drug trafficking to the UK 
costs an estimated £10.7 billion per year817. According to Salt, in this context, organised 
criminal gangs seek to promote their criminal activities by increasing their ability to 
penetrate legitimate business to cover the source of their proceeds, i.e. the phenomenon 
of ML. Globalisation has unintentionally benefited organised crime gangs, who took 
advantage of movement in international trade, and used the tools of maritime shipping 
for the illegal movement of human beings818. 
3- The Islamic Regulation of Money Laundering 
As this study, has discussed in Chapter Six, Libya was governed by Gaddafi's regime for 
approximately 42 years without a constitution, but it has a Declaration of the Authority 
of the People issued in 1977 which transcends on all other legislation in Libya. This 
Declaration states that Shari’ah is the source of all the regulations issued in the country. 
                                                          
815 See Financial Action Task Force Report. Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and 
Smuggling of Migrants (2011, p.17). 
816 Bjeloper, J. and Finklea, K (2012) Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement Congressional 
Research Service CRS Report for Congress DIANE Publishing. (p.6). 
817 See NCA, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report  (2017 p.33) available at 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/suspicious-activity-reports-sars/826-suspicious-activity-
reports-annual-report-2017/file (accessed in 22/11/2018). 
818 Salt, J. (2000) Trafficking and Human Smuggling a European Perspective: International Migration Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd UK Vol.38, No 3 pp 31-56 (p.35). 
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The Libyan revolution in 2011 aimed to create a democratic country based on a 
constitution and Libyan institutions are still striving to achieve this. The constitution which 
is currently being prepared by a special committee will include Islamic Shari’ah, so this 
section this will discuss ML in Islamic law and how Shari’ah has addressed this crime. 
As this study, has argued, the term ‘ML’ was first used in the 1920s; but, 
Islamic regulations addressed ML as an illegal action 1400 years ago, however, as this 
study discussed earlier, ML is a crime based on another, primary crime as some sources 
of money; and Islamic regulations did not address ML directly, but focused on the sources 
of illegal money. Thus, in this context, this study will suggest that the definition of ML in 
Islamic regulations relates to how Islamic rules addressed the means of ML and its 
criminalization of this phenomenon. 
3.1- Criminal Liability in Shari’ah 
Criminality in Shari’ah is constituted by three necessary elements. The legal element 
requires that an act needs to be explicitly prohibited by legal provision as an unlawful act 
(Al-haram). The material element requires the commission of an unlawful act by an 
offender; and the penal element of crime addresses the “maturity, capability and 
accountability” of an offender. The crime thus involves intention, whereby the offender 
has thought about the action and decided to take the action, which becomes a crime 
when the offender starts to act on the decision. In Shari’ah this action is a crime even if 
the offender is unable to complete the action819.  
3.2-The Criminalization of Theft and Corruption in Islam 
In general, the provisions of Shari’ah law forbid any activities funded by money or assets 
derived from illegal sources. For instance, “any activities build from Soht (unlawful trade) 
will be cast into fire” as Prophet Mohammad said820. So, according to this text, all 
proceeds of illegal origin, including theft and the drug trade, are taboo. In the holy Qur’an, 
Allah says ‘And eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity’821. ‘Eating property 
in vanity’ can be interpreted to include all illegal actions to get gains. 
                                                          
819Tofangsaz, H. ibid (2012 p.401) 
820 Ibid (p.402). 
821Holy Qur’an Surah Baqarah 188. 
280 
 
3.4-Anti- Money Laundering in Islamic Regulations 
As this study, has explained above Shari’ah has addressed the means of earning money, 
and stipulates that the earned money must be acquired the Halal way (a way that is lawful 
and permitted in Islam) and not come from illegal acts such as theft, theft, embezzlement, 
bribery, corruption, corrupt contracts or riba(which means unjustified increments earned 
above the amount of loan, as a condition imposed by the lender or voluntarily by the 
borrower. Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks must follow Islamic religion, which 
prohibits riba). Thus, Islamic rules criminalize theft and corruption etc..., which are the 
primary crimes of ML; and under Shari’ah, criminals are requested to return any money 
that is described as illegitimate, as will be discussed later. 
4- The controversies of the International Criminalization of Money 
Laundering 
There are controversies about the criminalization of ML between supporters and 
opponents of the criminalization of this phenomenon. Tahar believes that opinions differ 
about ML criminalization because there are enough domestic regulations that cover ML 
cases, and thus some believe there is no need for a specific international legislation on 
ML. The criminalization of ML has restricted the movement of capital and investment 
activity, threatens bank privacy data and, as a result, investors will be reluctant to 
establish projects822. Additionally, it is difficult to prove that proceeds came from illegal 
activity, because a link needs to be demonstrated between illegal activities and the illegal 
proceeds gained by the accused. Moreover, this will lead to difficulty in punishing the 
criminal for one of the illegal actions, which is in violation of the legitimacy principle823.In 
the other words, the element of intention should be provided in this crime, and criminal 
intent is very difficult to prove. The reason is that it is difficult to prove that the criminal 
knew that the source of the proceeds was illegal. Thus, in this case, to criminalize this 
action requires criminal intent to be ignored, that will lead to results contrary to the 
legitimacy principle. Furthermore, until evidence is provided that the crime has taken 
place, the Penal Act cannot be used enforced until litigation is finished. However, due to 
the importance of the role of ML in serious crime all over the world, I believe that 
separate legislation needs to be enacted to prevent this crime. It is essential to curb the 
                                                          
822Tahar, M. ibid (2004 p. 18).   
823Kalid, M. Ibid (2011 p.99). 
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negative effects of this crime on the national and international economies and to achieve 
stability in the financial markets.  
ML can be seen as a global threat because of the serious risks it poses to national and 
international economies. ML crime may corrode the banking system if fraud is endemic 
at a bank where crime is taking place and is even participated in by bank personnel. Such 
activities increase the possibility that the entire bank will become corrupt and follow 
criminal interests. It is thus essential to limit the potential for these kinds of offence which 
generate enormous amounts of illegal money824. The ML process has many complicated 
and sophisticated steps, different stages and the launderers have knowledge about the 
banks' operations. This situation clearly demonstrates the need to adopt legislation 
against ML that ensures it will be dealt with and obliges the banks to report any suspicious 
operations825. 
In response to the argument that it is difficult to prove that proceeds are related to illegal 
activity, Mostefa has replied that the difficulty of proof is not just in ML crime but could 
be the case in any crime; for example, in the case of forgery, the accused must be shown 
to have an intention to use the fake documents. Therefore, ‘difficulty of proof’ should be 
no reason to prevent issuing a specific ML legislation826. Similarly, Mostefa has countered 
the argument that AML law will negatively affect direct investment by pointing out that 
illegally obtained money is invested specifically to launder it; as soon as this aim is 
achieved, the launderer will transfer the money, causing severe losses to other parties. 
Thus, a specific AML Act should be issued to curb this crime827. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
824 Amrani, H. Ibid (2012 p.82).  
825 Tahar, M. ibid (2004 p.24). 
826Mustafa, K. ibid (2008 p.77). 
827 ibid. 
